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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, social scientists have had access to a wide range of quantitative data
from administrative records and surveys in order to better understand the dynamics
of human capital formation at the school and the workplace. Skills development for
students and workers are at the center of public policies. Understanding the drivers
and consequences of education policies as well as the dynamics of the labor market is
becoming a more achievable task thanks to those data sources and therefore contributes
to a more rigorous approach of social sciences. At the same time, inequalities in student
and workers opportunities persist and, if anything, recent social and economic devel-
opments have increasingly generated challenges for policy-makers in developed and
developing countries.
In education policy, emerging questions are now being answered with a wealth of
quantitative data from administrative sources as well as from national and interna-
tional assessments. The field of economics of education has opened up new layers of
promising research. Moreover, the discipline is now in a better position to answer old
and new questions with broader experience in terms of identifying causal effects of
specific policy developments. For example, the continuity of national and international
assessments worldwide in recent decades has allowed a wide range of research ques-
tions on the determinants of learning outcomes to be addressed. At the same time,
administrative data records collected by education authorities in charge of managing
school networks serve as primary sources to understand student dynamics across the
schools within a specific district. In short, more research is now available with respect
1
2to enrollment patterns, demand for schooling, or school network policies.
With respect to the economics of skills and jobs, changes in labor demand patterns in
recent decades are raising new questions with regard to what to expect in terms of the
future labor force and the new skills that are required in the workplace. Technological
change, together with other social and economic forces, is altering the demand for new
jobs, while other jobs are moved out of the labor market. Such changes are transforming
the tasks performed by workers in advanced economies, generating winners and losers.
In the last two decades, the research on skills and labor economics has sought to identify
the skill requirements at work by means of surveys on work task requirements. This
has helped to better understand more in depth the conceptualization of the new job
task requirements presented in the seminal work by Autor et al. (2003).
This thesis seeks to contribute to these two lines of economic research with three
essays of empirical analysis that exploit administrative and survey data from students
and workers. Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 correspond to each of the three essays
and Chapter 5 revisits the findings from those three chapters, discusses the contribu-
tions and limitations of the analysis, and concludes with a more open discussion on the
policy implications.
In Chapter 2, ”The PISA shock in the Basque Country”, I explore the reasons why
the Basque Country region in Northern Spain experienced a great setback in the 2015
secondary education PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) results.
The Basque education system had been a top performer among Spanish regions in the
past, both in national and international assessments, and its relevance in terms of post-
secondary education enrollment is comparable to that of Northern European educa-
tion systems. Hence, understanding this decline becomes a key question from a policy
point of view, even so when the PISA results were accompanied by declines in regional
assessments implemented by the Basque authorities (which validate the concerns of
policy-makers and society regarding structural changes in the Basque education sys-
tem). In particular, I explore the reasons of the decline by looking at socio-economic
factors (given the impact of the Great Recession in the region), along with school fac-
tors in the Basque education system. I pay specific attention to factors that may be
related to the very nature of the system, such as its linguistic education policy model,
the coexistence of public and private provision of education services or the high rates
of repetition experienced by the region compared to OECD and EU averages. I use
3decomposition techniques derived from the labor economics literature, to both under-
stand average changes in performance between 2015 with respect to previous editions
(2009 and 2012), as well as changes across the distribution of scores.
Chapter 3, ”School Choice, Student Mobility and School Segregation in Madrid”,
addresses a key historical question from the economics of education literature, which
relates school choice and student sorting. Over the last four decades, there has been
extensive academic debate in the field of economics on whether more choice should
be granted to students in school districts or school networks. Whereas proponents ar-
gue for the benefits of market-based education policies as drivers of improvement of
outcomes, opponents claim that excessive choice leads to social sorting and segrega-
tion due to the diverse responses of households to reforms. While the first argument
(improvement of performance) presents mixed evidence and points to the importance
of contextual and implementation factors, the second discussion (sorting of students)
seems to show evidence in the direction of more segregation of students across schools.
Nevertheless, the evidence on this last argument presents validity issues: a recent lit-
erature discussion by Epple, Romano, and Urquiola (2017) argues that the evidence
from large-scale programs has clear identification issues, as these are usually imple-
mented country-wide. In my work with David Mayor and Jose´ Montalba´n1, we try
to address this research gap by studying a large-scale reform in the administrative re-
gion of Madrid, which provides education services to more than one million students.
In particular, the city of Madrid shifted in 2013 to an inter-district single school zone
for students entering the system. By using a unique and high-quality administrative
record of student application data, we study the response of households to the reform.
We do so by, first, looking at mobility patterns of students, paying special attention to
heterogeneous responses by social and immigrant status of households. Consequently,
we measure the overall impact in terms of student segregation (or sorting) according
to such student characteristics. To better describe the policy effects, we consider a di-
verse set of reasons (income of the district, school ownership, or student composition
of demanded schools) that may be behind the changes in responses and the new com-
position of students across schools. An important contribution is that we are able use
other municipalities that implemented the reform at the same time (or the year before)
as a control group, in order to strengthen our identification strategy.
1This chapter is co-authored with David Mayor (Solchaga and Recio Asociados) and Jose´ Montalba´n
(Paris School of Economics). All authors contributed equally to the production and writing of the chapter.
4In the research presented in Chapter 4, and jointly conducted with Sara de la Rica2,
we use the OECD’s survey on adult skills PIAAC (Programme for International As-
sessment of Adult Competencies) to address differences on job tasks across a harmo-
nized sample of 20 countries across the world for the first time by using very precise
information on job contents at worker level. This implies an important measurement
contribution of the task content of jobs, given that this literature usually builds from
occupation-level data and overlooks within-occupation heterogeneity of the task con-
tent of jobs (Autor, 2013). Moreover, additional data on worker ability (which allows
to control for unobserved heterogeneity) is available. First, as a validity analysis, the
task measures constructed with PIAAC data are compared at the occupation level to
those from O*NET, the most well-known data source in the literature. In addition, the
relationship between job contents and individual and job characteristics as well as with
computer use at work, both across and within occupations, is assessed. Finally, we con-
sider the relationship between job tasks and wages, assuming that workers self-select
into occupations based on comparative advantage.
2This chapter is co-authored with Sara de la Rica (UPV-EHU and Fedea). Both authors contributed
equally to the production and writing of the chapter.
Chapter 2
The PISA ”shock” in the Basque
Country
2.1 Introduction
The cognitive skills of secondary school students in the Basque Country (Spain), mea-
sured by the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), experi-
enced a significant decline in 2015 relative to previous rounds. In particular, results
published in December 2016 displayed two key relevant findings. First, 15-year old
students of the Basque education system (born in 1999) obtained lower levels of read-
ing, mathematics and scientific skills than their peers three and six years before, with
statistically significant declines in mathematics (13 PISA points), and especially science
(23 PISA points). Second, for the first time, this implied that the Basque regional edu-
cation system was for the first time below the average mean scores in Spain for two out
of the three competencies assessed in PISA (science and reading).
The PISA outcomes for the Basque country were not a surprise for the regional au-
thorities and stakeholders. Following the introduction of a new Education Act (LOE
(3/2006)), the Basque Country developed its own external diagnosis assessments (Eval-
uacio´n Diagno´stica) in 2009, consisting of a competency-based test organized for both
primary (Year 4) and secondary (Year 2 of lower secondary education, the equivalent
to Year 8) students, which were run every two years. The 2015 results of such regional
assessments which were published in early 2016 already showed a decline in several
5
6assessed competencies (language, mathematics and scientific competencies) for both
primary and secondary students taking the test1. Although the cohorts of students
taking the assessments did not correspond to the same one which sat in PISA (most
of them being in Year 10 in 2015), these trends were in the same direction as the ones
observed in PISA outcomes in 2015.
The PISA assessment has shaped public debates and promoted a new paradigm in
the global education discussion and the governance of education systems (see Sellar
and Lingard (2014)). Since it was first conducted in 2000, there have been numerous
examples of education systems being highly influenced by unexpected PISA results
through the public discussion and the policy direction taken by governments around
the world (see Breakspear (2012)). The results in the Basque Country (which has par-
ticipated with enough schools to generate its own representative sample since 2003)
generated significant attention in the media for weeks, and the main issue raised by the
coverage was to understand the reasons for the decline.
This paper explores such reasons and sheds light on the factors behind the decline,
by looking at student, school and system factors. I construct a harmonized dataset for
the Basque country for the five rounds in which the region has participated so far (2003,
2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015). The PISA student assessment has been historically accom-
panied by a student and school questionnaire, hence allowing for an analysis of the
weight of underlying factors in shaping student outcomes. The periodicity of certain
key student and school background questionnaire items is not safely guaranteed, and
hence requires common items to be selected across years for consistent comparisons.
The Basque education system is characterized by two school networks (public and
privately run) of equal size which are both funded by the Department of Education of
the Basque Government. Being a multilingual region (Basque and Spanish, with the
latter being the main language of use), the system of instructionis organized into three
different linguistic models. Finally, the system has experienced two important changes
in the last decade, such as the arrival of a large number of immigrant families and the
social and economic consequences of the Great Recession.
Considering all these and other factors, I find that the decline in test scores in 2015,
relative to previous editions is mostly unrelated to changes in socioeconomic charac-
teristics of students. Conversely, I find three important factors to be behind the decline
1See ISEI-IVEI (2016b) and ISEI-IVEI (2016a).
7in student outcomes since 2009 and 2012: the rate of student repeaters, the percentage
of students taking the test in a language different to the one at home, and the changes
in the perceived disciplinary climate and student behavior at school by the school prin-
cipal. Depending on the baseline year (2009 or 2012) and the domain of comparison
(science, mathematics or reading), the estimated difference effects account for between
20% and 90% of the total observed decline. Hence, an important proportion of the
decline remains unexplained.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the literature
related to changes in education quality in education systems using cross-section data.
Section 2.3 describes the Basque education system and its most recent context. The
PISA data collection process and the construction of harmonized dataset is detailed in
Section 2.4. The results and its analysis are shown in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 provides a
final discussion and concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper is well related to the literature which has sought to address country changes
(or cross-country differences) in learning outcomes. The literature mostly uses data
from international assessments, such as PIRLS, TIMSS or PISA, and analyzes differ-
ences in student outcomes across countries or years by isolating the explanatory power
of each observable factor that can affect student learning. Ammermueller (2007) finds
ambiguous results in explaining the differences in PISA performance between Finland
and Germany. Additionally, other authors have studied the gap differences between
countries or regions (Nieto and Ramos (2015); Ojima and Von Below (2010)). Other
studies have analyzed the nature of certain observable gaps within countries: Ramos
et al. (2012) analyze the dynamics of rural-urban gaps in Colombia using PISA data and
find that most of the differences are attributable to family characteristics as opposed to
those of the school. Finally, another group of studies has looked at the differences across
years for specific countries. Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011) look at the increase in PISA per-
formance in Indonesia between 2003 and 2006 and find that almost the entire test score
increase is explained by the returns to characteristics, mostly related to student age.
However, the authors find that the adequate supply of teachers also plays a role in test
8score changes. In Bulgaria, Gortazar et al. (2014) look at the large improvements ex-
perienced in PISA scores between 2006 and 2012: they find that the improvements of
student socioeconomic characteristics as well as the improvements in school resources
account for most of the performance changes.
The decomposition methods have often been used in the labor economics literature
to understand the nature of wage gaps or wage dynamics across time. In the case of
the education literature, decomposition studies have also looked at mean differences in
student learning outcomes using the Oaxaca (1973) method. Nevertheless, from an edu-
cation policy perspective, decomposition methods at the mean may end up missing key
information that is fundamental to understand student learning dynamics. Recent em-
pirical methods in the labor economics literature have brought new econometric tech-
niques to analyze wage gaps and wage inequality by computing counter-factual de-
compositions throughout the whole wage distribution (DiNardo et al. (1996), Machado
and Mata (2005) and Firpo et al. (2007)). These methods have the advantage of intro-
ducing in a less restrictive assumption on the relation between observable independent
variables and the outcome variable of interest: that is, that factor differences across
groups or changes across years may not be affecting outcomes similarly across the dis-
tribution.
A similar assumption can hold for the education production function literature: that
education policies and student and family factors may have a different influence on
learning across student performance distribution, and that the changes across years in
such factors may not be the same for all students. For example, it may well be the
case that after the increase of immigrant population in the Basque school system, the
learning outcomes of immigrant and non-immigrant students may have changed due
to changes in the peer effect mechanisms, the composition of immigrant population
(with different cultural and language backgrounds) at schools, or the organization of
teaching within schools with a sudden large share of immigrant students. Hence, while
student covariates may change across years (a larger share of immigrant population),
the relation between immigrant population and student outcomes may change from a
distributional perspective too.
The Firpo et al. (2007) decomposition has already been used in the decomposition
literature with education production functions. For example, Lounkaew (2013) uses
a Firpo-Fortin-Lemieux approach to decompose differences between rural and urban
9student performance in Thailand using PISA 2009 data. Moreover, Gouss and Ledonn
(2014) look at the changes in the inequities of performance in France between 2000
and 2009 following a similar approach. They find that disadvantaged socioeconomic
background has become even more penalizing to learning in 2009 compared to 2000. In
addition, two educational policies seem to explain a large part of the rise in the decrease
of low-achieving students: changes in sorting practices (through repetition policies)
and changes in special education policies. Finally, the study from Gortazar et al. (2014)
in Bulgaria extends the mean decomposition estimation to quantiles, and finds that
among low-performing students, the improvement of school resources accounted for a
large share of the increase, whereas among high-performing students, the improvement
of socioeconomic conditions and the changes in peer composition at schools accounted
for most of the learning improvements.
2.3 The Basque Education System and its Context
This section describes the key elements of the Basque education system, the recent
trends and background factors which have occurred in the last years, and the extent
to which these may have had an incidence in student learning outcomes. The Basque
school system is a self-managed and self-financed model through its own tax sys-
tem2, although it is subject to Spanish regulation for basic issues3. In the school year
2014/2015, the system served 369,000 students between kindergarten and upper sec-
ondary (both general and vocational) education4. The system is organized around two
distinct school networks of equal size, both publicly funded, and one being publicly
managed (Centros Pu´blicos) whereas the other is privately run (Centros concertados) 5.
Although the admission criteria for students are similar in both school networks and
depend on public regulation set by the Basque government, there are three important
2The three provinces of the Basque Country, along with the region of Navarra, are granted constitu-
tional rights to have their own tax system, through which they finance their public services and for which
they pay an estimated amount covering the proportion of competencies that are not transferred by the
central government.
3According to the Spanish Constitution, the Spanish central government regulates the conditions for
granting and providing education diplomas and develops the basic norms for the implementation of Arti-
cle 27, which recognized simultaneously the right to education and the freedom of education and teaching.
4Source: EUSTAT.
5Moreover, a minority of 0.8% of students attend privately funded schools, which represents the lowest
share among all Spanish autonomous communities.
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differences between the two school networks. First, the school management criteria dif-
fer: privately run schools are legal entities with budgetary autonomy to distribute all
resources (given a set of rules fixed by the public administration) within the school and
to hire and fire staff following the standard labor code. Conversely, public schools are
managed by the Department of Education, with all staff mostly being civil servants6,
and the principal being a civil servant teacher appointed by a committee comprising
representatives of the education authority and the school board in question. The sec-
ond main difference is that the access to privately run schools is in practice not fully
free of charge: although parents are not meant to pay for basic education services, in
practice, the lack of sufficient public funding generates the needs of those schools to
obtain alternative sources of funding (Rogero-Garcı´a and Andre´s-Candelas (2018)). In
particular, given that charging fees in these schools is not legal, schools expect house-
holds to contribute with private donations or symbolic fees which end up acting as an
entry barrier. This means de facto that the privately run school network of schools acts
as a semi-public service rather than a full public service, a definition (semi-public) that
we adopt following Calsamiglia and Gu¨ell (2018)7. Partially because of this, the third
difference has to do with the differences in student composition: privately run schools
serve on average a more socially advantaged population and a much smaller share of
immigrant children, whereas public schools serve a more disadvantaged student pop-
ulation, including most of the immigrant children in the Basque Country8.
In recent years, the system has experienced three important phenomena that have
affected the structure of the Basque education and hence, may have impacted the re-
sults on student outcomes. First, as a bilingual region where two languages (Spanish
and Basque) coexist, the Basque country organizes its education system along three dif-
ferent school streams in terms of language of instruction: the A model (Spanish as the
main language of instruction and Basque being taught as a single subject), the B model
(which balances the weight of both languages in terms of hours of instruction) and the
D model (Basque being the main language of instruction, and Spanish being taught
as a single subject). Since the early 2000, the number of schools with Basque as main
language of instruction (model D) has increased significantly as part of an effort by the
Basque public administration to increase the percentage of bilingual citizens. By 2015,
6A small proportion of public school teachers hold fixed-term appointments.
7According to the Basque statistical agency EUSTAT on the recent data available in 2012, parents paid
an average annual fee of e707.6 for basic education services (without considering complementary activi-
ties or services) to semi-public schools in the Basque education system.
8Source: Departamento de Educacio´n Polı´tica Lingu¨ı´stica y Cultura: Basque Government (2016)
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almost two thirds of students in lower secondary schools studied under the Basque
language immersion model (through the D model).
This means that, given the linguistic demography of the region (with almost 75%
of the population declaring Spanish as the mother tongue and main language used at
home9), an increasing share of students with Spanish as mother tongue attend schools
with a Basque immersion program under the D model. Whereas the advantages of
being fluent in both languages have been identified from the cognitive psychology lit-
erature (bilingual education, especially early in life, has a long-term positive impact on
cognitive development10) and labor economics literature (speaking the two languages
increases job opportunities in adult life11), these can be offset in the short-term by a de-
crease of learning outcomes, given the positive effects that mother tongue instruction
(usually in primary) has on short-term academic outcomes (Ivlevs and King (2014)).
Moreover, beyond the language of instruction, the language used to administer the test
can also have implications on student outcomes. This is what is found in the different
exploratory analyses conducted by the Basque Institute for Research and Evaluation in
Education (ISEI-IVEI), a public agency answering to the Basque Department of Edu-
cation. Using data from previous PISA rounds and the regional assessments, students
enrolled in the linguistic D model with Spanish as the language used at home display
better outcomes when taking the test in Spanish as opposed to taking it in Basque (ISEI-
IVEI (2004); ISEI-IVEI (2012)).
The other major background event in the Basque education system is the surge in
foreign-born children living in the Basque country and therefore using the Basque ed-
ucation system. In particular, the proportion of immigrant students rose from 2% in
2002 to almost 8.4% in 201512, with many of these students coming from countries
whose language has not Latin origin and they therefore have lower cultural language
links with the native population13. This phenomenon has increased the pressure on the
system to provide quality education to a more diverse student population, and at the
9Source:EUSTAT
10See Costa and Sebastia´n-Galle´s (2014)
11Cappellari and Di Paolo (2015) find positive results to bilingual education in Catalonia (Spain), a
region which like the Basque Country also implemented Catalan immersion programs at schools. Prior to
that, Angrist and Lavy (1997) find positive returns to bilingual education in the labor market in Morocco.
12Source: EUSTAT
13Source: Basque Government Departamento de Educacio´n Polı´tica Lingu¨ı´stica y Cultura: Basque Gov-
ernment (2016). In the school year 2014/2015, there were 35,804 foreign-born students in the basic educa-
tion schools, out of which only 8,899 (around 25%) were born in Latin American countries and 5,270 were
born in EU countries (around 15%), whereas 14,436 (more than 40%) where born in African countries.
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same time may have altered the peer effects dynamics between students from different
backgrounds, as well as the enrollment dynamics of families when the vast majority of
children enter schools at age 3.
Even though the Basque Country is one of the richest autonomous communities in
Spain, the Great Recession also greatly impacted the Basque economy (and hence, on
employment and public finances) when compared to other European countries or re-
gions. According to the Basque Government’s statistical Agency (EUSTAT) the regional
GDP decreased by 7.5 percentage points between 2008 and 2013, whereas the unem-
ployment rate boomed from 3.5% to 16.6% in the same period. In terms of education
financing, the decline of economic activity and the pressure on autonomous communi-
ties from Spanish and European authorities to meet deficit goals led to a decrease in the
regional public executed education budget of %15.5 between 2009 and 201514. These
two factors (unemployment and budget cuts) may have had significantly negatively
impacted learning outcomes that could first be observed in education assessments such
like PISA 2015, and would not be a surprise according to recent evidence. On the one
hand, evidence from another autonomous community in Spain (Catalonia) has shown a
causal relation between parental job loss and the decline of student performance (Ruiz-
Valenzuela (2015)). On the other hand, Jakcson et al. (2018) have recently shown that
the spending cuts that have occurred in the US during the Great Recession are causally
linked to a decrease in student outcomes and graduation rates.
The changes in these important factors (linguistic models, immigration, economic
crisis) may have been important in shaping the results of the student population in the
Basque education system observed in national and international assessments. Beyond
these, another two important characteristics that are idiosyncratic to the Basque educa-
tion system are its large share of pre-primary enrollment and the prevalence of grade
repetition. In the Basque country, more than 90% of children start kindergarten as early
as age 2, and almost 50% of children are already attending childcare centers at age 115.
These numbers place the Basque country region as high as Denmark or Iceland, the
OECD countries with the largest enrollment rates in kindergarten(OECD (2016a)16).
14According to the Basque Department of Finance, the public executed budget in education by the
Basque Government, which includes services from kindergarten to tertiary education, decreased from
e3,021 million in 2009 to e2,552 million in 2015, with the lowest investment made in 2014, with e2,441
million. For more information see aurrekontuak.irekia.euskadi.eus.
15Source: Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (Spain).
16Source: See Education at a Glance 2017
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The other key feature of the system is grade repetition. Grade repetition is a preva-
lent policy in Southern European education systems due to cultural inheritance of as-
sessment practices at the school level (Eurydice (2011)), and the Basque Country is not
exempted from large share of repeaters, both when compared to OECD and EU stan-
dards. Grade repetition has shown to be an inefficient policy, which does not obtain
expected results in terms of providing adequate opportunities to students lagging be-
hind (Hattie (2008); Manacorda (2012); Jacob and Lefgren (2009)). Garcı´a-Pe´rez et al.
(2014) find for the Spanish case that grade retention has a negative impact on educa-
tional outcomes. At the same time, in Spain in general, and in the Basque Country in
particular, students from the most disadvantaged backgrounds are the ones that bear
the negative costs of repeating, as the policy disproportionately affects this group, no
matter what their cognitive skills are (OECD (2014)).
2.4 Data and Variables
2.4.1 The PISA Dataset
I use the data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in 2015,
a triennial assessment which provides information on countries and economies’ educa-
tion systems. It does by means of an assessment taken by 15-year olds which focus on
three domains (reading, mathematics and science), and which does not only ascertain
whether students can reproduce knowledge; it also examines how well students can
extrapolate, reflect, evaluate and communicate what they have learned and can apply
it in unfamiliar settings, in different contexts inside and outside the school. This ap-
proach is set to be key in the context of modern economies, which rewards individuals
not for what they know, but for what they can do with it.
In the PISA 2015 wave, for example, 71 countries and an additional set of subnational
regions (such as the Basque Country) participated. The data included a country random
sample of usually 100 to 150 schools per country, with around 30 students per school
responding to a two-hour test with multiple choice and open questions. In each edition,
the test focused on one of the three domains of study: in 2000 it started with the reading
domain, in 2003 it continued with the mathematics domain and in 2006 it moved to the
scientific domain. Following this order, the 2015 edition focused for the second time on
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the scientific domain.
PISA, in the same way as other large scale studies, uses an Item Response Theory
(IRT) approach to transform the student item responses into competency scales. It does
so by providing different plausible values for each subject area derived from taking
random draws out of the distribution resulted from the IRT scaling process. This is
because not all students respond to all items and domains (in order to keep their at-
tention on the test) and hence the OECD derives an estimated probability distribution
out of the items answered. For the first time, PISA 2015 edition displayed a model
resulting in 10 plausible values for each of the three domains, an improvement with
respect to previous editions, as it enlarged the usual 5 plausible values of the previous
PISA rounds. I use plausible values in the analysis when feasible, which allows me to
produce more consistent standard errors. The estimates that I produce in the next sec-
tion are hence derived from computing average estimates of each parameter obtained
in regression models on plausible value scores, as well as the adjusted standard errors
of these estimates17.
Moreover, PISA provides rich data from the student and school background ques-
tionnaires. Students answer questions related to their family and home, their views
about life, their school, their schedule and learning time, their learning experience and
their views about learning. Principals, on the other hand, answer questions related to
the school background information, the school management, the teaching staff, the as-
sessment and evaluation practices, the organization of learning across student groups,
and the school disciplinary and behavioral climate. These two questionnaires cover a
wide range of questions for students and principals to answer. However, the question-
naires have not been identical across years: in particular, many student and principal
questions focus on the domain of study at each PISA round (reading, mathematics or
science) and the learning and teaching practices around that domain, which means that
many items of the questionnaire are not comparable across all years. Other questions
simply change the item answers by restructuring them or substituting some of them by
new adjusted categories. Hence, in order to construct a harmonized and comparable
dataset, I restrict myself to use item questions that are strictly comparable across years,
so that these are domain-free (or domain related for the case of science comparisons
between 2006 and 2015) and they follow the same answer categories.
17I do so by using the REPEST command in STATA (Avvisati and Keslair (2016))
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2.4.2 Variable Description
I examine several dimensions that affect learning and which have been well studied in
previous empirical studies using national and international data sources. I also con-
sider idiosyncratic variables of the Basque education system described in the previous
section. To do this, I group variables by student characteristics, school characteristics
and systemic characteristics.
With respect to student characteristics, I include student’s gender, age (through month
of birth), language at home, and the nationality of birth. I include the Index of Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Status (ESCS), constructed by the OECD based on parental
education, occupation and home possessions, to consider the socioeconomic dimen-
sion. Moreover, I consider variables related to student’s prior education history, such
as the fact of having repeated one or two grades in the past. I do not include the vari-
able of years in pre-primary education, as there was a change in the question structure
for 201518.
The second group of variables includes school characteristics, behavior and climate
and learning and teaching practices. First, I consider the average socioeconomic status
of students in the school, which I compute by calculating the average score of the ESCS
Index for all students in a specific school. I also consider student wellbeing variables,
such as items related to learning anxiety, learning motivation and sense of belonging
at the school. I consider teacher and student behavior variables. For the case of sci-
entific questions (which I observe in 2006 and 2015 because of the focus on the science
domain), I include variables related to perceptions of scientific learning, reported by
students, such as self-efficacy in science, or science learning enjoyment.
The third group of variables considers elements which are observed at the school
level but determined at the system level. I first pick the two main idiosyncratic vari-
ables, which at the same time are the two variables through which the sample strat-
ification is conducted: the ownership of the school (public or semi-public) and the
linguistic model of instruction (A, B or D) in the school. Moreover, I consider other
dimensions such as the level of autonomy of the school (measured by the two OECD
18The attending pre-primary school variable in 2015 is organized in terms of age of entrance to kinder-
garten. This represents a change with respect to previous editions, where this variable was framed by the
number of years of schooling before primary education, and hence does not allow for rigorous compar-
isons.
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indexes of autonomy on resources and pedagogic and curriculum issues), the school
location (whether it is urban or rural), the school size or the level of school resources
(which allows changes in the school budget in the years of the economic crisis to be
proxied).
2.4.3 Harmonizing Variables and Indexes
The data preparation requires comparable variables or indexes to be used. To exploit
variation in several dimensions, I use OECD’s indexes on different student and school
dimensions, which transform a set of questionnaire items into one single index dimen-
sion through a parametric model19. I exploit the variation of such indexes to better
identify differences across years. These indexes (the Index of Economic, Social and
Cultural Status (ESCS) is the best-known) have the goal of synthesizing different ques-
tionnaire items around a latent dimension. They are created independently for each
PISA round. They usually take a mean value of zero and a standard deviation of one
for the yearly distribution of OECD countries. Hence, these are constructed as relative
scales for which the values taken by students on a specific country or region directly
depend on the students’ responses in other countries that same year. This means these
scales are not comparable within the same education system that from a time perspec-
tive.
I use an alternative approach to make these indexes comparable for a given edu-
cation system, such as the Basque country. First, I identify item questions that are
repeated across years, so that indexes are time-consistent. Although in general I fol-
low the OECD recommendations, for some cases I have to discard certain items which
are not present in different years. Beyond a change to the index values because of the
rescaling, this implies certain ordinal discrepancies with respect to the values given by
OECD official indexes. That is, for example, in 2012, it may be the case that a Basque
student is placed in the 99th percentile of the ESCS index in the Basque country accord-
ing to the OECD index value, but is then moved to the 98th percentile in 2012 when I
re-calibrate the index to make it time-consistent. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, I
provide correlations between the re-calibrated index values and the OECD index values
for each index and year.
19A more detailed description of each index item can be found in the Appendix
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Once the items are identified, I follow a similar approach as OECD (OECD (2012)),
and compute indexes using Item Response Theory (IRT) models, Rasch models (a par-
ticular version of IRT) or just the aggregation of positive responses (for the school re-
sponsibility indexes). I perform this calibration by computing parameters jointly for
all years in the Basque country with equal weight for each year. Hence, the parameters
transforming items into indexes are common for all Basque students and schools which
have participated in PISA 2015 and all the previous editions.
For the case of the ESCS index, the index is computed through a Rash model (Rasch
(1960)) of dichotomized items 20 based on three sub-indexes which, following the OECD
recommendations, are aggregated through a principal component analysis. These three
sub-indexes include parental education (PARED: the highest educational level of par-
ents was also recoded into estimated number of years of schooling), parental job occu-
pation (HISEI: highest occupational status of parents measured by the ISEI occupation
score) and a home possessions index (HOMEPOS, a summary index including items
from different dimensions of goods owned at home 21). I use imputation methods for
missing values of one of the three ESCS sub-dimensions22.
Table 2.1 shows the structure of the ESCS index (socioeconomic status) once it has
been re-calibrated for the Basque Country. The first two columns show the differences
of the two Indexes (the OECD and the re-calibrated Index). While the OECD Index
decreased between 2012 and 2015, this was due to the OECD full sample values rather
than to relevant changes in the Basque Country. In particular, results display a stagna-
tion of the re-calibrated index between 2012 and 2015, but not a decline. In particular,
the ESCS components show a decrease in the index of home possessions, an increase
of the Index occupational status, and a very mild decrease of the highest parental ed-
ucation level. What can be observed is a decline of socioeconomic conditions of the
20The items usually take several categorical responses, but following OECD recommendation, I reduce
those categories to only two.
21The HOMEPOS index is derived of items of three sub-dimensions: WEALTH (possessions of durable
goods at home, such as cars, TVs, computers, rooms at home), CULTPOS (cultural possessions such as
classical literature, poetry or works of art) and HEDRES (home educational resources such as a desk,
computer, a room to study, textbooks or educational software) as well as books at home. I recode all the
four, five or six categorical variables into two-level categorical variables to compute a Rasch model. A
more detailed description of the HOMEPOS Index construction can be found in Table 2.8 in the Appendix.
22Regarding the missing values for students with missing data for only one variable of the three sub-
dimensions, I follow OECD recommendation (OECD (2012)) and impute predicted values plus a random
component based on a regression on the missing variable of the other two variables. Variables with im-
puted values were then used for a principal component analysis. If there were missing data on more than
one variable, ESCS was not computed for that case and a missing value was assigned for ESCS.
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students in the lowest percentiles of the distribution since 2009, particularly p10 and
to a lesser extent p25, whereas there are small increases of socioeconomic conditions
of students in the median and the upper part of the ESCS-distribution. Overall, it can
be seen that since 2009 the standard deviation of the re-calibrated ESCS Index has in-
creased, which is consistent with other social and economic indicators. Hence, one
would expect an increase in outcomes dispersion related to the observed increases in
dispersion statistics of student ESCS. Finally, there should be an important note of cau-
tion when looking at this indicator in the Basque Country (and in general, Souther
European economies): the fact that the index does not capture the employment sta-
tus of parents overlooks important variation of income and labor dynamics in house-
holds, given the large surges in unemployment rates observed in recent years. In the
Basque Country, this pattern is even larger in households with children (Save the Chil-
dren Spain (2017)).
Beyond ESCS, I re-compute the rest of the indexes, which can be seen in Table 2.2,
and for the years for which the data is available: (i) Index of Sense of Belonging at
school (BELONG); (ii) Index of Science Enjoyment (JOYSCIE); (iii) Index of Science
Self-Efficacy (SCIEEFF); (iv) Index of School Autonomy on Resources (RESPRES); (v)
Index of School Autonomy on Pedagogics and Curriculum (RESPCURR); (vi) Index
of Instructional Leadership (LEADINST); (vii) Index of Instructional Improvement and
Professional Development promoted by the principal (LEADPD); (viii) Index of Teacher
Participation in Leadership (LEADTCH); (ix) Index of Student behavior (STUBEHA);
(x) Index of Teacher Behavior (TEACHBEHA). A summary of the items used for each
index can be found in Figure 2.3 of the Appendix.
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TABLE 2.1: Evolution of ESCS and its Statistics in the Basque Country since 2003.
OECD ESCS Re-calibrated ESCS for Basque Country
Mean S.D Mean HOMEPOS HISEI PARED S.D p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
2003 -0.10 0.94 -0.29 -0.16 45.21 12.13 1.020 -1.66 -1.02 -0.31 0.47 1.09
2006 -0.04 0.99 -0.08 0.01 47.92 12.58 0.990 -1.38 -0.81 -0.10 0.67 1.26
2009 -0.08 0.97 0.09 0.04 49.54 13.52 0.910 -1.15 -0.54 0.13 0.78 1.25
2012 0.03 0.93 0.14 0.03 51.30 13.69 0.980 -1.18 -0.61 0.21 0.96 1.41
2015 -0.25 1.08 0.15 0.00 52.49 13.67 1.020 -1.27 -0.64 0.23 1.04 1.45
Total -0.09 0.00 -0.02 49.31 13.13 1.000 -1.35 -0.74 0.02 0.83 1.32
Notes: Values are computed after re-scaling of all indexes. Re-calibrated ESCS index is the result of a principal component analysis, with
replacement of missing values based on linear regressions on the other two observations.
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TABLE 2.2: Index Items and Years.
Year 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
ESCS X X X X X
BELONG X X X
JOYSCIE X X
SCIEEFF X X
RESPRES X X X X
RESPCURR X X X X
LEADINST X X
LEADPD X X
LEADTCH X X
STUBEHA X X X X
TEACHBEHA X X X X
I compute an IRT model for the Index of Sense of Belonging at School, the Index of
Science Enjoyment at School, the Index of Science Self-Efficacy, the Index of Instruc-
tional Leadership, the Index of Instructional Improvement and Professional Develop-
ment, the Index of Teacher Participation in Leadership, the Index of Student Behav-
ior, and the Index of Teacher Behavior. For the school autonomy indexes, I follow the
OECD procedure and compute the proportion of ”yes” answers for school governing
board, principal or teachers reporting responsibility on specific issues vis a vis the yes
responses for regional/local education authority or national educational authority with
respect to the different dimensions of school management responsibility.
In Table 2.3, I display the year correlation between OECD indexes and the results of
the recalibration process of the indexes for the Basque Country. As can be seen, the
correlation is very high (above 0.9) for most dimensions, including ESCS, BELONG,
JOYSCIE, SCIEEFF, LEADINST, LEADPD, LEADTCH, STUBEHA and TEACHBEHA.
For the case of the indexes of school autonomy the results are slightly weaker, and usu-
ally stand between 0.8 and 0.9. For the case of ESCS, given the lack of some dimensions
in 2003 I also recomputed the index as a robustness check only using 2006 and the fol-
lowing years (without considering students in 2003): the results are slightly better than
the ones shown in Table 2.3, with year correlations with OECD Index values of 0.977 in
2006, 0.967 in 2009, 0.976 in 2012, and 0.967 in 2015.
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TABLE 2.3: Comparison of re-calibrated Items and OECD Values, by Year.
Year 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
ESCS 0.971 0.967 0.950 0.965 0.955
BELONG 0.978 0.866 0.981
JOYSCIE 0.966 0.997
SCIEEFF 0.936 0.954
RESPRES 0.874 0.944 0.840 0.915
RESPCURR 0.868 0.867 0.871 0.880
LEADINST 0.948 0.957
LEADPD 0.965 0.952
LEADTCH 0.995 0.996
STUBEHA 0.970 0.967 0.946 0.960
TEACHBEHA 0.916 0.918 0.881 0.969
Notes: Year correlations include all the sample of available
data constructed by both OECD and in this re-calibration
process in the Basque Country.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Empirical Strategy
I compute linear and non-linear models to decompose changes in student outcomes
in the Basque Country between 2015 and previous years 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012. I
use both Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca (1973)) for the mean and the method
proposed by Firpo et al. (2009) for unconditional quantiles. As previously discussed,
the reason to conduct non-linear decompositions is that it allows for a less restrictive
assumption regarding changes in covariates and their relation to student outcomes:
it may well be the case that the changes in the composition of socioeconomic status
have been different across the distribution of student outcomes, hence having a differ-
ential impact on the performance distribution. Following the classical Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition, I start by looking at a linear model in Equation 2.1:
Yij = α+ X
′
iβ+ P
′
j θ + S
′
jγ+ ei (2.1)
where Yij represents the competency score in the domain of interest of student i in
school j, X
′
i is a vector of individual student characteristics, P
′
j is a vector of school
characteristics, whereas S
′
j is a vector of school j characteristics determined at the sys-
tem level and ei is an error term. When comparing two groups of students at different
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years (year t0 and year t1), the difference of the PISA performance is computed as:
Yij,t1 −Yij,t0 = (αt1 − αt0) + (X
′
i,t1βt1 − X
′
i,t0βt0) + (P
′
j,t1θt1 − P
′
j,t0θt0)+
(S
′
j,t1γt1 − S
′
j,t0γt0) + (ei,t1 − ei,t0)
(2.2)
Adding and subtracting X
′
i,t0βt1 , P
′
j,t0θt1 , and S
′
j,t0γt1 on the previous Equation 2.2 and
rearranging terms gives the expression:
Yi,t1 −Yi,t0 = {(X
′
i,t1 − X
′
i,t0)βt1 + (P
′
j,t1 − P
′
j,t0)θt1 + (S
′
j,t1 − S
′
j,t0)γt1)}+
{X′i,t0(βt1 − βt0) + P
′
j,t0(θt1 − θt0) + S
′
j,t0(γt1 − γt0) + (αt1 − αt0) + (ei,t1 − ei,t0)}
(2.3)
The previous equation represents the two-fold Oaxaca decomposition. It shows a first
term in brackets which is the explained part of the differences: i.e. the difference due
to difference in observed covariates across years. The second term in brackets is con-
sidered the unexplained part, and consists of the differences in returns to inputs (dif-
ferences in the learning outcome premium of each of the covariates) and an error term
representing unobserved characteristics which the model cannot capture. Following
Lounkaew (2013), I do not report the results of the estimates of returns to covariates for
each year (say, for example, βt1 and βt0) because of their difficult interpretation. Hence,
the interpretation of the model is only related to changes in student and school charac-
teristics across years, but not to changes in returns to learning (i.e. the relation between
these characteristics and student learning). To control for unobserved heterogeneity, I
add control variables of student and school characteristics that may be correlated with
the error term in order to minimize the impact of omitted variables in the model.
This model considers the returns to student and school characteristics in year t1 to
be the baseline returns, but alternative specifications of the Oaxaca-Blinder model and
the organization of coefficient weights can be used. In a more general form, the model
considers a linear combination of the two vectors of coefficients (βt1 and βt0), so that
the explained part of Equation 2.3 is multiplied by the following term b∗:
b∗ = Wβt1 + (I −W)βt0 (2.4)
where I is an identity matrix and W is a matrix of weights of two groups of year t1 and
year t0. The Equation 2.3 is re-written (given time vectors of covariates Xt1 and Xt0) so
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that the difference in scores across years R is:
R = (Xt1 − Xt0)′{Wβt1 + (I −W)βt0}+ {X′t1(I −W) + X′t0W}(βt1 − βt0) (2.5)
In the context of the OLS regression, I follow the Neumark (1988) approach with the co-
efficient W = (X′t1 Xt1 + X
′
t0 Xt0)
−1(X′t1 Xt1), which basically displays the parameters re-
sulting of computing a two-fold decomposition pooled model excluding the year vari-
able out of the model.
As previously discussed, the second step of the empirical strategy is to extend the
OLS analysis to other distributional statistics. I do this by using a RIF-regression ap-
proach, proposed by Firpo et al. (2009). The problem about quantile regression is that
the marginal effect of a specific variable cannot be generalized to an unconditional
interpretation, fixing the rest of covariates constant. While this is possible in linear
models for the mean due to the Law of Iterated Expectations, it does not apply for
non-linear statistics. The proposal of Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (FFL) is to replace the
score function by a linearized function which approximates a statistic of interest (quan-
tile, inequality statistic, etc...) and hence allows marginal effects to be interpreted for a
specific quantile as unconditional effects without the need of constructing conditional
effect estimate functions. For a quantile of interest qτ, the RIF function is written as:
RIF(I; qτ) = qτ +
τ − D(I ≤ qτ)
f I(qτ))
(2.6)
where D is an indicator function, f I(.) is the density of the marginal distribution of
scores. In practice, we do not observe RIF(I; qτ), but just its sample version, which can
be written as:
RIF(I; qˆτ) = qˆτ +
τ − D(I ≤ qˆτ)
ˆf I(qτ)
(2.7)
where qˆτ is the sample quantile and f̂ I(qτ) is the density estimator kernel function.
Hence, as part of the second step of the empirical strategy, I compute regular regres-
sions using RIF functions as dependent variables for a range of quantiles for years t0
and t1. Similar to the linear approximation, I then compute the Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position by years for each quantile of interest.
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2.5.2 Descriptive Statistics
The decline observed in learning outcomes in the Basque Country in 2015 came af-
ter a gradual increase of test scores between 2006 and 2012 (see Figure 2.1). Between
2012 and 2015, the Basque Country decreased its performance in mathematics by 13
PISA points and especially science, by 23 PISA points. Beyond the statistical signif-
icance, this decline is large, given recent estimates that equate one year of schooling
to 35 PISA points (OECD (2016b)). This decline represents an exception with respect
to other regions in Spain, with most of them staying at the 2012 levels or even experi-
encing significant improvements23. Between 2012 and 2015, the average score in Spain
increased significantly in reading, while it did not change in mathematics and science.
The Spanish mild improvements contrast with an overall decline in many OECD coun-
tries. In fact, between 2012 and 2015 the OECD-3524 average scores dropped from 501
to 493 points for science, from 496 to 493 points in reading, and from 494 to 490 points in
mathematics. These declines were especially large in countries with historically good
results such as Austria, Australia, Finland, South Korea, Netherlands, Poland or Swe-
den. Overall, these global trends show that providing quality education in the most
developed systems is becoming more and more difficult, suggesting the rise of impor-
tant challenges in the coming years.
Beyond computing the evolution of mean scores, I report the changes in the distri-
bution of scores across years for the three domains. Figure 2.2 shows the performance
distribution of students in the Basque education system for each of the five rounds in
which the Basque Country has participated. The green line, representing the results
of 2015, shows a shift to the left in all domains with respect to 2012 (yellow) and 2009
(black). However, the decline is larger (especially in mathematics and reading) for the
group of highest achieving students, which have the lowest possible scores of all 5
rounds. With respect to the lowest achieving students, compared to the mean decline,
the decline in scores was large in science, but smaller in mathematics and rather con-
stant in reading: this results in a decline of the standard deviation in math, a constant
evolution in reading and an increase in science. Overall, this does not go hand in hand
with the evolution of socioeconomic status as seen in Section 2.4.
23It is to be noted that 500 points are anchored to the OECD average in 2000 (reading), math (2003) and
science (2006) and hence stands as a fixed level of competencies for each of the three domains.
24OECD average-35: Arithmetic mean across all OECD countries.
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FIGURE 2.1: Changes in PISA Student Performance in the Basque Country
Notes: Source: OECD results for PISA 2003-2015 in the Basque Country.
FIGURE 2.2: Distribution of PISA Performance in the Basque Country across Domains
and Years.
(A) Science. (B) Mathematics.
(C) Reading.
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I compute the average scores of the variables of interest described in the previous
section by year. Results in Table 2.4 show no changes in the proportion of girls or the
average age. Conversely, the proportion of students who take the test in a language
similar from the one at home decreased by 9% (from 91% to 82%) between 2012 and
2015. The proportion of immigrants has increased in recent years, especially between
2003 and 2012, as it went from 2% to around 9%, remaining stable between 2012 and
2015. As was previously shown in Table 2.1, the re-calibrated Index of Social, Economic
and Cultural status (ESCS) shows a progressive increase between 2003 and 2012, and
a stagnation between 2012 and 2015, where there was not much change. More impor-
tantly, the proportion of 15-year old students enrolled in public schools has increased
in the sample, which coincides with the official numbers provided by EUSTAT25.
In terms of linguistic models of instruction, it can be seen that the joint (public and
semi-public) proportion of students in the A model has decreased significantly between
2003 and 2015, especially in semi-public schools, where it felt from 25% to 8% of the
total student population. In the other two language models of semi-public schools, this
led to an increase of students in both the B model (from 17% in 2003 to 23% in 2015 out
of the total students in the system) and the D model (from 18% in 2003 to 24% in 2015
out of the total students in the system). At the same time, the decrease in enrollment in
A and B models in public schools, together with the slight increase of total enrollment
in public schools has implied a large increase of enrollment in the D model in public
schools from 23% in 2003 to 38% in 2015 out of the total student population.
Regarding other key variables, the rate of repeaters decreased progressively between
2003 and 2012 (from 24% to 20%), but it increased again between 2012 and 2015 up
to 24% together with a shift in the proportion of students who had repeated once by
age 15 to those which had repeated twice by that same age (from 4% to 6%). Regard-
ing the harmonized indexes, there was a slight significant increase 26 in the Index of
Instructional Improvement and Professional Development promoted by the principal
as well as in the Index of Teacher Participation in Leadership. At the same time, the
indexes of teacher and student behavior display divergent patterns: such indexes take
large positive values when reflecting negative behavioral patterns at school, and nega-
tive values when reflecting positive behavioral patterns. This means that between 2012
25According to EUSTAT website, the proportion of students enrolled in public schools in lower sec-
ondary grades was 42% in the school year 2002/2003, 44% in 2005/2006, 45% in 2008/2009, 46% in
2011/2012, and 47% in 2014/2015.
26T-tests for the mean differences across years were conducted and found significant change in values.
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and 2015, there was a deterioration of student behavior at school and an improvement
in teacher behavior at school27. The indexes of school responsibility on both resources
and pedagogy have decreased in 2015 with respect to previous years. Other relevant
findings include a slight increase in student-teacher ratio (from 10.8 in 2009 to 11.5 in
2015), consistent with a decrease of public budget for education in the Basque Country.
27Again, t-tests for the mean differences were conducted and found very small standard errors of the
estimates, resulting in statistically significant changes.
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TABLE 2.4: Descriptive statistics of key Variables in the Basque Country, by year.
2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Gender (Female) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Age 15.89 0.28 15.86 0.29 15.89 0.28 15.88 0.28 15.88 0.28
Language of test same as home 0.90 0.29 0.92 0.28 0.91 0.29 0.91 0.29 0.82 0.38
Immigrant status (Native) 0.98 0.13 0.96 0.19 0.95 0.21 0.91 0.28 0.91 0.28
ESCS (Harmonized) -0.29 1.02 -0.08 0.99 0.09 0.90 0.14 0.98 0.15 1.03
Repeater (1 year) 0.22 0.41 0.17 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.38
Repeater (2 years) 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.21 0.06 0.24
LEADTCH (Harmonized) -0.03 0.95 0.01 1.02
LEADPD (Harmonized) -0.06 0.90 0.09 1.03
LEADINST (Harmonized) -0.10 0.94 0.10 0.93
STUBEHA (Harmonized) -0.03 1.04 -0.15 0.91 0.02 0.96 0.15 0.95
TEACHBEHA (Harmonized) 0.13 1.04 0.07 0.90 0.18 1.00 0.00 1.01
BELONG (Harmonized) -0.04 0.87 0.01 1.02 0.03 1.10
JOYSCIE (Harmonized) -0.10 0.91 0.11 1.07
SCIEEFF (Harmonized) 0.03 0.92 -0.04 1.08
RESPRES (Harmonized) 0.24 1.17 0.09 0.98 0.03 0.93 -0.22 0.86
RESPCURR (Harmonized) 0.12 0.93 0.07 0.99 0.18 0.94 -0.28 1.04
Public (Model A) 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19
Public (Model B) 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19
Public (Model D) 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.38 0.48
Semi-Public (Model A) 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.41 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27
Semi-Public (Model B) 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42
Semi-Public (Model D) 0.18 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43
School Size 738.22 515.24 770.48 517.27 707.81 470.80 731.14 472.39 740.55 509.20
Student-teacher ratio 12.79 5.64 11.80 4.81 10.84 4.33 11.23 4.85 11.47 4.41
Notes: Values are computed using plausible values and replicate weights.
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2.5.3 Results
I first display results of the linear regression model for 2015, with the covariates in-
cluded in Table 2.4. Table 2.5 shows the OLS regression results for all domains in 2015.
First, the lack of observations on specific variables (leadership indexes or school re-
sources) reduces the sample by more than 30% of observations28. The results show a
positive effect for boys in mathematics and science, while there is a positive effect for
girls in reading, all of which are statistically significant. Moreover, taking the test in
the same language as the main language at home is associated with large positive and
significant increases of 10 to 22 PISA points, especially in reading. Combined with the
decrease in the proportion of students who take the test in a language similar to the
one they regularly speak at home observed in Table 2.4, this already suggests that this
factor is going to be a key driver behind the decline in performance observed in 2015.
More importantly, the gradient of socioeconomic characteristics is small, and smaller
compared to other countries (OECD (2016a)). This is important, as it lowers the ex-
pectations on the discussion on changes in socioeconomic conditions and its potential
impact on learning. I find a negative relation of immigrant students and learning, even
after controlling for socioeconomic status, which is more intense in mathematics and
science. Finally, students who have repeated a grade are far behind those who have
not even after controlling for socioeconomic characteristics (70 points for one-year re-
peaters, and around 100 points of 2-year repeaters). These numbers are large and con-
sistent with Garcı´a-Pe´rez et al. (2014) for the whole Spanish case.
Beyond student characteristics, the Index of Student Behavior is significantly asso-
ciated with student performance. A one standard deviation positive increase in the
index (hence showing behavior problems at the schools) is associated with a decrease
of 6 to 7 PISA points in all three domains. In the science domain, the scientific learn-
ing indexes show a positive and significant relation with learning outcomes, especially
the Index of Science Enjoyment (which seems of course to hide an endogenous relation
with learning outcomes). Finally, it is to be noted that at the system level, there are no
significant differences between school networks or linguistic models. Similarly, school
size, student-teacher ratio and school autonomy variables do not display significant
relations with student outcomes when controlling for key student characteristics.
28I consider alternative specifications by removing these variables, but the results are essentially similar
for the key variables of interest.
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TABLE 2.5: OLS results in 2015.
Science Math Reading
Gender (Female) -13.35*** -20.05*** 8.98**
Age 1.48 2.32 5.19
Language of test same as home 17.11*** 9.53 22.26***
Immigrant status (Native) 17.02*** 22.62** 11.34
ESCS (Harmonized) 7.04*** 10.90*** 10.45***
Repeater (1 year) -67.36*** -79.35*** -75.66***
Repeater (2 year) -92.55*** -99.45*** -102.76***
ESCS at School (Harmonized) -0.48 -0.55 -2.52
LEADTCH (Harmonized) -4.61 1.27 -4.69
LEADPD (Harmonized)) 1.44 -5.12 1.97
LEADINST (Harmonized) -1.00 -0.20 -2.89
STUBEHA (Harmonized) -7.71** -6.63* -7.02*
TEACHBEHA (Harmonized) 1.55 0.81 -0.73
BELONG (Harmonized) 1.77 1.34 4.95**
JOYSCIE (Harmonized) 21.42***
SCIEEFF (Harmonized) 7.43***
RESPRES (Harmonized) -0.41 0.68 -0.95
RESPCURR (Harmonized) 4.50* 3.81 3.02
Public (Model B) 6.46 14.13 7.26
Public (Model D) -11.31 -3.00 -15.12
Semi-Public (Model A) -1.61 -0.77 2.45
Semi-Public (Model B) -12.18 -9.10 -12.09
Semi-Public (Model D) -4.88 -2.91 -11.14
School Size 0.00 0.00 0.00
Student-teacher ratio -0.17 0.20 0.26
R-2 0.37 0.32 0.28
Observations 2,140 2,302 2,302
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and
1-percent level, respectively. Values are computed using plausible values and replicate
weights.
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In Table 2.6, I show the results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for the mean dif-
ferences between 2015 and 2012, and between 2015 and 2009, for all three domains29.
Results for 2012 show that the model explains around 35% of the differences in science,
40% in maths, and 90% in reading. In particular, I find that among the variables of the
model, the increase in the share of students who take the test in a language different
from the one at home (which is part of the individual characteristics group of variable)
and the increase in the share of repeaters are statistically significant and account for
most of the explained part. These two factors jointly explain around 5 points of the de-
cline between 2012 and 2015 for all three domains. Although grade repetition (which
takes place prior to the test) is highly endogenous to the PISA scores, it can be argued
that the decision of taking the test in a specific language is rather exogenous and de-
pends mostly on the school preferences. Hence, the effect measured is derived from
a genuine variation of student and school behavior which in principle should not be
related to unobserved endogenous factors.
Overall, these results show that the explanatory power of the model is limited for
the mathematics and science drop in outcomes, and unfortunately does not capture an
important share of the variation in scores. The fact that the explained part in read-
ing is high is possibly due to the model construction, which measures differences in
covariates which are repeated in the three models, except for science, for which more
data is available to find additional sources of variation in covariates between 2012 and
2015. Given that the observed differences in reading between 2012 and 2015 are lower,
the model is able to capture a larger share of the decline, although the absolute drop
captured is similar to the one in mathematics and science.
For the case of differences between 2009 and 2015, results show that the model ex-
plains almost 50% of the differences in science, almost 40% in maths, and does not bring
any significant results for reading, where the observed differences are very small. The
increase of proportion of students who take the test in a difference language than the
one at home and the increase in the share of immigrants are the two factors explaining
29In Tables 2.9 and 2.10 of the Data Appendix, results for 2003-2015 and 2006-2015 are showed in sum-
marized way by grouping variables. What can be seen is that first, the differences in performance are
not as large as with respect to 2009 and 2012. Second, the improvements in terms of socioeconomic back-
grounds translate into counter-factual improvements in learning outcomes. This means that the explained
part of the model accounts for positive increases in performance (although it is not statistically significant
on aggregate terms), and hence, the unexplained part in the case of science and mathematics is negative,
larger and statistically significant.
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the incidence of individual characteristics in the decline, although the size is small: to-
gether, they account for an average of 2 PISA points, depending on the domain. More-
over, the worsening of student behavior indicators between 2009 and 2015 accounts
for an important share of the explained part (especially for mathematics scores), and is
statistically significant. The other variables observed in the model do not display rel-
evant changes with respect to 2009 that incur in score differences that are statistically
significant.
TABLE 2.6: Oaxaca-Blinder mean detailed decomposition in three domains between
2009-2012 and 2015.
2012-2015 2009-2015
Science Math Reading Science Math Reading
PISA 2015 Score 487.70 495.87 496.91 487.60 495.79 496.46
PISA 2012 Score 511.13 511.48 504.47 496.63 511.65 496.52
Difference -23.4*** -15.6*** -7.56 -9.02** -15.8*** -0.06
Explained -8.66** -6.93* -6.79** -4.71 -5.92* -2.73
Unexplained -14.8*** -8.68*** -0.76 -4.31 -9.93*** 2.67
Explained variables
Gender -0.14 -0.18 0.13 -0.39 -0.91 0.50
Age 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01
Language of test same as home -1.15** -0.78* -1.25** -0.98** -0.69** -1.24**
Immigrant status -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.59* -1.06** -0.58**
ESCS (Harmonized) -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 0.42 0.40 0.34
Repeater (1 year) -1.66* -1.78* -1.74* 0.30 0.36 0.48
Repeater (2 years) -1.90* -1.90* -1.97* -0.26 -0.29 -0.28
ESCS School (Index) -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 -0.71 -0.83 -0.80
LEADTCH (Harmonized) 0.31 0.33 0.17
LEADPD (Harmonized) -0.67 -0.97 -0.10
LEADINST (Harmonized) -0.58 -0.19 -0.46
STUBEHA (Harmonized) -0.95 -0.74 -0.81 -1.87* -2.46* -1.74*
TEACHBEHA (Harmonized) -0.29 -0.16 -0.31 -0.40 -0.47 -0.26
BELONG (Harmonized) 0.25 0.17 0.42
RESPRES (Harmonized) 0.12 -0.01 0.15 -0.01 -0.12 -0.06
RESPCURR (Harmonized) -0.17 -0.07 -0.10 -2.09 -0.08 -1.70
Public (Model B) 0.02 -0.14 -0.02 0.83 -0.12 1.02
Public (Model D) -1.06 0.48 -0.79 -1.46 -0.33 -0.83
Semi-Public (Model A) -0.14 -0.12 -0.16 1.50 0.27 1.51
Semi-Public (Model B) -0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.21 0.05
Semi-Public (Model D) 0.31 -0.45 0.23 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
School Size -0.12 -0.01 -0.05 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07
Student-teacher ratio -0.48 -0.15 0.01 1.04 0.30 0.93
Observations 2015 2,302 2,302 2,302 2,370 2,370 2,370
Observations 2009-2012 2,584 2,584 2,584 4,213 4,213 4,213
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-
percent level, respectively. Estimates are computed using plausible values and replicate
weights. A Neumark model specification is considered. Standard Errors are clustered at
the School level.
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Finally, in Table 2.7, I decompose the differences in results across the performance
distribution following the RIF regression approach. I do this by comparing both 2009
and 2015, as well as 2012 and 2015. For the sake of simplicity, results are reported in
groups of variables. Moreover, it is to be noted that the standard errors are usually
smaller compared to those computed for the mean in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6: this is
because the model does not allow for clustering standard errors. The purpose of this
estimation, nevertheless, is to take a deep look at point estimates, rather than its statisti-
cal significance, which was already estimated previously in the linear specification. For
better interpretation, given that 2012 and 2009 scores are higher than 2015 for most of
the performance distribution, results are reported by subtracting the 2015 scores from
those of 2009 and 201230.
I use three different quantiles of the distribution, p20, p50, and p80. Regarding the
comparison for 2012, I find that the explained differences are larger in the low percentile
of the distribution (p20), which is related to the fact that the distributional statistic is
related to a larger proportion of repeaters, and in particular, two-grade repeaters. Sim-
ilarly, there are more students in that quantile who take the test in a language different
from the language spoken at home, and hence the model is able to account for more
observed differences. With respect of the largest percentiles (p80), results show that
in mathematics and science, there is a significant (but small) improvement related to
public schools in the linguistic D model and a decline of performance related to semi-
public schools in A and D linguistic models. The aggregate effect of the school type
differences is neutral and hence cannot be seen in aggregate terms in Table 2.731. For
the case of the comparison with respect to 2009, the explained differences are larger in
the low-achieving students (p20). This is due to a larger increase in problems of student
behavior with students in the lowest quantile, which has implied a larger observed de-
crease in scores with respect to 2009. The larger share of repeaters (two-year repeaters)
and the increase in the proportion of students who take the test in a language different
than the one they use at home are also behind this larger explained gap in p20.
30Just for the case of the reading percentile 20 comparing 2009 and 2015, the sample scores of 2015 are
higher than those of 2009.
31For more details, please contact the corresponding author.
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TABLE 2.7: Oaxaca-Blinder quantile decomposition in three domains between 2009-
2012 and 2015.
2012-2015 2009-2015
P20 P50 P80 P20 P50 P80
Science
PISA 2015 416.7 490.06 558.29 416.66 490.29 559.71
PISA 2012 451.37 514.89 573.7 436.65 498.52 558.27
Difference (2015-2012/09) 34.67*** 24.83*** 15.41*** 19.99*** 8.23*** 1.44
Explained 10.02*** 9.77*** 7.51*** 8.04*** 4.81*** 1.37
Unexplained 24.66*** 15.06*** 7.9*** 11.94*** 15.06*** 7.9***
Individual Characteristics 1.62*** 3.32*** 0.94** 1.96*** 2.3*** 0.07
ESCS (Harmonized) 0.1 0.44 0.18 -0.38 -0.49 -0.54
Repetition 5.05*** 3.62*** 2.01*** 1.39 0.96 0.52
ESCS School (Harmonized) 0.02 0.23 0.2 -0.12 -0.34 -0.44
School Leadership 0.78* 1.78* 1.23***
School Climate 1.17* 1.95*** 1.56*** 4.29*** 1.95*** 1.13**
Student Wellbeing -0.43 -1.86 -0.18
School Autonomy -0.02 -0.11 -0.01 1.16 1.22 0.81
School stratum 0.96* 1.8* 0.92* 0.08 0.08 0.25
Resources 0.76* 2.02** 0.67*** -0.33 -0.86* -1.71***
Mathematics
PISA 2015 431.7 499.64 558.82 431.72 499.64 558.66
PISA 2012 445.35 514.89 579.15 446.96 517.18 582.28
Difference (2015-2012/09) 13.65*** 15.25*** 20.33*** 15.24*** 17.54*** 23.62***
Explained 8.19*** 7.55*** 5.52*** 7.88*** 5.9*** 3.67***
Unexplained 5.46** 7.7*** 14.81*** 7.35*** 11.65*** 19.96***
Individual Characteristics 1.26** 1.14** 0.94** 3.33*** 2.68*** 1.9***
ESCS (Harmonized) 0.08 0.15 0.18 -0.31 -0.44 -0.53
Repetition 5.79*** 3.78*** 1.95*** 1.74 1.05 0.58
ESCS School (Harmonized) 0.16 0.11 0.14 -0.31 -0.29* -0.35*
School Leadership 0.74 0.76** 1.04*
School Climate 0.93 1.24** 0.65 3.78*** 2.35*** 1.8***
Student Wellbeing -0.2 -0.31** -0.15
School Autonomy -0.07 0.05 0.16 0.23 0.46 0.6
School stratum -0.45 0.24 0.36 -0.4 0.11 -0.06
Resources -0.06 0.38 0.26 -0.18 -0.03 -0.27
Reading
PISA 2015 430.41 501.1 565.15 430.1 500.68 564.84
PISA 2012 440.79 512.2 569.99 429.57 503.67 565.39
Difference (2015-2012/09) 10.38** 11.10*** 4.85* -0.53 2.99 0.55
Explained 8.58 7.83*** 4.86*** 4.61* 3.29** 0.56
Unexplained 1.8 3.27 -0.01 -5.14* -0.31** -0.01
Individual Characteristics 1.90*** 1.34*** 0.62** 2.16*** 1.74*** 0.76**
ESCS (Harmonized) 0.11 0.14 0.17 -0.24 -0.39 -0.49
Repetition 6.29*** 3.45*** 1.72*** 1.75 1 0.54
ESCS School (Harmonized) -0.01 0.11 0.09 -0.58** -0.46** -0.54**
School Leadership -0.28 0.29 1.03
School Climate 0.96 1.67*** 0.99 3.38*** 1.34** 0.6
Student Wellbeing -0.56** -0.45* 0.23
School Autonomy -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.83 0.23 0.75
School stratum 0.29 0.78 0.49 -0.13 0.18 -0.03
Resources -0.06 0.5 -0.05 0.91** 0.34 -1.04**
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent level, respectively.
A RIF-regression model was applied following the RIFREG command in Stata with Neumark model specification
for the Oaxaca decomposition. The RIFREG command does not allow a computation using plausible values and
replicate weights and clustering errors at the school level.Individual characteristics include gender, age and immi-
grant status. Repetition includes dummies for one and two-year repeaters. School Climate variables include the
Index of teacher and student behavior. School autonomy variables are the two indexes RESPCURR and RESPRES.
School stratum include the 5 streams of school ownership and linguistic models (with Public schools in Model A as
omitted). Resources include student-teacher ratio and number of students at the school.
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2.6 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper describes and documents the recent trends in secondary education student
outcomes in the Basque Country (Spain) as measured by PISA data. The ”PISA Shock”
experienced by the region in 2015 was large and significant in mathematics and espe-
cially science. I explain only part of this decline (around 30% to 50%), which has to do
with three unrelated factors.
First, repetition rates slightly increased in 2015, both among 1-year repeaters and 2-
year repeaters. Repetition is a policy implemented at the school level, and although
it is endogenously related to the learning potential of students, previous research has
shown that an important part is closely linked to cultural factors, teacher biases and
misaligned internal assessments. Long-term trends show that repetition has been de-
creasing very slowly in the last years, and hence, this abrupt increase may have to do
with sample selection of students or a temporary stagnation in the trend. According
to the recent repetition trends in primary and lower secondary32, one would expect a
short decrease of repeaters at the end of lower-secondary (age 15) in the coming years,
and hence a slight increase of learning outcomes measured by the PISA sample (which
includes non-repeaters and repeaters) in the nearby future.
Second, I discuss the effect of the language of instruction and language of testing:
mother-tongue instruction and test administration are positively related to student out-
comes, at least in the short term. The fact that more students are taking the test in a
language different from the one at home is a consequence of school decision and the
school linguistic policy, not to student factors or key education policy decisions. In par-
ticular, the change in 2015 has to do with more students who speak Spanish at home
now taking the test in Basque. This increase is concentrated mostly in schools which
provide instruction in the linguistic model D, where students are receiving their ed-
ucation predominantly in the Basque language. This makes sense from a pedagogic
and policy point of view, and given the low-stakes nature of the test, there are no real
losses in terms of learning and opportunities by taking the test in one language or an-
other. Overall, these are cosmetic changes that do not reflect changes in system reforms,
school policies or pedagogic practices, but rather the externalities of a multi-lingual
school system such as the one in the Basque country.
32See MECD (2017).
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However, results regarding student behavior are more worrying. The index of stu-
dent behavior has progressively deteriorated between 2009 and 2015. When I look at
its components, I see a deterioration of three items: student truancy, students skipping
classes and students lacking respect towards teachers. Whether these are real problems
taking place in Basque schools or whether there is an growing dissatisfaction of princi-
pals and teachers due to the increasingly diverse student population or the social effects
of the economic crisis remains unknown. Nevertheless, clearly additional information
will be required required through civic engagement and school climate assessments in
the nearby future.
What remains clear is that there is no apparent overall effect of the economic crisis
on student learning, at least as regards what can be measured with PISA background
questionnaires. First, socioeconomic conditions of students have on average not wors-
ened since 2009, although low-ESCS students have experienced socioeconomic declines
during the economic crisis. Nevertheless, this decline for disadvantaged students does
not translate into worse student outcomes, probably due to the low ESCS gradient on
learning observed in the Basque Country in comparative international assessments. It is
to be noted that the PISA ESCS Index does not consider employment status of parents,
hence overlooking the large variation in that respect in the Basque economy, which usu-
ally experiences large employment fluctuations. At the same time, student-teacher ratio
has slightly increased in PISA 2015, consistent with the budgetary situation of schools,
but I do not observe a relevant association with the decline of student outcomes.
In fact, although given the previous factors discussed account to explain a relevant
share of the ”PISA Shock”, a large proportion of the decline remains unexplained. The
PISA decline in the Basque Country goes hand-in-hand with the declines in the regional
external assessments conducted by the Department of Education of the Basque Govern-
ment. Beyond the aforementioned contingent factors, this points to deeper structural
changes in the Basque education system. From a policy perspective, this generalized
phenomenon raises at least are two questions that I cannot test, but which will require
further research.
The structural decline is also taking place in high performing education systems,
such as Finland, South Korea or the Netherlands, as has been shown in the PISA 2015
results. Staying on top of performance is becoming increasingly difficult. For example,
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some authors have argued that the penetration of technology is generating a competi-
tion with schools as a knowledge institution (see Va¨lijaa¨rvi and Alasuutari (2017) for
Finland). Others have argued that the demand for education may be changing due to
the perceived low returns to schooling after the economic crisis, hence generating the
perception that the education social contract may be broken.
The other reason behind the abrupt decline in performance may be the surge of anti-
assessment cultures in the Basque (and Spanish) education system given the fact that
the PISA test is of low-stakes nature. Zamarro et al. (2016) find that cross-country dif-
ferences in international low-stakes tests like PISA are explained to a relevant extent
(between 32% and 38%) by socio-emotional skill measures, such as survey and test
effort. In particular, in Souther European countries like Spain -and all its regions in-
cluding the Basque Country, as reported by Balart and Cabrales (2017)-, these measures
of student effort are usually lower than in Asian or Nordic countries. After the new
Spanish Education Act-LOMCE was approved in 2013 (which implied a large reform
in the national assessments) there has been increasing anecdotal evidence of reporting
problems and test-taking issues, including episodes of family and school boycotting
of testing. If Spain (and the Basque Country) is more prone to being affected by the
testing context (as shown by Zamarro et al. (2016)), such events may be having a non-
negligible impact on student outcomes. Further research should address this in the
future, in order to disentangle cultural factors around low-stakes testing with the real
cognitive skill dynamics of students due to the evolution of education policies, school
practices and socioeconomic factors.
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2.7 Data Appendix
TABLE 2.8: Index Items and Years.
Sub-Dimension Item
Wealth Index (WEALTH) A room of your own
A link to the internet
A DVD-Video
A desk to study at
Cultural Possessions Index (CULTPOSS) Classic literature
Books of poetry
Work of art
Home Educational Resource Index (REDRES) A quiet place to study
A computer you can use for school work
Books to help with your school work
A dictionary
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TABLE 2.9: Oaxaca-Blinder mean decomposition in three domains between 2006 and
2015.
Variable Science Math Reading
PISA 2015 Score 492.20 495.70 496.36
PISA 2006 Score 497.72 503.08 492.12
Difference -5.53 -7.38 4.24
Explained 5.87* 5.88 5.35
Unexplained -11.40*** -13.26*** -1.10
Explained Variables
Individual Characteristics -2.42*** -2.53** -2.22**
ESCS (Harmonized) 2.59*** 3.91*** 3.82***
ESCS School (Harmonized) 3.14** 3.99** 3.73**
Science Learning (Harmonized) 3.88**
School Autonomy -1.10 -0.69 -0.21
School stratum 0.26 1.93 1.11
Resources -0.47 -0.73 -0.88
Observations 2015 2,302 2,302 2,302
Observations 2006 2,584 2,584 2,584
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent level, respectively.
Estimates are computed using plausible values and replicate weights. A Neumark model specification is considered.
Standard Errors are clustered at the School level. Individual characteristics include gender, age and immigrant
status. Scientific learning variables include the two indexes JOYSCIE and SCIEEFF. School autonomy variables
are the two indexes RESPCURR and RESPRES. School stratum include the 5 streams of school ownership and
linguistic models (with Public schools in Model A as omitted). Resources include student-teacher ratio and number
of students at the school.
TABLE 2.10: Oaxaca-Blinder mean decomposition in three domains between 2003 and
2015.
Variable Science Math Reading
PISA 2015 Score 487.94 496.08 496.86
PISA 2003 Score 488.81 504.74 501.94
Difference -0.86 -8.66** -5.08
Explained 0.58 -0.53 -2.07
Unexplained -1.45 -8.13*** -3.01
Explained Variables
Individual Characteristics -1.13** -1.45* -1.70**
ESCS (Harmonized) 5.86*** 4.48*** 5.24***
Repetition -1.51 -1.58 -1.69
ESCS School (Harmonized) 2.73* 2.18 2.00
Student wellbeing 0.01 0.08
School Climate -1.06 -1.12 -0.86
School stratum -4.32*** -3.40*** -5.34***
Resources 0.01 0.29 0.00
Observations 2015 2,302 2,302 2,302
Observations 2006 2,584 2,584 2,584
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent level, respectively.
Estimates are computed using plausible values and replicate weights. A Neumark model specification is considered.
Standard Errors are clustered at the School level. Individual characteristics include gender, age and immigrant
status. Repetition includes dummies for one and two year repeaters. Student wellbeing includes the sense of
belonging index. School Climate variables include the Indexes of Teacher and Student Behavior. School School
autonomy variables are the two indexes RESPCURR and RESPRES. School stratum include the 5 streams of school
ownership and linguistic models (with Public schools in Model A as omitted). Resources include student-teacher
ratio and number of students at the school.
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Chapter 3
School Choice, Student Mobility
and School Segregation in Madrid
3.1 Introduction
School choice is one of the main pillars of a country’s educational framework. The
school decision is key for children, since it determines a large portion of the student’s
future social and academic development, as well as labor market outcomes. At the
government level, it is a public policy concern due to the fact that it implies making
decisions about who is granted priority to a certain school when available places are
limited. At the family level it is a fundamental decision, insofar as taking the system
as given, the objective is to identify the strategy which maximizes the options of being
admitted to their preferred school.
School choice has been at the center of a lively debate during the last decades. Fried-
man (1955) first advocated for market-based education policies. Proponents of large
school choice settings claim that, through student vouchers, a market-based school sys-
tem increases the competition between schools for students who would lead to a rise
in the effectiveness of schools for better student outcomes for all. Competition derived
from parental choice can result in a rise of learning through more effective schools. For
example, Hoxby (2000) finds more effective schools in districts with higher levels of
choice. Conversely, opponents of school choice claim that the policy does not clearly
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present positive results, while it tends to exacerbate inequities through student sort-
ing (Levin (1998); Epple et al. (2017)). Research has documented the diverse demand
patterns of families when more choice can be exerted. While choice can allow for bet-
ter opportunities for some households which live in disadvantaged neighborhoods,
reforms granting excessive choice to parents overall appear to be exacerbating educa-
tional inequality through larger school segregation (sorting across schools) of students
by their social or immigrant background (Musset (2012)).
This paper investigates a large-scale inter-district school choice reform in the city of
Madrid on student geographic mobility and its consequent impact on within-school
social and immigrant segregation. In a nutshell, we find that the reform increases the
level of geographic mobility for most families, which goes from a non-response from
households with immigrant children to a larger response being exerted by higher edu-
cated households. The increase in the level of mobility is associated to a sharp increase
of the within school immigrant segregation and a small decrease of social segregation,
although heterogeneous results are found depending on the average performance of
the school of interest.
During the last three decades, there has been a clear pattern of educational authori-
ties having increased the degree of school choice in their educational systems (Musset
(2012)). In the US, many school choice reforms were complemented by busing pro-
grammes (e.g. Seattle in 1999 or North Carolina in 2002). In particular, school choice
reforms involve, among others, zoning and de-zoning policies, changes in admission
criteria, and changes in the system of assignment of students and schools.
In Spain, the national legislation in place in 2013 regulates school admission through
the principles of equality of opportunity of learning and freedom of choice for families.
The region of Madrid provides education to more than 1 million students in the city
of Madrid (our main focus of study) and the 178 municipalities of the region, which
taken as a whole is the third largest metropolitan area in the European Union. Regard-
ing school choice criteria, one of the most important priority criteria conceding several
points in case of over-demand for school was proximity to the school up until 2012. The
city of Madrid has 21 school districts, which pre-2013 coincided with administrative ar-
eas regarding such proximity criteria. Between 2012 and 2013, the school system of the
region of Madrid implemented an inter-district school choice reform in primary and
secondary schools of the city of Madrid (and other municipalities), virtually granting
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no importance to the proximity criteria for schools within the same school district of the
household. This largely expanded the supply of potential school choice for families: in
the case of the city of Madrid, families shifted from an average number of 20 schools
per district (the catchment area) to all the municipal network of more than 500 schools.
The relation between school choice reforms and student segregation has generated
significant policy interest, although the lack of identification in large-scale reforms is a
regular caveat. Our paper constitutes a novel piece of evidence on the effects of a large-
scale school choice reform on household mobility and school segregation. We exploit a
unique rich administrative dataset of the universe of student applications and the final
assignment to primary schools receiving public funds in the region of Madrid from 2010
to 2015.1 Data allow us to geographically locate households and schools in order to test
how parents change their preferences in terms of commuting distance and willingness
to take their children to another district of the city. We also use student and census data
to better understand the social and immigrant dynamics after the reform. Moreover, we
use measures of school quality derived from the ”Indispensable Knowledge and Skills”
(CDI in its Spanish acronym) external assessment of students, implemented yearly for
all students at the end of primary school in sixth grade.
We find that parents reacted positively in terms of commuting distance and foreign-
district applications to the inter-district school choice reform. Highest educated par-
ents are more prone to commute, and the reform exacerbated this: while the increase
in inter-district mobility for the lowest education quintile group was of 1.3 percent-
age points, that of the most educated household went up to 5.7 percentage points. At
the same time, parents of non-immigrant children reacted strongly to the reform (an
increase of 3.9 percentage points in inter-district applications), while parents of immi-
grant children did not react at all to the reform in terms of inter-district mobility. We
distinguish between intensive margin (within district) and extensive margin (between
districts) effects. We find that the increase in distance traveled was mostly due to exten-
sive margin effects, i.e. parents commuting to districts different from where they reside.
This suggests, on the one hand, that the reform results that we identify are well related
to the policy implemented (at the district level). On the other, although to a lesser ex-
tent, some distance mobility (an average 4% increase) was also exerted within districts
as a consequence of the reform, probably due to the fact that outer-district applications
1Privately funded schools are not subject to the admission policy, representing around 15% of the total
school network in the region. We do not observe these students in our analysis.
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leave new places in schools within the same district.
Given such heterogeneous responses, we evaluate the consequent effects of mobility
on student segregation across schools from a social (parental education) and immigrant
status perspective. Controlling for school effects and residential segregation dynamics,
we find that student social segregation experienced a small decrease. However, we
find heterogeneous results when we look at the performance of the school of interest:
schools at the bottom of the score distribution seem to report a decrease (increase) in
the level of heterogeneity (segregation), whereas schools in the 3rd, 4th and 5th quintile
of the distribution experience a larger increase in terms of social diversity (decrease in
segregation). We find a significant increase of immigrant segregation, as there is a po-
larization of the share of immigrants at schools: while there was an increase of schools
with a low share of immigrants, the share of schools with a very large share of im-
migrants increased significantly. From an overall perspective, computing segregation
indexes shows non-significant changes of social segregation and a large significant in-
crease of immigrant segregation, jointly due to the policy effect of the reform and the
residential dynamics of immigrant population during the reform.
The results are driven by cream-skimming mechanisms. In particular, we find that
student mobility responses were mediated by the willingness to attend to semi-public
schools (a sort of charter school network in Spain which accounts for 35% of students
in Madrid). Semi-public schools are characterized by serving a larger share of students
from higher socioeconomic backgrounds and native-born status compared to public
schools. The small increase in social diversity of students took place in semi-public
schools and schools with better grades in the standardized tests, whereas social di-
versity in public schools and schools with lower grades did not experience relevant
changes. Conversely, the increase of immigrant segregation was driven by an increase
in the level of segregation in schools placed in low-income districts, the divergence of
public and semi-public schools, and schools in the 3rd and 4th quintiles of the test score
school distribution.
The policy context of the reform cannot be ignored. More specifically, we consider
two key aspects of the system which need to be mentioned. First, school segregation
due to socioeconomic characteristics is already very large in Madrid, while immigrant
segregation is rather low, as has been shown by Murillo et al. (2017) and Murillo and
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Garrido (2018)). Second, in Madrid, as in many other school systems, school assign-
ment through choice in based on the so-called Boston Mechanism, which has shown
limitations to capture truthful families’ preferences (Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez (2003)).
In this scheme, families’ first option of school usually becomes (around 85% for the case
of Madrid) the final school assignment. Together with other contextual factors of the
policy scheme, it is not surprising that the magnitude of the results of the reform are not
as large as one would expect, with an average increase of 3 percentage points on outer
district applications. Looking at final school assignment rather than the first choice
of school as the outcome of interest does not qualitatively alter the magnitude of the
results: if any, compared to first school option, final school assignment (through the
Boston Mechanism) is associated with a larger gradient of parental socioeconomic and
immigrant characteristics for mobility outcomes.
We tackle the regular identification problem of large-scale choice schemes (Epple
et al. (2017)) by exploiting variation in implementation of the reform in municipalities
beyond the city of Madrid. Our identification strategy aims to detect the immediate
response2 of households with new entrants to the education system (at age 3), which
potentially reduces bias concerns. Our approach follows a before-and-after analysis
with a control group of municipalities by looking at the outcomes of interest through
three different school years.
While the policy was implemented in the city of Madrid for the school year 2013/2014,
it was announced in March 2012, allowing for parents to anticipate the reform in terms
of residence. If highly educated parents moved to cheaper districts, the increase in mo-
bility would be mediated by an artificial decrease of residential segregation, rather than
by the true preferences of parents given their place of residence. Nevertheless, control-
ling for the implementation in other municipalities allows us to address this: we look
at parental responses of households living in other municipalities in the region which
also implemented the inter-district school choice, some in 2012 (the smaller ones) and
others in 2013 (the larger ones). We find a similar response in terms of mobility for
both type of municipalities for the year when the proximity criteria was implemented,
suggesting that for the case of those in 2012, the anticipation to the reform may have
played a small role in confounding the response to the reform. Moreover, there were
2Testing family reactions in subsequent years after the reform (after 2013) would potentially raise con-
cerns in the identification of family strategic choices (e.g. changing their residence as a consequence of the
reform) plus other confounding factors that could also be taking place during that period.
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other forces operating at the same time along with the inter-district school choice re-
form, which blurred the marginal impact of the school-choice reform on mobility and
segregation, such as the implementation of the bilingual program for primary schools:
we find that the expansion of this program did not seem to be a crucial confounding
factor for the school choice reform effects, in terms of mobility and segregation.
Another issue in our identification strategy is that the city of Madrid, together with
the rest of municipalities in the region, implemented other relevant changes in terms of
the priority criteria during the year 2012. In particular, the low-income priority bonus
points became more restrictive, whereas a new criterion prioritizing students with rel-
atives that were former students of the school was introduced (allowing for additional
social sorting in highly demanded schools). However, compared to the small change
in mobility observed in Madrid in 2012 (with respect to 2011), we find that the change
in 2013 was independent of these two new criteria, which makes us think that the true
preferences for mobility were mediated by the inter-district school choice criteria and
not by other factors.
Finally, it is puzzling to find that the mobility response driven by highly educated
parents does not link well with the mild decrease in social segregation. It is worth men-
tioning that the lack of accurate data in terms of parental education suggests that we
may be over (under)-estimating the increase (decrease) in within-school (segregation)
heterogeneity of parental education if the reform correlates with unobserved measure-
ment error. Considering the fact that parental education and immigration status cor-
relate negatively in Madrid, we may be computing a lower-bound estimate of social
segregation in 2012 and 2013, so that social segregation may have actually stayed con-
stant or even increased, as was the case of immigrant segregation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 deals with the literature
on school choice and school segregation. Section 3.3 describes and contextualizes the
Madrid school choice reform. Data are detailed in Section 3.4. The results are shown
in Section 3.6 and the mechanisms driving the reform are explored in Section 3.7. Sec-
tion 3.8 addresses several robustness checks and finally Section 3.9 concludes.
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3.2 Related Literature
This research is related to the literature analyzing the effects of school choice policies on
parental preferences, the heterogeneity of those preferences, and the indirect effect on
school segregation. Finally, we discuss the relation of student segregation and student
outcomes.
3.2.1 Geography and Demand for Schooling
The debate on school choice policies often lacks appropriate context to better under-
stand trade-offs faced by households, especially in urban areas. Without specific back-
ground information on the geographical distribution and density of households in a
school district, region or country, it is hard to disentangle results from key theoreti-
cal and empirical nuances. In particular, the degree of specific Tiebout choice around
the household deeply influences the real incentives faced by families. For example,
in large urban areas with usually large residential segregation patterns, excessively
small school zones (with the extreme case of an ex-ante assignment of each student
to a unique nearby school) can end up perpetuating existing geographic segregation
patterns and even promoting strong housing selection incentives which end up exacer-
bating urban segregation (Burgess et al. (2007); Gibbons et al. (2006)). The opposite case
would be to extend all the school districts to a unique one, whch was what happened in
the Madrid reform. In that case, the weight of social and immigrant-origin differences
in the demand for schooling and the commuting capacity may gain importance, leading
to a potential effect on the degree of school sorting. In the Madrid reform, the Regional
Government enlarged the choice zone to the municipal level, granting a larger set of
options to all households. The reform moved from around 2,000 within-municipality
catchment areas to 179 single municipal zones.
Parents typically choose the school with the highest possible performance taking into
account other school characteristics such as proximity and accessibility. The school
performance depends on two main dimensions: school effectiveness and student com-
position. Even for the most educated families, ranking schools in terms of the school
effectiveness is a difficult and imprecise task. In particular, the literature describes that
parents tend to mostly value peer composition of the school and, only to a lesser extent,
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the effectiveness of the school in the learning progress of students given their socioe-
conomic characteristics (Rothstein (2006); Mizala and Urquiola (2013)). Nevertheless,
provision of information matters: Hastings and Weinstein (2008) show with the help of
a natural field experiment that low-socioeconomic parents receiving information about
the school performance increase their likelihood of choosing a high-scoring school.
Additionally, preferences for schools are different depending on family socioeco-
nomic background since preferences for different dimensions of education vary across
types (see Anderson et al. (1992) and Burgess et al. (2015)). Hastings et al. (2009) find
that while high-income families care mainly about test scores, poorer and minority
families must trade off preferences for high-performing schools against preferences
for a predominantly minority nearby schools: the authors argue that the difference
in choice responses leads to a more stratified school system, as the impact of school
choice policies will be determined eventually by parents’ preferences on education. Be-
yond income factors, the sociology and psychology literature have identified several
mechanisms through which school choice is shaped by own aspirations, behaviors, so-
cial capital and networks. For example, Teske and Schneider (2001) discuss parental
involvement and motivation as drivers of differences in school choice.
Moreover, parental preferences can take even more explicit forms as a reaction to
the dynamics of school enrollment. For example, there is evidence that those families
who make the choice to opt out of the assigned school, either to non-public schools or,
when possible, to alternative public schools, are more advantaged (see Levin (1998) for
a review), and place higher value on the academic achievement of schools (Hastings
et al. (2009)). There is also evidence of white flight and of so-called tipping points for
schools, meaning that white students opt out if the minority share increases above a
certain threshold (Card et al. (2010)). In summary, it seems that socioeconomic condi-
tions, immigrant origin, aspirations and motivation, as well as school dynamics shape
parental preferences in both implicit and explicit forms when choosing a school for
their siblings.
3.2.2 School Choice and Segregation
The implementation of reforms that have granted greater choice to families seems to
be positively related to an increase in social and immigrant segregation. For example,
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Sweden implemented two key reforms in 1992 that offered families more choice options
when choosing schools. After the 1992 reform, Bo¨hlmark and Lindahl (2007) find ev-
idence of students being sorted by immigrant origin and parental background shortly
after the reform was implemented, whereas Bo¨hlmark et al. (2016) find a smaller im-
pact in the long term. The 2000 reform, which sought to grant more choice in secondary
schools, has also been documented to increase segregation at schools (So¨derstro¨m and
Uusitalo (2010); Yang Hansen and Gustafsson (2016)). In the case of Chile, Hsieh
and Urquiola (2006) find that school choice did not increase average quality of edu-
cation, but it actually increased segregation. Moreover, the New Zealand reforms im-
plemented in the 1990s have also shown to increase social and immigrant segregation
of schools (Ladd and Fiske (2001)).
However, other factors interacting with choice settings may play a hidden role re-
garding the real effects, such as how schools are able to implement explicit or implicit
forms of discrimination. For example, Burgess and Briggs (2010) investigate the ef-
fect of school choice on social mobility in secondary education in England. They find
that children from poor families are less likely to get places in good schools and this
probability is unaffected by the degree of school choice. This suggests that there must
be other additional features belonging (or related) to the educational system affecting
student mobility beyond the degree of school choice.
3.2.3 Segregation and Outcomes
In the case that certain choice settings may lead to more segregation, it is equally impor-
tant to justify why segregation may become an issue for advanced education systems.
Excessive school segregation is becoming a growing public concern in policy and pub-
lic debates. International organizations are starting to warn education systems about
the risks of chronifying the cycle student disadvantage through school segregation. In
the economics of education literature, the debate on segregation usually pivots around
peer effects (by ability grouping) in the classroom and its impact on academic out-
comes, which seems to be mixed. While Duflo et al. (2011) have found positive effects
of sorting in Kenya basic schools, there are other important consequences of segrega-
tion that take the place both within and outside the classroom and the school. Hastings
et al. (2012) find that the demand-side differences observed among households gener-
ate divergent pressures on high and low-scoring schools, resulting in a wider, rather
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than narrower, gap in achievement. A recent work by Chetty et al. (2016) analyzes the
long-term impact of the Moving to Opportunity (MVO) housing project, which granted
low-income families housing vouchers to move out to better neighborhoods. The au-
thors observe that younger participants moving to a lower-poverty neighborhood were
more likely to attend college and earn a higher wage.
On other topics, Billings et al. (2014) show that the end of de-segregation policies
(through busing programmes) in the USA widened racial inequality again through
more crime and poorer academic results, despite large efforts through compensatory
resource allocation. However, there is also a general concern that social cohesion is ad-
versely affected in excessively segregated education system. While, for example, the
2000 reform in Sweden did not seem to imply a decline in civic attitudes and social co-
hesion as a consequence of greater school segregation (Shafiq and Myers (2014)). Levin
(2002) highlights the importance of social cohesion as one of the key dimensions in a
democratic and free society when thinking about school choice settings. In particular,
he refers to common elements of schooling for diverse student population, with regard
to curriculum, social values, language, and political institutions. Another example is
presented by Cullen et al. (2006), who study the outcomes for students who randomly
get the place at their most preferred school and those who do not. While no academic
effects are found, they find that students experience improvements on nontraditional
measures (e.g. self-reported disciplinary incidents and arrest rates). While most stu-
dents benefit from better peers, clearly the one important question is whether those
potential gains come at the expense of losses of high-performing students in the class-
room and school.
3.3 The School choice reform in Madrid
The Spanish Education System. The Spanish education system consists of 10 years
of compulsory education, which start at age 6 and includes six years of primary school
(up to age 12) and four years of lower secondary education (up to age 16). Even though
compulsory primary education starts at the age of 6, students are offered free universal
access to the public education system from age 3 onwards. Since most of publicly-
funded schools offer preschool and primary education together, age 3 is typically the
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time when families enroll their children to school.3.
Regarding the access to schools, the 1978 Spanish constitution grants the coexistence
of the right to education and the freedom to educate children, an equilibrium of rights
stemming from a political pact between progressive and conservative forces. In terms
of education policy, the second principle was translated into the 1985 education act
(LODE) which explicitly regulated the freedom of families to choose their children’s
school4. In the following years, this was accompanied by a decentralization process
through which educational policies started to be jointly determined at the national,
regional and municipal level5. Since then, the central government is responsible for
establishing the organic laws (Organic Laws) and the royal decrees that the regional
governments are allowed to further develop as long as they do not contradict the or-
ganic laws. With respect to the Spanish school choice policies in the years around the
reform, the national organic law in place at the time of the reform (LOE6) established
the general regulatory principles to be followed by the regional governments in order
to determine the priority criteria of students in over-demanded schools.
In Spain, the vast majority of the school network is publicly funded. Such network
includes public and semi-public schools (we follow Calsamiglia and Gu¨ell (2018), who
name the network of privately managed schools as semi-public schools). Public schools
are fully funded by the government and managed by civil servants and local school
boards. Semi-public schools (centros concertados) are privately run but mostly financed
through public funds. Although tuition fees are not allowed in semi-public schools, in
practice parents pay small quasi-compulsory symbolic donations for basic educational
services that can act as barrier of entry to disadvantaged families. With respect to ad-
missions, all the schools of the public system (public and semi-public) are expected to
unconditionally accept all students assigned by the centralized school choice mecha-
nism, provided demand does not exceed supply.
School Choice in Madrid. In the region of Madrid, the majority of schools (around
85%) are part of the publicly funded network of schools by the Regional Government.
3Preschool education is fully publicly funded from age 3 to 6. This right was recognized in the Organic
Law 1/1990 (Ley Orga´nica de Ordenacio´n General del Sistema Educativo, LOGSE).
4Organic Law 8/1985 (Ley Orga´nica reguladora del Derecho a la Educacio´n.).
5See the Organic Law 9/1992: Ley Orga´nica de transferencia de competencias a Comunidades Auto´nomas que
accedieron a la autonomı´a por la vı´a del artı´culo 143 de la Constitucio´n.
6Ley Orga´nica de Educacio´n 2/2006.
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Such system includes publicly managed schools (which cover around 50% of all stu-
dents) and semi-public schools (privately managed, which cover around 35% of all stu-
dents). Some authors have argued that preferences for education in Spain are mediated
by the existence of the semi-public network (Arellano and Zamarro (2007); Mancebo´n
et al. (2012)). These schools tend to be located in urban areas are larger in size, and
serve more upper-middle income and non-immigrant households. In terms of the so-
cial composition of students in secondary education schools, the region of Madrid is
the most socially segregated (where social means social, economic and cultural charac-
teristics of the family) among all autonomous communities in Spain and neighboring
countries (Murillo and Garrido (2018)), while its immigrant-origin segregation is rather
low in terms of other Spanish regions (Murillo et al. (2017)).
The school choice system has been further updated and regulated after the 2006 LOE
education act was passed. A centralized assignment mechanism is used to allocate
students to schools in the publicly funded system (both public and semi-public) for
pre-primary (starting at age 3) primary, and lower secondary, as well as for special ed-
ucation. Families are requested to submit a ranked-order list of schools up to a total
number of choices, and their children are allocated by the centralized and algorithm-
based automatic allocation procedure, the so-called Boston Mechanism (see Abdulka-
diroglu and So¨nmez (2003)).
The application timing works as follows. Before the school year starts in Septem-
ber (between end of April and early May), every participating family is requested to
submit the ranked-order list of schools to their first choice. Applicants are assigned
into a school by means of the Boston Mechanism (BM hereafter), a centralized school
choice system which works as follows. First, students are allocated to their first choice
school. For schools where there is an over-demand of students, students are granted
priority points (according to several criteria which depend on student characteristics
and location of the household or parental job) which provide them with a rank num-
ber that assigns places to students until all available places are filled. Ties are broken
conditional on priority bonus points obtained7. In the second step, students who are
rejected from their first choice are proposed to their second submitted school in the
rank list provided there is room available after the first step. If there are more appli-
cants than available places, students are allocated in the same way as before with the
7See Table 3.12 in the Appendix for further details.
53
priority points granted in the first choice. In the third step, those students who are re-
jected from their second choice are proposed to their third choice, and the mechanism
continues until all students are assigned a place in a school of the public system.
The final assignment is made public in June, and enrollment must take place at the
end of June (for pre-primary and primary education) or July to September (for lower
secondary education). A special feature of the system is that student’s priority points
that are used for tie-breaking at all stages are based on the ones obtained in the first
choice.8.
Until recently, the BM has been very influential in practice (beyond Spanish regions,
US school districts which used this mechanism included Boston, Cambridge, Denver,
Minneapolis and Seattle, among others, as well as other cities such as Beijing, Am-
sterdam or Frankfurt). One of the special features of this assignment system is that
the choice of the first ranked school is highly important, since the assignment in each
round is final. The probability of a student of being admitted in the second round
relative to the first is substantially reduced, and the chances decrease even more in fur-
ther rounds.9 Moreover, recent empirical evidence supports the theory. In the case of
Barcelona, Calsamiglia and Gu¨ell (2018) highlight the fact that more than 85 percent
of the assignments are resolved in the first round, and this is persistent across differ-
ent cities worldwide10. In Madrid, around 86 percent of children were assigned to the
school they ranked first, as will be seen in Section 3.4.
Reform of the priority criterion to school access. As highlighted above, in case of
over-demand at a certain school, students are assigned to schools based on a government-
determined priority criterion, which grants points to students according to their charac-
teristics and their home residence or parental job location. For school choice, the region
8As Calsamiglia (2014) states, the main reason why the government uses this procedure is because it is
computationally easier. Alternative assignment mechanisms require computational power that currently
the education administration cannot deal with.
9 Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez (2003) highlighted that one of the major difficulties of the BM is the fact
that it is not strategy-proof. A student may be highly prioritize to enter a school s, but if she does not
list it as her first choice, she loses her seat in favor of students who have listed s as their top choice. BM
provides incentives to families to misrepresent their preferences by ranking first those schools where they
have higher priorities.
10See also Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2006) for Boston; Hastings et al. (2009) for Charlotte; Lavy (2010) for
Tel Aviv; and De Haan et al. (2015) for Amsterdam.
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of Madrid is divided into 179 municipalities, with the medium and large-size munici-
palities being subsequently divided into school choice catchment areas11. In particular,
the city of Madrid (the largest municipality and our main unit of analysis) is divided
into 21 districts, which coincide with such choice catchment areas. Table 3.1 exhibits
the score scale used in the city of Madrid before and after the reform12. Before the
reform (school year 2011/2012) and regarding proximity, children living or any par-
ent/guardians working in the (a boundary) district of the school ranked first received 4
points (2 points). Regarding student individual characteristics, students were awarded
2 points if their per capita household income was under the IPREM Index (7,236.60
euros),13 and got 1 point if their per capita household income was between 100% and
200% of the IPREM (between 7,236.60 and 14,473.20 euros). Families which ranked a
school where there was a sibling first got 4 points, plus an additional 3 for every sibling
enrolled at this school. Students received extra points if they have a family member
with a disability (1.5 points), and if they belonged to a large family (1.5 if general - 3
children - and 2.5 if special- 4 or more children-). In addition, a specific point (1 point)
was decentralized to the school decision, which must be decided according to objective
criteria that are made public.
In March 2012, the Regional Government announced a reform that aimed at strength-
ening the principle of school choice by households with children entering pre-primary,
primary and lower secondary schools14. The Regional Government founded its argu-
ments on the constitutional right that parents have to educate their children based on
their convictions. The goals of the government policy were to increase families partic-
ipation, improve the availability of information on schools (through the results on the
standardized test scores, school’s educational program, school resources and services),
simplify the admission process, promote school competition, and enhance free school
choice. In particular, the reform modified the computation of student’s priorities in
each school, as can be seen in Table 3.1 for the city of Madrid. The changes in priority
points and school districts were implemented in two consecutive years:
1. In 2012/2013:
11Called as zonas de influencia.
12The Table also applies to the rest of the municipalities regarding the individual characteristics.
13IPREM is the acronym in Spanish for Multiple Effects Income Public Index and represents a minimum
annual threshold for social programs and subsidy eligibility. The Index remained constant between 2010
and 2015.
14Order 2939/2012 of March 9 of the Regional Government of Madrid.
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• The criterion to obtain bonus points awarded to low-income students was
reduced and changed.
• A new priority bonus was awarded when a student’s family member was a
former student of the first listed school.15
2. In 2013/2014: The proximity to school criterion was relaxed: the Regional Gov-
ernment of Madrid updated the regulatory framework with a regional decree16
which regulated the single school choice for all the municipalities of the region.
For the city of Madrid, this implied turning from 21 districts (with around 20
schools per district) as choice catchment areas to a single municipal with more
than 500 schools 17.
In 2012/2013, a sharp decline in the bonus for low-income students was introduced.
Children were awarded 2 points if the family received the Minimum Income for Inser-
tion Subsidy (Renta Mı´nima de Insercio´n), a social program which is granted to a small
proportion of low-income households with no earnings (0.9% of the total population
in the region of Madrid). The number of recipients of this subsidy are much less nu-
merous (around 30,000 households in a region of more than 6 million population) than
the families with a per capita household income under the 100% of the IPREM (around
15% of the population18) and even less than those between 100% and 200% of IPREM.
Finally, an additional 1.5 points were awarded for students in a school were any family
member had been a former student, an issue that may potentially limit equality of op-
portunity of students to access certain schools, given the weight given to socioeconomic
background of parents19.
In 2013/2014, family incentives to apply for a school inside their residence district
were shifted with the implementation of the inter-district school choice (hereafter the
15Additionally, more points were awarded to families with siblings enrolled at school. Following Cal-
samiglia and Gu¨ell (2018), we consider this change irrelevant for the analysis, given that students’ choice
are previously conditioned by their older siblings’ choice, and we do not include students with older
siblings in our analysis.
16Decree 29/2013 (Decreto del Consejo de Gobierno, de libertad de eleccio´n de centro escolar en la Comunidad de
Madrid).
17Relative to 2012/2013, 2 more points were awarded to families with siblings enrolled at school. We do
not consider this change relevant for our analysis.
18The share of households at risk of poverty or social exclusion in Madrid in 2014 was 19.2%. The
poverty line in 2014 was established at 7,961 euros, slightly higher than the IPREM index, 6,390 euros.
19Tie-break criteria were slightly modified, as can be seen in Table 3.12 of Appendix.
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Madrid reform is referred as the inter-district school choice reform). A student liv-
ing or with parents working and applying for a school in the same school district was
awarded with 0.5 points, plus 4 points (2 points) if the school was in the same munici-
pality (other municipality of the region) of the household or the parental workplace2021.
Overall, the inter-district choice reform was operationalized through a large drop in the
importance of the proximity criteria for over-demanded schools.
TABLE 3.1: Priority Points in case of over-demand of Schools in the City of Madrid.
BONUS CRITERIA
NUMBER OF POINTS
Before 2012/2013 2012/2013 2013/2014
Proximity -Madrid city-
Family house or parents’ work in:
School district 4 4
Boundary school district 2 2
Family house or parents’ work in:
Same municipality 4
School district 0.5
Region of Madrid 2
Low-income
Income<=IPREM 2
IPREM <Income <=2IPREM 1
Minimum Insertion Subsidy 2 2
Siblings First one 4pts, and additional 3pts 4One or more 8 10
Disability Parents, students or siblings 1.5 1.5 1.5
Large Family General 1.5 1.5 1.5Special 2.5 2.5 2.5
Former student Family member is former student 1.5 1.5
School 1 1 1
discretionary
Notes: The changes beyond the proximity criteria were applied together across all medium and large municipalities. IPREM is
the acronym in Spanish for the Multiple Effects Income Public Index, which was e7,455.14 in the period of study. The Minimum
Insertion Subsidy (Renta Mı´nima de Insercin) is a special provision granted for people with lower income than IPREM. School
discretionary is a point that the schools have freedom to assign by “public and objective” criteria.
20The weight of going to a school within the same district of household residence/parental job went
from 4 points out of 4 to 0.5 points out of 4.5 points after the reform.
21Tie-break criteria were also slightly modified, as can be seen in Table 3.12 of Appendix.
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Implementation of the reform in other municipalities. In the region of Madrid, the
number of school catchment areas (districts for the city of Madrid) depended on the
size of the municipality. The region has 179 municipalities. The smallest 142 munici-
palities - with a population of less than 10,000/15,000 inhabitants - have always had a
unique school catchment area, whereas larger municipalities had more than one. Due
to implementation capacity reasons, the expansion of the inter-district school choice
across medium and large-size municipalities was conducted in two consecutive years:
(i) In 2012/2013, 22 municipalities mostly of medium size (with a population between
15,000 and 100,000 inhabitants approximately) adopted the inter-district school choice
policy; (ii) In 2013/2014, the remaining 15 municipalities (mostly all the larger ones,
including the city of Madrid) adopted the inter-district school choice policy.22 We use
the gradual implementation across municipalities as a robustness check.
3.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.4.1 Data
We use a combination of four administrative datasets that provide rich and unique
information on the universe of primary school applications of each household in the
region of Madrid, the characteristics of publicly funded schools in the region of Madrid,
the education of households at the census block level in the city of Madrid, and the
standardized test scores at the school level (CDI). Data on student applications, schools
and school test scores were provided by the Education Ministry (Consejerı´a de Educacio´n)
of the Madrid Regional Government, and data on parental education was obtained
from the Madrid Census. Information is available for every year from 2010/11 (2010
hereafter) to 2015/2016 (2015 hereafter).
Primary education applications. Our primary source of analysis is a unique and rich
dataset containing information on the universe of all students who applied for a new
school in primary education in the region of Madrid. For each applicant, the dataset
contains the priority list of schools ranked from one to fourteen, the basic student infor-
mation regarding family characteristics, home address, priority points obtained based
22Table 3.13 in the Appendix provides a summary of the municipalities that joined the single-zone school
choice system across years.
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on such characteristics and final school of assignment. Regarding family information,
student home residence is given using geographic coordinates which we link (with the
help of geolocation software) to different geographical areas (neighborhoods and dis-
tricts). In addition, the application contains information about the student’s country of
birth, which we use to construct a variable of immigrant background status.
School database. The Madrid Regional Government also provided a list with the uni-
verse of schools and some of their features: the geographic coordinates of each school,
the school ownership (public, semi-public or private), whether the school offers bilin-
gual education (Spanish and English), and the levels of education offered.
Household socioeconomic characteristics. We use information from the Census Of-
fice of the city of Madrid which provides the distribution of education levels of the pop-
ulation by geographical levels of the city in 2014. The data is accessible for the three
geographical levels of disaggregation: districts, neighborhoods and blocks. The most
disaggregated units are the census blocks (Seccio´n censal), which are constructed for lo-
cal, regional and national election purposes (assigning each block to one voting center),
and usually contain no more than 2,500 people23. We have access to information on the
proportion of population in each education category by age groups at the census block
level. We use this to translate the corresponding level of education to an equivalent
number of years of schooling24, which allows us to compute the average number of
years of schooling for each block25. We assign to each family the corresponding value
at the block where the family resides. This proxy for parental education is potentially
obtained with measurement error. Limitations and potential unobserved heterogeneity
issues are discussed in Section 3.8.
CDI Tests. In order to proxy school quality, we use a standardized exam admin-
istered for all Year 6 students in the region of Madrid between the 2004/2005 and
2014/2015 school years. The exam, known as the Essential Knowledge and Skills test
23Figure 3.5 in the Appendix includes an example of a block of the Central district of Madrid.
24The construction of this variable is detailed in the Appendix.
25Ideally, one would use data from 25-49 age group to obtain a more accurate proxy for the parental
education, as this is the most relevant level of education for parents with preschool and primary school
children. Nevertheless, we do not use this measure as the main one because the database corresponds to
2017, too far from the years of the reform.
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(CDI-Conocimientos y Destrezas Indispensables), was designed for education policy mea-
sures, not for specific academic consequences on students. In particular, the goal of
the test was to provide information for policymakers, schools and families about the
school’s average performance. The test focused mostly on curriculum content knowl-
edge in the areas of reading and mathematics. The results were publicized every year
with the purpose of facilitating school choice for families with new students entering
the system.
3.4.2 Sample Restrictions
Table 3.2 presents the restrictions for the analysis sample. Depending on the year of
interest, there are about 34,000 to 37,000 students who apply for a school of the public
education system in the city of Madrid. Our population of interest consists of those
students who live in the city of Madrid, apply to schools in Madrid, and have no sib-
lings in the first-ranked school. Following Calsamiglia and Gu¨ell (2018), we focus on
students with no older siblings enrolled in the school of first choice due to the fact
that such families have different incentives and behavior compared to the rest of appli-
cants: their present choice is previously conditioned by their past choice. The amount
of bonus points that families obtain when applying for a school where a sibling is al-
ready enrolled is the highest, and the admission to those schools is almost automatically
guaranteed. These families may therefore react differently to policy changes since they
have distinct preferences and incentives.
Despite the fact that the administrative dataset of applications is unique and exhaus-
tive, adding other sources of information for the analysis implies some observations
(detailed in Table 3.2) are missing. For example, our analysis focuses on all students
who apply for a school where information on the test scores (our measure of school
quality) is available. We are able to identify the school test score measure for about
90% to 95% of the observations. Finally, given the importance of identifying geograph-
ical mobility patterns, we discard students whose address information is missing or
not valid. This may be because school application forms are manually submitted to
the school or the central administration which then introduce the information into the
digital centralized system (Calsamiglia and Gu¨ell (2018)). We are able to identify the
address of about 99% percent of the final population of interest. The analysis is based
on a population of about 26,000 to 29,000 observations, depending on the school year.
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TABLE 3.2: Sample Restrictions: School Applicants in the city of Madrid over 2010-
2015.
Number of Applicants 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total unique applications 37,146 39,986 37,300 36,273 35,727 34,124
Students with no siblings 32,009 30,594 30,930 30,022 29,341 27,762
School test scores 29,977 28,884 29,488 28,714 27,810 26,487
Valid Address 29,666 28,720 29,338 28,577 27,807 26,491
Total Final Sample 29,736 28,700 29,205 28,478 27,579 26,271
Notes: Each year corresponds to the year of application and the school
year starting in September of that year.
3.4.3 Descriptive Statistics of Applicants
Table 3.3 displays summary statistics of applicants. First, the majority of applicants
(more 60 percent) are applying to start in preschool education at age 3, which is the
key stage of enrollment at schools. Following Calsamiglia and Gu¨ell (2018), we keep
this as our group of interest in the analysis, given that assignment after this age in
over-demanded schools becomes extremely difficult due to the lack of available places.
Beyond this, a large fraction of applicants are native students (around 85 percent),
whereas the rest represents the foreign-born student population. In 2013, there was
a significant rise in the proportion of immigrant students, from 12.9% to 16.6, although
this is consistent with the city demographics26. In our empirical strategy, we account
for these changes by tracking residential dynamics of the immigrant population. The
proportion of boys and girls remains constant over the period. Moreover, students
awarded places with each of the two new priority bonus created in the 2012 reform
only account for a small part: between 3% and 4% for the new low-income bonus and
around 6% for former student relatives at the school. We do not drop these students
from the main sample analysis due to the fact that we do not have this information for
years before the reform. Discarding these observations may lead to a sample selection
bias between the period before and after the reform.
26According to official municipal data in the city of Madrid, there was a sharp decrease of births in 2009
(who were age 3 in 2012) and 2010 (who were 3 in 2013) with respect to those born in 2008. In particular the
number of births in the city of Madrid was 36,663 in 2008, 35,147 in 2009 and 33,987 in 2008. Conversely,
the number of immigrants increased between 2010 and 2013. Hence, the observed drops in the census are
consistent with those observed in Table 3.2.
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TABLE 3.3: Summary Statistics: School Applicants in the City of Madrid over 2010-
2015.
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
A. Grades
Preschool Age 3 18,391 18,289 18,006 16,970 16,323 16,266
[0,62] [0,64] [0,62] [0,6] [0,59] [0,62]
Preschool Age 4 2,738 2,571 2,850 2,746 2,556 2,268
[0,09] [0,09] [0,1] [0,1] [0,09] [0,09]
Preschool Age 5 2,087 1,925 2,156 2,306 2,109 1,769
[0,07] [0,07] [0,07] [0,08] [0,08] [0,07]
Primary 1th grade 4,254 3,946 3,973 4,121 4,315 3,899
[0,14] [0,14] [0,14] [0,14] [0,16] [0,15]
Primary 2 to 5th grade 1,602 1,373 1,539 1,618 1,559 1,451
[0,05] [0,05] [0,05] [0,06] [0,06] [0,06]
Primary 6th grade 664 596 681 717 717 618
[0,02] [0,02] [0,02] [0,03] [0,03] [0,02]
B. Students characteristics - Preschool Age 3
Total Students 18,391 18,289 18,006 16,970 16,323 16,266
B.1. Gender
Boys 9,351 9,290 9,316 8,671 8,142 8,291
Girls 9,040 8,999 8,690 8,299 8,181 7,975
B.2. Immigrant Status
Native 16,221 15,923 15,023 14,335 13,969 14,046
Immigrant 2,170 2,366 2,983 2,635 2,354 2,220
C. Bonus information
Bonus for Former student N/A N/A 909 821 863 2,125
Bonus for RMI N/A N/A 638 601 645 615
Notes: Each year corresponds to the year of application and the school year starting in
September of that year. Data on bonus information for former students and RMI was
not available before 2012 given the reform was implemented that year.
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3.5 Empirical Strategy
Families elaborate their submitted list of schools depending on their preferences and
school priorities. This, together with the response of other families, determines the
probability of being assigned to a given school. In this paper, we attempt to first esti-
mate the impact of changes in priorities on families choices and, second, their subse-
quent outcomes in terms of student composition at schools according to their social (i.e.
parental education) and immigrant (estimated through the country of birth) character-
istics. Hence, we investigate whether the choice reform has a direct impact on student
mobility, and as a secondary effect on student sorting and segregation.
We exploit two successive changes in the school priority points (described in Sec-
tion 3.3): (i) In 2012, bonus points for low-income households were reduced, whereas
bonus points for new criteria of former school students were incorporated; (ii) In 2013,
bonus points for proximity were relaxed, leaving an almost de facto inter-district school
choice area for the city of Madrid. These two changes modified the set of schools where
families could have a high degree priority to attend. We identify the effect of these
changes on family preferences comparing school choices immediately before and af-
ter these changes. We focus our main analysis on families that applied for a school in
the city of Madrid, with no siblings enrolled in the first listed school, and with children
starting school at age 3. We use the school ranked in the first position as the main proxy
for household preferences.
3.5.1 Geographic Mobility
We look at two different indicators to investigate changes in mobility after the reform in
the city of Madrid, which are complementary to each other. First, we compute the com-
muting distance between household and the first ranked school. We do so by using the
Open Source Routing Machine (OSRM) routine, which returns the travel distance using
the latitude and longitude coordinates of the household and the school 27. Second, we
look at whether parents aim to send their children to a school located in a different dis-
trict from the one of the household. Both variables provide different information: while
27The command computes such distance within a map: we use OpenStreetMap as it allows to work
offline with an unlimited request of distances to be computed and replicated (Huber and Rust (2016)). The
database contains the UTM coordinates in ED50 base. The OSRM command needs GPS coordinates and
ETRS89 base so we use a Geographical Information System (GIS) to turn them into suitable coordinates.
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outer district application may be seen as a pure “extensive margin” measure of mobil-
ity, the average distance to first choice school may represent a combination of “inten-
sive” and “extensive margin” variable of mobility, as the distance traveled may include
within and between district mobility. An important issue in this case and, to a lesser
extent, in the computation of the commuting distance variable, is that we cannot iden-
tify parental workplace. Given that the reform reduces the importance of the district of
both the household and workplace location, we need to assume that parental mobility
to the workplace is constant during the years of the reform. Otherwise, changes in stu-
dent mobility to schools could be driven by greater parent mobility to the workplace
during the years of the reform.
Baseline regression. To identify the effect of change in priorities on the different mea-
sures of families preferences for geographic mobility, we use the following reduced-
form equation:
Dijt = α+ βYear2012ij + γYear2013ij + Xn + eijt (3.1)
where Dijt is either the travel distance from the residence of the student i to the first
choice school j in year t in her application form, or a dummy that takes value 1 if
student i applies for a school j located in a different district where she resides in year
t, and 0 otherwise. Year2012ij is a dummy that takes value 1 if student i applies for
a school j in the academic year 2012/2013. Year2013ij is a dummy that takes value 1
if student i applies for a school j in the academic year 2013/2014. The coefficient α
captures the mean outcome variable for the year prior to the reform, 2011 (academic
year 2011/2012). We also control for the population density of the neighborhood n (the
next geographical unit inside districts) where the student’s household i lives (Xn) since
it is a determinant factor on our outcome variables. We focus on the year immediately
after the reform in order to capture the response to change in priorities. Looking at
the family reactions in consequent years after the reform (after 2013) would potentially
increase the bias concern in families choices, due to the fact that families had time to
learn from the reform and change their reactions to the policy (e.g. changing their
residence as a consequence of the reform) plus other confounding factors that could
also be taking place during that period. Our identification strategy aims to detect the
immediate response of households (β for 2012 and γ for 2013) with entrants to the
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education system (at age 3)28. Our empirical strategy analyzes the response of different
cohorts of new students across years: hence we need to assume that the distribution of
preferences remain constant over time. This seems to be highly plausible at least for the
specific years of the reform.
Heterogeneous Responses. We also attempt to identify heterogeneous responses by
family characteristics as a prior step to understand the student segregation and sorting
dynamics. We look at the family background of students in two dimensions: parental
education and student nationality (immigration status). This allows the social and
immigrant-origin dynamics in the responses to the reform to be understood.
In order to identify the heterogeneous effects on parental education we use:
Dijt =α+ βYear2012ij + γYear2013ij + pic∑
c
EDUi,c + κc∑
c
EDUi,c ∗Year2012ij+
+ ηc∑
c
EDUi,c ∗Year2013ij + Xn + eijt
(3.2)
where EDUi,c is a set of dummies accounting for the family educational background c
for the student i. These dummies represent quintiles of years of adult education of the
census block in which the student lives in.
We use the following specification to estimate heterogeneous effects on student im-
migrant status:
Dijt =α+ βYear2012ij + γYear2013ij + λInmijt + θ Inmijt ∗Year2012ij+
σInmijt ∗Year2013ij + Xn + eijt
(3.3)
where Inmijt is a dummy that takes value 1 if student i is an immigrant who applies for
a school j in year t, and 0 otherwise. pic and λ represent the average differences in the
outcome variable for each category of student background status (parental education or
28Using students who are already in the system and apply for a school change may bias the results.
First, after the first year of entrance to the system (at age 3), students have priority to remain at the same
school (if they plan to continue in primary education at first grade). Students who enter the system after
age 3 do not face the same set of feasible schools than students that enter the system at age 3 as they
depend on school available slots due to current students leaving the school, under-demand of capacity, etc.
Second, these families may have different preferences for schools. Third, these households may act even
more strategically due to the fact that they potentially know better how the system works since they had
previously applied. Hence, students who enter the system for the first time (at age 3) may have different
preferences, priorities and behavior than students that aim to change the school later in the system, which
may make it more difficult to compare both groups.
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immigrant status) before the reform. Our parameters of interest are κc and ηc (θ and σ)
for parental education (immigrant status), which capture the immediate heterogeneous
responses of families choices after the reform.
3.5.2 School Segregation
The second goal of this paper is to estimate the effect of the change in priorities on the
level of sorting and segregation of new students entering the school system. We test
whether the flow of new entrants to the school system is now more or less socially and
immigrant-origin concentrated within schools due to the policy reform. We refer to so-
cial diversity/heterogeneity (the opposite of social segregation) for parental education
and immigrant segregation for immigrant-status segregation. We identify the reform
effects net of other important factors such as school effects or dynamics in residential
segregation of students (e.g. due to the increase in immigrant arrivals concentrated in
some neighborhoods). The analysis on mobility outcomes may drive heterogeneous
differences in responses to the reform that may lead to an impact on later stages of the
education cycle (primary, secondary and post-secondary schooling) and affect oppor-
tunities for students to attend schools with students from diverse social and immigrant
backgrounds.
Social Heterogeneity. We use a two-stage method to compute the change in within-
school heterogeneity regarding student’s parental education. Hence, what we are com-
puting is an inverse measure of social segregation of schools. In the first step, we regress
student’s parental education on school dummies and neighborhood fixed effects of the
school in a joint regression for 2011, 2012 and 2013. This can be seen as:
EDUijt = α+ φj + δn + eijt (3.4)
where EDUijt are the number of parental years of education of student i applying for
a school j in year t, φj are school fixed effects, and δn are neighborhood fixed effects.
We take the absolute value of the student residual (|eˆij|), and for a better interpretation,
we use the logarithm of the residual in the second step. This provides a measure of
the student parental education variation that cannot be explained by the school that
the student is applying for and the neighborhood heterogeneity in parental education
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where the student resides.
In the second step, we regress this value on a year dummy to measure the average
effect of the reform on school heterogeneity. In other words, to establish whether the
unexplained variance of student parental education has changed due to the reform.
Hence, the estimation can be described as follows:
log|eˆijt| = α+ θYear2012ij + κYear2013ij + ε ij (3.5)
where the coefficients θ and κ are the average change in the student social diversity or
heterogeneity in 2012 and 2013. A positive value of the estimates would be interpreted
as an increase in social heterogeneity (decrease in segregation), and a negative one as
decrease in the level of social heterogeneity (raise in social segregation).
The residual |eˆij| of student i for school j reflects the level of student heterogeneity
that may not be explained by the school fixed effect and the residential dynamics of
the Madrid households between 2011 and 2013. The second estimation step regresses
this measure of student heterogeneity on the post-reform year dummies net of other
contextual factors such as the school and the neighborhood.
Immigrant-origin Segregation. A slightly different process is followed regarding the
estimation of changes in the composition of immigrant population across the school
network in the city of Madrid after the reform. While parental education (measured
by years of schooling) is a continuous variable, immigrant status of the student is a
dummy variable which is identified at the student level. This implies that, although the
variable is very precise at the student level, we cannot compute a measure of immigrant
diversity at the school level, but simply a measure of incidence of immigrant population
for each school. Hence, we first consider the following linear model at the level of the
school:
Imjt = α+ φj + δNjt + θYear2012j + κYear2013j + ejt (3.6)
where Imjt is the proportion of immigrants among students applying for school j. φj
are school fixed effects, and Njt is the average proportion of immigrants in the neigh-
borhood where school j is located in year t, which allows to control for residential dy-
namics of the immigrant population across neighborhoods. Moreover, θ and κ are the
average change in the immigrant school composition in 2012 and 2013. To understand
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the differential effects among the distribution of immigrants across schools, we report
the equivalent quantile regression of Equation 3.6 to measure the differential effect of
2012 and 2013 with respect to 2011 for each of the nine deciles of the distribution of the
proportion of immigrants at each school.
3.5.3 Identification Challenges
A potential identification challenge may be that we cannot entirely capture the response
in family preferences since we only observe the school ranked first in the submitted list.
In fact, the school choice allocation mechanism plays a key role. A special characteristic
of the BM is the fact that first choice is crucial for final allocation. Abdulkadiroglu and
So¨nmez (2003) show that this mechanism is not strategy-proof, implying that families
have incentives to misreport their true preference list by ranking first a school where
they have higher priorities, due to the fact that rounds are final in this algorithm.29 Fur-
thermore Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2011) highlight that one of the features of the BM is
that it better takes the students’ cardinal preferences into account, compared to other
algorithms with better ordinal desirable properties (e.g. Gale Shapley or Top Trading
Cycles). Moreover, a particularity of Madrid is the fact that student’s priority points
are always measured for the school ranked first, which provides an additional incen-
tive to families to think carefully about their first choice and potentially to apply for the
school where they have highest chances. Table 3.4 shows the percentage of students
who were assigned to the school they ranked first, those who went to a school they did
not rank first, and those not assigned to any of their listed schools. It shows that about
86 percent of the students were assigned to the school they ranked first, and around 3
percent were not assigned to any of the schools families listed. These numbers are con-
sistent with the results of Calsamiglia and Gu¨ell (2018) and Lavy (2010), where under
the same allocation mechanism, find that between 85 and 90 percent of the students
were assigned to the school they ranked first in Barcelona and Tel Aviv respectively.
Hence, despite not being able to capture the entire information of family incentives, the
school ranked first is crucial under the BM to understand preferences and provides a
vital amount of information about them (while not so much under a truth-telling al-
location mechanism). In Section 3.8, we consider an alternative specification of results
with data from school assignment as opposed to data from the first choice of school.
29This allocation mechanism is not efficient, and it might create situations, called justified envies, when
a student is rejected from a school while another one with lower priority is accepted.
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TABLE 3.4: School Allocation in Madrid over 2010-2015.
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Assigned to first choice of school 15,640 15,286 15,703 14,845 14,253 1,4049
[0.85] [0.84] [0.87] [0.87] [0.87] [0.87]
Assigned to other school 2,226 2,203 1,961 1,693 1,604 1,539
[0.12] [0.12] [0.11] [0.1] [0.1] [0.09]
Not assigned to any ranked school 525 800 342 432 466 678
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04]
Total Students 18,391 18,289 18,006 16,970 16,323 16,266
Notes: Each year corresponds to the year of application and the school year starting in September
of that year.
A second potential identification threat would be the announcement of the reforms.
The inter-district school choice reform was a proposal in the electoral program of the
political party that won the elections in the region of Madrid in May 201130. The infor-
mation on the 2012 (and 2013) priority changes was disclosed to the press in February
2012, and announced formally through an administrative order in March 2012. A po-
tential identification problem would arise if families reacted before the implementation
of the reform (e.g. by changing their main household of residence). Hastings et al.
(2009) find that the preferences for high ranked schools increase with proximity, and
that parents with higher income are more willing to commute farther away for such
schools. This increases the demand for districts with higher average public school per-
formance that raise housing prices in those districts (see e.g. Fack and Grenet (2010)).
A relaxation of the proximity priority criteria may reduce these incentives, and poten-
tially stimulate families to change their main residence to districts with lower housing
prices (typically positively correlated to lower school performance), since living in the
school district of the desired school is not as decisive as previously in terms of admis-
sion probabilities. In this case, a potential positive significant effect on out of district
application (and distance to school) may be correlated to this dispersion effect, leading
to an upward bias in our estimates that would reflect an upper bound of the “true”
effect. Applications must be handled between April and May of the academic year,
implying that families did not have much time from March to May of 2012 to distort
their decisions. However, they had about one year between the reform was formally
30In the programme, the winning party in the 2011 election (the conservative party Partido Popular)
included the following statement: ”to establish full freedom of school choice, implementing a single zone for
parents to bring their children to whichever school they wanted”.
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announced and the 2013 applications, potentially raising concerns about their anticipa-
tion.
3.6 Results
This section analyzes the changes in student mobility and student segregation induced
by the school choice reform in the city of Madrid. First, we start by describing the
changes in geographical mobility. Second, we investigate the effects of the reform on
the within-school social and immigrant segregation. Third, we look at overall equilib-
rium effects by computing an index of segregation widely used in the literature.
3.6.1 Geographic Mobility
FIGURE 3.1: Measures of Student mobility to school before and after the reform.
Notes: Blue dots are point estimates. Horizontal lines are confidence intervals at 95%.
70
Figure 3.1 plots the average and confidence intervals of the estimates for two measures
of geographic mobility (outer district application and distance traveled) between 2010
and 2015. The red stripes reflect the two consecutive changes in the choice priority
system in 2012 and 2013. Panel A and B of the Figure show a significant increase in the
level of mobility after the reform. In particular, the measure of intra-district mobility
shows that almost 11% of parents had already aimed to bring their children to districts
other than the ones they lived in (probably reflecting parental job mobility prior to the
reform) by 2010. After the reform, this rose above 13% of applications, an increase
of more than 2 percentage points (18%). Moreover, the measure of distance traveled
to school increased from an average of 1,300 meters in 2010 and 2011 to almost 1,540
meters in 2013 and the subsequent years, a rise of 18%. For both indicators, the change
seems to be fairly stable for all years after the reform. The most important moment
when the change took place in 2013 and although 2012 already marked a change in the
trend, it does not seem to be significant with respect to 2011.
Table 3.5 presents the results of the baseline regression and heterogeneous models
described previously in Equations 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. We present the results of the 2012
and 2013 effect using 2011 as the baseline year in all equations. Panel A shows that
the reform increased the fraction of students applying to a school outside their district
of residence by 1.2 and 3.3 percentage points in 2012 and 2013, respectively, at the 0.1
percent level of confidence. In addition, the policy raised the willingness to travel a
greater distance by 11.6% in 2013. Panel B displays heterogeneous effects by parental
education. It seems that families with more educated parents are more willing to both
apply for an outer district school and commute a longer distance, relative to lower ed-
ucated households. The effect of the reform in outer district applications was highly
heterogeneous. While only the highest educated families (5th quintile) responded pos-
itively to the changes in 2012, all education groups responded positively by 2013 but
with different magnitudes: while the effect for the 1st and 2nd education quintile was a
1.3 percentage point increase, the magnitudes of the effects are increasing in the quin-
tiles of the parental education distribution, with additional 2.2, 2.4 to 4.4 percentage
points for 3rd, 4th and 5th quintiles respectively. In contrast, the reform does not seem
to affect the willingness to commute similarly: while all groups respond positively, the
second and fifth education quintiles are more willing to commute after 2013 (by about
an additional 7% to 8%) than the rest. Panel C also shows heterogeneous effects by im-
migrant status. Parents of immigrant students were less prone to apply for a school out
of their district of residence (a difference of 4.2 percentage points compared to native
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students) and to commute (18.8% less relative to native students) prior to the reform.
The reform affected positively both natives and immigrants in 2012 (1.6 percentage
points) for outer district applications, and did not have a significant effect on commut-
ing distance. In 2013, however, immigrants did not changed their behavior compared
to 2011, whereas native students reacted positively to the reform (in about 4 percentage
points) for outer district applications. In terms of the distance commuted, households
with native students responded responded by a 12.9% greater willingness to commute,
whereas immigrant students responded 6.1% less than their native peers, so that their
aggregate response to the reform is positive and significant (6.8%), but smaller relative
to native students.
Overall, there are two important findings. First, on average, the reform implied a
positive response in terms of mobility for most households, both in distance traveled
and outer-district commutes. Second, the effect was not homogeneous across social
groups and native-immigrant population. In particular, students from the most ed-
ucated households and native students where the ones that reacted positively to the
reform, whereas students from less educated households or students from immigrant
origins either displayed mild or negligible response to the reform. These results are
consistent with previous evidence of other country reforms (e.g. Sweden31), show-
ing that less advantaged and immigrant households tend to exert less (or simply do
not strain any) choice than the rest of families when choosing for schools (which may
reflect differences in preferences, information, etc.). This could have distributional im-
plications that are further analyzed in the next section. Finally, the magnitude of the
change in terms of the total student population is modest from a broader perspective.
It is probably due to the weight of other key contextual factors, such as the 0.5 points
that families still get when they reside in the district of first choice application, or/and
the disutility that commuting provides to household’s preferences.
31See Bo¨hlmark and Lindahl (2007).
72
TABLE 3.5: Geographic Mobility Coefficient Effects
Dependent variable
Outer district applications Travel Distance
(Fraction) (Log Meters)
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
(1) (2)
A. Baseline Estimates
Baseline Effect (vs 2011) - 0.012*** 0.0332*** - 0.0085 0.116***
- (0.034) (0.0034) - (0.011) (0.011)
B. Heterogeneous Effects: Parental Education
(3) (4)
Baseline Effect (vs 2011) - 0.0083 0.0126* - 0.014 0.0825***
- (0.0074) (0.0076) - (0.007) (0.0251)
2nd quintile EDU 0.0143* 0.0004 0.0125 0.095*** 0.0682* 0.0367
(0.0075) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0245) (0.0351) (0.0357)
3rd quintile EDU 0.065*** 0.0031 0.0218** 0.186*** 0.0002 0.0008
(0.0075) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0245) (0.0351) (0.0357)
4th quintile EDU 0.076*** -0.0083 0.0245** 0.267*** 0.0265 0.050
(0.0075) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0245) (0.0352) (0.0357)
5th quintile EDU 0.0877*** 0.023** 0.044*** 0.340*** 0.0165 0.0795**
(0.0075) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0248) (0.0352) (0.0357)
C. Heterogeneous Effects: Immigrant Status
(5) (6)
Baseline Effect (vs 2011) - 0.0160*** 0.0393*** - 0.0173 0.129***
- (0.034) (0.0037) - (0.0121) (0.0122)
Immigrant student -0.042*** -0.0148 -0.0320*** -0.188*** -0.0100 -0.0607*
(0.0071) (0.0096) (0.0098) (0.023) (0.032) (0.032)
Number of Obs. 53,220 53,220
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent level,
respectively. Each panel represents regressions from Equation (1), (2) and (3) respectively. In Equations (2)
and (3) heterogeneous effects need to be interpreted as an addition to the baseline effect. We control for the
population density in the student neighborhood. Clustering errors at the district or neighborhood levels
does not alter the significance level of the results.
3.6.2 Estimating student segregation
The second goal of this paper is to identify the marginal impact that the reforms had on
the level of segregation of new students entering the school system, net of the dynamics
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of school characteristics and residential segregation. This is relevant, especially in im-
migrant segregation, given the increase observed in immigrant population in 2012 and
2013. We consider segregation in two dimensions: social (estimated through parental
education) and immigrant-origin segregation. The previous analysis shows that after
the implementation of the inter-district school choice reform, there was an overall in-
crease in the preference for mobility of families, but this change was heterogeneous
and more intense for middle-educated families as well as those with non-immigrant
children. A heterogeneous change in choice may make that the flow of new entrants to
the school system more socially and immigrant-origin segregated, which may impact
on the opportunities of students to attend schools with students with different back-
grounds.
FIGURE 3.2: Densities of within-school socioeconomic variation and immigrant share,
by year.
(A) Parental Education. (B) Immigrant Origin.
We first present descriptive evidence of the dynamics in student composition at schools.
Figure 3.2 displays the density of within-school variation of student background for
2011, 2012 and 2013. The solid line represents the density for 2011, while the short-
dashed and long-dashed lines refer to 2012 and 2013 respectively. The left-hand side
graph (Figure 3.2a) shows the density of within-school standard deviation of parents’
years of education. The curve shifts mildly to the left in 2012 (with respect to 2011),
whereas the 2013 density curve shifts to the right in the low and middle part of the
distribution indicating a mild increase in within-school student heterogeneity in terms
of parental education. The right-hand side graph (Figure 3.2b) plots the distribution
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of the proportion of immigrants within school normalized by the total share of immi-
grants in the city.32 This Figure shows a polarization of the distribution in 2012 and
2013: while the share of schools with very low proportion of immigrants slightly in-
creases, the proportion of schools with a median proportion of immigrants decreases
in 2012 and 2013. At the same time, there was an increase in the share of schools with
higher proportion of immigrants (usually more than 30% of immigrants). Whereas the
evidence in terms of social segregation is mild, the second graph describes a process of
immigrant segregation across schools at the time of the reform.
TABLE 3.6: Change in within-school student heterogeneity by parental education.
Dependent variable: log|eˆi,j| (2012) (2013)
Specification 1 0.0059 0.0517***
(0.0127) (0.0129)
Specification 2 -0.134 0.043***
(0.0128) (0.013)
Specification 3 0.0059 0.0517***
(0.0127) (0.0129)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** in-
dicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent level, respec-
tively.
Social Heterogeneity (by parental education). Table 3.6 presents the results for the
estimations of the model of Equation 3.5 model. We estimate changes in the within-
school heterogeneity of parental education of students. It compares the marginal effect
of 2012 and 2013 relative to 2011, controlling for school fixed effects and neighborhood
dynamics of residential segregation. We conduct three different specifications: (i) we
compute the residuals in a joint regression for the three years, controlling for neighbor-
hood heterogeneity of parental education; (ii) we calculate residuals in separate year
regressions, controlling for neighborhood heterogeneity of parental education; (iii) we
measure residuals in a joint regression for all three years, controlling for district het-
erogeneity of parental education. The Table shows that the changes in within-school
heterogeneity of parental education did not change in 2012, but increased significantly
in 2013 with respect to 2011. The magnitude of the effect is between 4% and 5%. In other
32We standardize the standard deviation of parental education by dividing by the total yearly standard
deviation of education. Conversely, we normalize the proportion of immigrants by subtracting the yearly
mean and dividing by the average mean of immigrants in the system. This is because the socioeconomic
characteristics of parents may not be constant in the 2011-2013 period.
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words, it seems that the reform increased diversity within school by 4 to 5%. Neverthe-
less, the measurement error of the parental education variable may be correlated with
the direction of the reform, inducing a positive (negative) bias in our heterogeneity
(segregation) estimates that we discuss in Section 3.8.
Immigrant Segregation. Figure 3.3 displays the parameter of interest θ and κ in Equa-
tion 3.6 for each decile of the distribution of quantiles. The Figure shows that, con-
ditional on school fixed effects and immigrant share in the school neighborhood, the
relative proportion of immigrants in 2013 seems to increase for schools with a larger
share of immigrants, while it decreased for schools with a lower share of immigrants.
In 2012, the relative proportion of immigrants decreased in schools with a smaller share
of immigrants, while those with the highest share of immigrants did not experience rel-
evant changes. Nevertheless, the size of estimates is relatively small, mostly because
accounting for school and neighborhood effects reduces the magnitude of the coeffi-
cients33, an issue which suggests that geographical segregation of immigrants was also
an important factor during the period of the reform.
FIGURE 3.3: Post-Reform effects on share of immigrant students, by quantiles.
33Estimates without controlling for school or neighborhood effects were larger in magnitude for all
quantiles, both for positive values (at schools with higher share of immigrants) and negative values (at
schools with lower share of immigrants). Results can be provided upon request.
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Computing Overall Segregation Indexes. Although we cannot provide causal evi-
dence on general equilibrium effects of the reform (due to other confounding factors
related to school effects and geographic mobility taking place at the same time), we
aim to assess the potential effects of the reform from a broader policy perspective.34 To
measure the overall change in social and immigrant segregation, we compute the Dis-
similarity Index (Duncan and Duncan (1955)), one of the most widely used measures in
school segregation literature. For a two-type groups of students ai and bi in the school
system, the ”D” Index is defined as:
D =
1
2
I
∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ aiA − biB
∣∣∣∣ (3.7)
where there are I schools in the city, and school i has ai students of the first category
and bi of the second category. The value of D represents the proportion of a group
that would need to move in order to create a uniform distribution of population across
schools. Thus, this index will go from 0 to 1. The index is equal to 0 when the edu-
cational system is fully heterogeneous across schools and 1 if the system is completely
segregated. This Index can be generalized to be a multi-group index, following Rear-
don and Firebaugh (2002) and can be interpreted as the percentage of all students
who would have to transfer between schools to equalize the group proportion across
schools, divided by the percentage of students who would have to transfer if the school
system was fully segregated. For parental education, we divide it into five quintiles
and compute the multi-group version of the index.35.
TABLE 3.7: Evolution of school segregation during the reform in the city of Madrid.
Social Segregation Immigrant Segregation
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Dissimilarity Index Estimate 0.495 0.501 0.488 0.421 0.449* 0.467*
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0058) (0.0084) (0.0072)
Number of Obs. 18,289 18,006 16,970 18,289 18,006 16,970
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are computed by bootstrapping individual data. We perform 20
bootstrap replications for each estimate. * indicate significance change at the at 5 percent level between
2011 and 2013.
34The validity of the conclusions draw in this subsection has to be considered in an appropriate context.
35To calculate standard errors, we compute this measures for years 2011, 2012 and 2013 using the STATA
commands localseg for a multi-group model (parental education quintile groups) and dicseg for a two-
group model (immigrant status of students).
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Table 3.7 presents the values of the index for both measures of student background
before and after the reform. Results show that social segregation seems to be constant
across the years of the reform, given that there is a mild decrease in the point estimate
which is not statistically significant. Nonetheless, there is a considerable increase of
immigrant segregation (about 11%), which is significant both in 2012 and 2013 relative
to 2011. This can be better seen in Figure 3.4 below. From a broader perspective, these
results imply a large increase in the overall immigrant segregation and a rather stable
dynamics of social segregation. The driving mechanisms may go beyond the impact of
the school choice reform (e.g. changes in residential segregation patterns), and hence
we cannot conclude that there is a causality link between the policy reform and the
aggregate effect.
FIGURE 3.4: Computing overall Segregation (Social and Immigrant).
Notes: Blue dots represent point estimates. Horizontal lines depict upper and lower confidence intervals at the 95% of
confidence.
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3.7 Mechanisms
This section discusses the mechanisms that may be driving the results. First, we es-
timate the impact of the reform on mobility between and within district in order to
capture direct and indirect effects of the reform. Second, we investigate heterogeneity
of the results by school characteristics, such as school average score, income of school
district, or school ownership (public vs semi-public). Finally, we examine to which
extent the implementation of the bilingual education programme was a confounding
factor for our baseline results.
3.7.1 Extensive and Intensive Margin of Geographic Mobility
The inter-district school choice reform in Madrid has been shown to improve the ac-
cess to schools outside household’s districts, as the willingness to commute out of the
district increases. However, it is not clear whether all the changes in distance com-
muted are exclusively driven by this or, in addition, the willingness to commute to
another district is also accompanied by changes within district. If the total distance
commuted increases, it could be the joint effect of more mobility within and between
districts. In particular, if households aim to move towards other districts, this may cre-
ate an emerging supply of places in their district and a subsequent internal demand for
them. Therefore, the inter-district school choice may be jointly operating in the exten-
sive (between districts) and intensive (within districts) margin of mobility. In order to
disentangle these two levels of the mechanism through which mobility is generated,
we compute estimates of distance mobility and school segregation considering within
and between district applications separately.
Table 3.8 shows the baseline estimates of willingness to commute for households who
apply for an outer or inner district school. Results are mainly driven by households
that are willing to move out of their district. Households moving to another district
increase their willingness to commute by 31% after 2013, as opposed to the average of
11.6% seen in Table 3.5. A small effect remains in the intensive margin, since the effect
on those who are willing to stay in their own district increases in a magnitude of 4.6%.
This could be the consequence of the potential new supply of places at schools in their
same districts (i.e. indirect effect), so that families are willing to go to these schools
that are farther away from their homes. The extensive margin effect is present in all
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educational groups, although the most educated group of households displays a very
large effect on commuting distance: an additional increase of 25.6% relative to other
households and hence a total of 47% with respect to the beginning of the reform. No
differences regarding immigrant and native status of the student are found for mobility
of students applying to schools inside and outside their own district.
TABLE 3.8: Geographic Mobility Coefficient Effects - Intensive and Extensive Margin
Dependent variable: Travel Distance (Log Meters)
Inner district applications Outer district applications
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
(1) (2)
A. Baseline Estimates
Baseline Effect (vs 2011) - -0.007 0.0459*** - 0.0263 0.315***
- (0.012) (0.012) - (0.023) (0.023)
B. Heterogeneous Effects: Parental Education
(3) (4)
Baseline Effect (vs 2011) - -0.0286 0.0554** - 0.0141 0.211***
- (0.025) (0.025) - (0.075) (0.074)
2nd quintile EDU 0.084*** 0.072* 0.0235 -0.136* 0.0705 0.0238
(0.025) (0.036) (0.036) (0.071) (0.09) (0.096)
3rd quintile EDU 0.139*** -0.0038 -0.0337 -0.143** -0.042 0.0006
(0.025) (0.036) (0.036) (0.0645) (0.089) (0.088)
4th quintile EDU 0.209*** -0.053 -0.0044 -0.0477 -0.0753 0.124
(0.025) (0.036) (0.037) (0.064) (0.089) (0.087)
5th quintile EDU 0.286*** -0.0112 -0.0296 0.0339 0.0165 0.256***
(0.025) (0.0363) (0.037) (0.064) (0.086) (0.086)
C. Heterogeneous Effects: Immigrant Status
(5) (6)
Baseline Effect (vs 2011) - -0.00016 0.051*** - 0.023 0.322***
- (0.012) (0.013) - (0.0245) (0.025)
Immigrant student -0.154* -0.00089 -0.0017 -0.0424 -0.0424 -0.0703
(0.023) (0.032) (0.033) (0.06) (0.08) (0.081)
Number of Obs. 46,992 6,095
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent
level, respectively. Each panel represents regressions from Equation (1), (2) and (3) respectively. In
Equations (2) and (3) heterogeneous effects need to be interpreted as an addition to the baseline effect.
We control for the population density in the student neighborhood. Clustering errors at the district or
neighborhood levels does not alter the significance level of the results.
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We then compute the differential effect of the extensive versus intensive margin on
student segregation at schools. We follow a similar approach as the one used in the pre-
vious section, but with separate segregation estimates depending whether their own
residence is in the district of choice or in a different one. For example, when looking
at social heterogeneity (by parental education of students) as in Table 3.6, the statistical
significance of the increase observed does not hold for students who move to another
district, as the p-value is larger than 0.1 (although the point estimate is positive and
larger - around 6%-). With respect to students staying in the same district, the effect re-
mains significant at 90%, but the magnitude goes down up to 2.3%36. All in all, it seems
that the mild increase in student diversity is rather associated to the intensive margin
effects of the reform. With respect to immigrant segregation, we run Equation 3.6, but
for each school we control for the share of students who come from a different district:
the results are qualitatively the same compared to those in Figure 3.337. Overall, the
results in terms of mobility and segregation are mostly driven by the extensive margin
of student mobility to other districts, rather than the intensive margin.
3.7.2 Type of School and District
In this subsection, we estimate differences experienced in mobility and school social
and immigrant segregation over key dimensions of the school system, such as the char-
acteristics of the district where the school is located, the school performance in the
standardized test, the socioeconomic characteristics (parental years of education and
immigration status) of students entering the school previously, and the type of school
in terms of school ownership (i.e. public versus semi-public schools). This is funda-
mental in order to better understand what contextual features of the school system are
driving the policy responses of the households.
In terms of the student mobility, given the importance shown of the extensive margin
in the final effects, we only examine the outer district applications. We update Equa-
tions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 in order to allow for interactions with school characteristics. We
36Results can be provided by the authors upon request.
37Results can be provided by the authors upon request.
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use the following specification:
Dijt =α+ βYear2012ij + γYear2013ij +∑
k
γjZijt + θk∑
k
Zijt ∗Year2012ij+
κk∑
k
Zijt ∗Year2013ij + Xn + ε ijt
(3.8)
where Zijk is a vector of school observable characteristics for the first choice school j of
student i in year t. We investigate five school variables (with values over k): (i) average
income of the school district, dividing districts into three groups of income; (ii) school
score in the previous year’s standardized test of the region of Madrid normalized for
each year, information that was publicly available to parents during their choice process
and which takes values from 0 to 1038; (iii) school average years of parental education of
students entering the school in the previous year; (iv) school proportion of immigrant
students entering the school in the previous year; (v) school ownership (public vs semi-
public).
We implement a similar specification regarding the estimation of student segregation
at schools net of other factors, both in terms of social segregation (Equation 3.11) and
immigrant segregation (Equation 3.10):
log|eˆijt| = α+ θYear2012ij + κYear2013ij +∑
k
γkZk + θk∑
k
Zk ∗Year2012ij+
κk∑
k
Zk ∗Year2013ij + ε ij
(3.9)
Imj = ατ + θτYear2012ij + κτYear2013ij + θk,τ∑
k
Zk ∗Year2012j + κk,τ∑
k
Zk ∗Year2013j
+ θj,τ + δτNj + ej,τ
(3.10)
Geographic Mobility. The results in Table 3.9 show the existence of cream-skimming
mechanisms in the baseline estimates of outer district applications by different school
characteristics. Panel A displays heterogeneous effects by dividing districts in terciles
according to their average income distribution39. Families are more willing to leave
38For instance, we use CDI results of 2012/2013 for the school year 2013/2014 applications.
39For a detailed description of district classification according to income, see Figure 3.14 in the Ap-
pendix.
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their district for schools located in richer districts (particularly for schools in districts
within the top income tercile) relative to poorer (in 3.2% for middle income and 15.6%
for high income districts). The reform increased the proportion of applications to a
school outside their district, but the willingness to commute to a school placed in a high
or middle relative to a low-income district did not change. Panel B presents heteroge-
neous effects by the average school performance in CDI. Households seem to prefer
to leave their district for schools with higher performance score (i.e. for an increase of
1 standard deviation in the school exam, parents are more willing to move from their
district in 3.3 percentage points). This preference is heterogeneous across school perfor-
mance score quintiles: family willingness to change their district is larger for schools
for which the performance score quintile is higher, although the reform did increase
this preference only for schools with scores in the 4th quintile 40. Panel C analyzes het-
erogeneous effects by school ownership (public vs semi-public): while families seem to
be 5.8% more willing to leave their districts for a semi-public school, the reform exacer-
bated these differences by an additional 3.4 and 3.1 percentage points in 2012 and 2013
respectively.
Panel D and E investigate the student socioeconomic characteristics at the school
(parental years of education and immigration status) for those students who applied
in the previous academic year. Although this information is not public to parents, it
serves as a proxy for student socioeconomic characteristics entering the school, an issue
which the literature has documented to be important in parental preferences (Mizala
and Urquiola (2013)). In particular, Panel D looks at whether there are heterogeneous
effects by the average years of parental education at the school: families seem to be
more willing to leave their district for schools where the average parental years of edu-
cation of peers is higher (i.e. for an increase of 1 year of school average parental educa-
tion, families are more willing to leave the district by 2.4% percentage points). What is
more important, the reform increases the willingness to apply for schools with higher
average parental education of peers by an additional 0.4 percentage points per year of
education. Similarly, Panel E examines heterogeneous effects by average proportion of
immigrants at the school. For each decrease of a percentage point of immigrants at the
school, parents are 0.23% more willing to leave the district to apply for such a school:
40See Table 3.15 in the Appendix. We observe a differential effect for the 4th quintile of schools by 2.9%.
Before the reform, the willingness to commute is higher by 4.7%, 7.5%, 7.6% and 9.3% for for 2nd, 3rd, 4th
and 5th quintiles with respect to the 1st.
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the reform increased even more such preferences by an additional 0.09% for each per-
centage point of immigrants lower at a school. Overall, these two findings reveal that
what parents reacting to the reform are looking for is a combination of high average
scores and high socioeconomic status of peers or semi-public schools.
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TABLE 3.9: Mechanisms for Geographic Mobility, by School Characteristics
Dependent variable: Outer District Applications (Fraction)
A. District Income B. School Grade C. School ownership
Constant 0.046*** Constant 0.065*** Constant 0.040***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Year 2012 0.012** Year 2012 0.013***
(0.005) (0.003) Year 2012 -0.005
Year 2013 0.024*** Year 2013 0.033*** (0.005)
(0.005) (0.003) Year 2013 0.017***
Middle Income Dist. 0.032*** Sch. Grade (t-1) 0.033*** (0.005)
(0.005) (0.003) Semi-Public 0.058***
High Income Dist. 0.156*** 2012*Sch. Grade (t-1) 0.003 (0.005)
(0.006) (0.004) 2012*Semi-Public 0.034***
2012*Middle Income Dist. 0.000 2013*Sch. Grade (t-1) 0.004 (0.007)
(0.008) (0.004) 2013*Semi-Public 0.031***
2012*High Income Dist. -0.004 (0.007)
(0.008)
2013*Middle Income Dist. 0.012
(0.008)
2013*High Income Dist. 0.009
(0.008)
Number of Obs. 53,22 Number of Obs. 53,22 Number of Obs. 53,220
D. Years of Education E. Proportion of Immigrants
Constant -0.206*** Constant 0.084***
(0.013) (0.004)
Year 2012 -0.004 Year 2012 0.012**
(0.018) (0.005)
Year 2013 -0.023 Year 2013 0.056***
(0.018) (0.005)
Avg.Years Education (t-1) 0.024*** Avg. Frac. Inmig. (t-1) -0.233***
(0.001) (0.019)
2012*Avg.Years Education (t-1) 0.001 2012*Avg. Frac. Inmig. (t-1) -0.018
(0.002) (0.027)
2013*Avg.Years Education (t-1) 0.004*** 2013*Avg. Frac. Inmig. (t-1) -0.093***
(0.002) (0.025)
Number of Obs. 52,468 Number of Obs. 52,468
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent level, respectively. We control
for the population density in the student neighborhood. Clustering errors at the district or neighborhood levels does not alter the
significance level of the results.
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TABLE 3.10: Mechanisms for Social Heterogeneity, by school characteristics
Dependent variable: Social Segregation
A. District Income B. School Grade C. Type of School
Constant -0.636*** Constant -0.514*** Constant -0.470***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.013)
Year 2012 0.003 Year 2012 0.008 Year 2012 0.005
(0.019) (0.013) (0.018)
Year 2013 0.031 Year 2013 0.045*** Year 2013 0.014
(0.020) (0.013) (0.018)
Middle Income Dist. 0.337*** Sch. Grade (t-1) 0.097*** Semi-Public -0.056***
(0.021) (0.009) (0.018)
High Income Dist. 0.112*** 2012*Sch. Grade (t-1) 0.026* 2012*Semi-Public 0.001
(0.022) (0.013) (0.025)
2012*Middle Income Dist. -0.000 2013*Sch. Grade (t-1) 0.054*** 2013*Semi-Public 0.075***
(0.030) (0.014) (0.026)
2012*High Income Dist. 0.010
(0.031)
2013*Middle Income Dist. 0.029
(0.030)
2013*High Income Dist. 0.024
(0.032)
Number of Obs. 53,017 Number of Obs. 53,205 Number of Obs. 53,205
D. Years of Education E. Proportion of Immigrants
Constant -1.236*** Constant -0.321***
(0.048) (0.012)
Year 2012 -0.008 Year 2012 0.008
(0.068) (0.018)
Year 2013 0.023 Year 2013 0.129***
(0.069) (0.018)
Avg.Years Education (t-1) 0.063*** Avg. Frac. Inmig. (t-1) -1.458***
(0.004) (0.071)
2012*Avg.Years Education (t-1) 0.001 2012*Avg. Frac. Inmig. (t-1) 0.003
(0.006) (0.100)
2013*Avg.Years Education (t-1) 0.002 2013*Avg. Frac. Inmig. (t-1) -0.134
(0.006) (0.092)
Number of Obs. 52,454 Number of Obs. 52,454
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent level, respectively.
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Social Heterogeneity (or Social Segregation). Table 3.10 presents the baseline esti-
mates of changes in social heterogeneity by different school characteristics. Panel A
shows that social diversity within school is higher in middle income (31%) and high
income (25.5%) districts relative to low income districts, but the reform did not change
the within-school heterogeneity of parental education differentially by income district.
In Panel B, it can be seen that schools with a standard deviation higher in the stan-
dardized school score has around 10% more heterogeneity in parental education. This
fact is heterogeneous across school performance score quintiles: the social diversity
is larger as the school performance score quintile is higher (17.8%, 21.5%, 30.2% and
28.2% for for 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th quintiles respectively). The reform increased diversity
for schools with higher standardized score by 5.4 percentage points for each standard
deviation of tests. When looking at this more in depth, we observe a decrease in the
social diversity (an increase in the level of segregation) for schools of the first quintile
of the average performance score by 6.1 percentage points, while an increase in social
diversity by 12.3, 15.8, and 17.5 percentage points for schools with performance in the
3rd, 4th and 5th quintiles respectively41. Panel C shows that semi-public are 5.6% less
diverse than public schools. The reform increased the within-school heterogeneity of
parental education of semi-public schools relative to public schools by 7.5 percentage
points. Panel D and E show that schools with a higher average years of parental ed-
ucation are more diverse, and schools with higher proportion of immigrants are less
heterogeneous. Neither of these two relations changed with the reform. In any case,
the measurement error may be correlated with the direction of the reform, inducing a
bias in our estimates that is discussed in Section 3.8.
Immigrant Segregation. The increase in the immigrant segregation due to the reform
is not related to the years of education or the proportion of immigrants at the school.
However, there is a strong relationship between the increase in immigrant segregation
and the school standardized score in the previous year’s test: segregation decreased in
schools with higher grades.42
Segregation Index. Finally, Table 3.17 looks at the overall evolution of segregation
by looking at the Dissimilarity Index in different school characteristics. Although the
41See Table 3.15 in the Appendix.
42See Table 3.16 in the Appendix.
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statistical significance is low (due to a smaller size of schools), point estimates of social
segregation (the opposite measure of social diversity) increase for low scoring schools
and decrease for high scoring schools. These are rather stable in terms of district in-
come, and decrease for semi-public schools and bilingual and non-bilingual schools.
In contrast, the increase observed in immigrant segregation is mostly concentrated and
statistically significant in the 3rd quintile of the school test distribution, in low income
districts, in both semi-public and public schools and in bilingual schools.
The role of semi-public schools. Overall, the previous results show that there is clear
evidence pointing to the role of semi-public schools in driving the increase in the will-
ingness to change the district to attend a semi-public school during the reform and this
holds in explaining the rise in social diversity. However, it is not clear whether this
is related to other school characteristics or to the genuine interest of families in semi-
public schools. In order to better understand which factors may be behind the raise
in the preference for semi-public schools, we look at the interactions of several school
characteristics and semi-public schools (see Table 3.18 in the Appendix). Overall, we
find that neither school test scores, nor school average years of education, nor the pro-
portion of immigrants in the school in previous years seems to explain the increase in
the willingness to travel to semi-public schools due to the reform. Hence, the greater
preference for semi-public schools seems to be due to other semi-public schools’ unob-
served factors that we cannot identify (such as pedagogical approaches or other specific
characteristics of semi-public schools).
3.7.3 Expansion of Bilingual Schools
Since 2004/2005, the Regional Government of Madrid implemented a new program of
bilingual education for publicly funded schools where a substantial part of the sub-
jects started to be taught in English language. Since then, the program experienced a
large expansion. In the first year of implementation, 26 schools joined the program, and
by 2014/2015 there were 298 bilingual public and 122 semi-public schools for primary
grades for all the municipalities of the region. In particular, in our baseline sample for
the city of Madrid, the number of bilingual primary schools expanded from 144 in 2011
to 182 in 2013: out of these new 38 schools 10 were public and 28 semi-public. Pre-
vious evidence has shown that the expansion of the bilingual network among public
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schools in the early years of the program was potentially associated with student sort-
ing according to their socioeconomic status (Anghel et al. (2016)). Hence, we analyze
whether the programme have confounding effects with the school choice reform on
student mobility and student segregation across schools. We follow a similar approach
as in the previous section in order to track interaction effects of bilingual schools on
mobility and segregation outcomes.
Table 3.19 in the Appendix presents the results of the analysis for a differential ef-
fect of bilingual schools in terms of mobility and segregation. Families are willing to
travel 13.2% more to attend a bilingual school, and these schools seem to be 21% more
socially diverse than non-bilingual schools. Nevertheless, the reform did not seem to
significantly affect the willingness to change the district or to commute further to attend
bilingual schools. Although the effect significance is mild (10 percent confidence level),
the reform appears to have increased the willingness to travel to bilingual schools by 4.1
percentage points. Overall, the implementation of the bilingual program does not seem
to be a crucial confounding factor for the school choice reform. Moreover, the changes
in within-school social and immigrant heterogeneity are not related to the expansion of
the programme.
3.8 Robustness Checks
In this section, we conduct a series of robustness checks looking at other factors that
could influence student’s mobility and segregation effects during the reform. First, we
analyze the fact that the choice reform in the city of Madrid was implemented in two
steps (first criteria to be reformed in 2012, whereas the inter-district reform was imple-
mented in 2013) to isolate the real effect of inter-district reform. Second, we consider
other municipalities of the region as a control group to validate the results found in the
city of Madrid. Third, we test whether results are robust for considering the final school
assignment of schools instead of the first school choice as the main outcome. Finally,
we discuss potential unobserved heterogeneity issues on parental education data at the
census block level.
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3.8.1 Reform Implementation in Two Years: Low-income and Former Stu-
dent Bonus
A potential issue in our identification strategy is that changes in the priority criteria
introduced in the city of Madrid in 2012 may be driving part of the effect of the 2013’s
inter-district reform. As mentioned in Section 3.3, the reform introduced changes in
2012 in two key criteria (i.e. low-income status and bonus points for former students
at the school). Table 3.5 shows that higher educated parents and parents of native-born
students already reacted to the 2012 reform. However, the overall changes in mobility
mostly took place in 2013 compared to 2012. Hence, we investigate whether the changes
observed in 2013 with respect to 2012 in terms of mobility in the extensive and intensive
margin are related to the criteria introduced in 2012.
Table 3.20 in the Appendix presents the change in mobility of new students in 2013
with respect to those of 2012. We look at the interaction term of the new criteria intro-
duced in 2012. We find that changes in mobility observed in 2013 are independent of the
new 2012 criteria. Hence, the introduction of the new 2012 bonus criteria is unrelated
to the large effects observed in 2013 in terms of mobility, which again suggests that the
mobility response is closely linked to the proximity criteria reform in 2013. Results are
robust to both measures of mobility.
3.8.2 Control Group of Other Municipalities in the Region
As described in Section 3.3, the school choice reform was also implemented in other
municipalities beyond the city of Madrid. Table 3.1 reflects the implementation of most
of the new criteria in 2012 for over-demanded schools in the city of Madrid: these new
criteria were also applied in the rest of municipalities. The only criteria that changed
in two separate school years depending on the municipality was the inter-district cri-
terion: for some municipalities (usually of medium size), the proximity inter-district
reform was implemented in 2012, whereas for the larger ones (including Madrid), it
took place in 201343. We exploit this heterogeneity in joining the inter-district school
choice to analyze the effects on other municipalities as a robustness check. In particu-
lar, we pay attention to the fact that households in municipalities that implemented the
43Table 3.13 in the Appendix describes which municipalities joined the inter-district criterion in 2012
and 2013.
90
inter-district reform in 2012 did not have time to anticipate the reform implementation.
For the control groups, we consider municipalities that have similar geographical
characteristics compared to the city of Madrid, as these condition mobility patterns of
households. We use three criteria: population density, average distance commuted by
households prior to the reform, and total number of year applications. In particular,
the city of Madrid is highly dense (4,835 inhabitants per km2) and the average distance
commuted before the reform was fairly low (1,500 meters). With respect to the total
number of applications, the rest of municipalities have much lower populations than
Madrid (with a population between 70,000 and 205,000, whereas Madrid’s population
is around 3.1 million): this implies that the total number of applications is much lower
compared to that of the city of Madrid. Among such a group, we use municipalities
that have at least 800 yearly applications for more than 25 schools in each municipality.
Applying these filters, the final sample of municipalities which implemented the inter-
district school choice reform includes two in 2012 (which we call as Group 1) and eight
in 2013 (Group 2):
• Group 1 municipalities (reform in 2012/2013): Alcobendas and Valdemoro.
• Group 2 municipalities (reform in 2013/2014): Alcala´ de Henares, Alcorco´n,
Fuenlabrada, Getafe, Legane´s, Mo´stoles, Parla and Torrejo´n de Ardoz.
• Group 3 municipality (reform in 2013/2014): Madrid.
In terms of mobility outcomes, we can only measure distance traveled given that we
do not have access to geographical data on the catchment areas in other municipalities
prior to the reform44. Regarding our empirical strategy, it has to be noted that two re-
forms were gradually introduced: (i) low-income and former student bonus criteria (in
2012 for all municipalities); (ii) inter-district school choice. For municipalities of Group
1, we are then measuring an effect which is a combination of the two reforms. For
municipalities of Groups 2 and 3, we are measuring the effects of the reforms being im-
plemented progressively45. Hence, we consider an alternative version of Equation 3.1,
so that municipality k (with population density Xk) in Group g with school j is included
44In Madrid, the choice catchment areas coincide with the city district. However, in other municipalities,
the catchment areas were defined through other criteria.
45This means that for Group 2 and 3, for 2012 we measure the first changes in criteria in 2012, whereas
for 2013 we measure the differential effect of the inter-district choice reform with respect to the new other
criteria previously introduced.
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in the category Groupkgj. Our specification is as follows:
Dijt = α+ β ∗Year2012ij + δ ∗Year2013ij + pig∑
g
Groupkgj + θg∑
g
Groupkgj ∗Year2012ij+
κg∑
g
Groupkgj ∗Year2013ij + γXk + ε ijt
(3.11)
Table 3.12 displays the results of this regression. The baseline effect for 2012 is signifi-
cant and the size is a 13% increase in distance for municipalities in Group 1 (Alcobendas
and Valdemoro), but it goes down (by 7.1%) to 4.3% for those municipalities in Group
2, and more importantly, down to non-existing effect for the case of Madrid. Con-
versely, the baseline effect for 2013 is on average a 11.6% increase in distance, with no
differences among the three groups of municipalities. As a robustness check, Column
2 considers a joint regression where Madrid is included with the rest of municipalities
from Group 2: as can be seen, for municipalities of Group 1 there was an increase of
13% in the distance traveled that same year, in 2012. This change cannot be extended to
the rest of municipalities in Group 2 and 3, as the interaction term of these with the year
2012 is negative and of similar size (although this is probably due to the larger num-
ber of observations in Madrid, Group 3). In 2013, however, the average commuting
distance effect slightly increases up to 16.4%, and it holds for both type municipalities,
which means that those of Group 2 and 3 experienced an overall change similar to that
experienced by the municipalities one year earlier.
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TABLE 3.11: Geographic Mobility (Distance traveled) for Madrid and its Control
Groups.
A. Group 2 and 3 separate B. Groups 2 and 3 together
Constant 6.899*** Constant 6.798***
(0.028) (0.028)
Year 2012 0.130*** Year 2012 0.130***
(0.038) (0.039)
Year 2013 0.166*** Year 2013 0.164***
(0.037) (0.037)
Group 2 -0.103*** Group 2 and 3 -0.209***
(0.031) (0.030)
Group 3 0.144*** 2012*Groups 2 and 3 -0.096**
(0.034) (0.040)
2012*Group 2 -0.071* 2013*Groups 2 and 3 -0.033
(0.041) (0.038)
2012*Group 3 -0.115***
(0.040)
2013*Group 2 -0.029
(0.040)
2013*Group 3 -0.039
(0.039)
Number of Obs. 92,903 Number of Obs. 92,903
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-,
5- and 1-percent level, respectively. Each panel represents regressions from equa-
tion (11) with two specifications. The dependent variable used is the log-distance
traveled. We control for the population density in the student municipality. Clus-
tering errors at the district or neighborhood levels does not alter the significance
level of the results.
Overall, we observe that municipalities of Group 1 register a similar shift to a greater
distance commuted in the same year as they implemented the inter-district reform,
with parents in those municipalities having no time to anticipate the implementation
of the reform. This would potentially rule out the hypothesis, at least partially, that
changes in distance commuted by parents (and outer district applications) have to do
with parents moving to cheaper areas in their municipality. It seems that the reform
genuinely shifted the interest of households to more mobility for their siblings’ schools.
Finally, the results show that the change was already significant in 2012 for munici-
palities in Group 2 and accounted for one third of the total change experience one year
later. This could be related to the fact that other priority criteria (changes in low-income
and former students criteria) may have driven those changes: it would be partly consis-
tent with what is observed in Table 3.5, where part of the change for the city of Madrid
was already taking place in 2012. We cannot directly test whether this is related to
these changes in 2012. Nevertheless, similarly to what is done for the case of the city
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of Madrid in Table 3.19, we find that Group 2 municipalities that reformed the criteria
in two consecutive years experimented an increase in distance traveled in 2013 with
respect to 2012 is independent of the priority criteria changes introduced in 201246.
3.8.3 Preferences, Assignment and Strategic Behavior
Section 3.5 discusses how the Boston Mechanism of assignment drives parents’ incen-
tives to be conservative and list their first choice for schools where they have greater
chances. This is the reason why a large proportion of students (around 85%) end up
being assigned to their first option, as was shown in Table 3.4. Nevertheless, as a ro-
bustness check, we consider an alternative specification to estimate the results of the
reform by using the school final assignment in the outcomes of interest.
We first look at the strategic behavior of parents (and schools) by looking at the mo-
bility outcomes in terms of final school assignment vis a vis the first choice analyzed in
Table 3.5. Results are displayed in Table 3.21 of the Appendix. First, it is to be noted that
the baseline effect in 2013 in terms of mobility is slightly lower in the final school as-
signment compared to the first choice option: for example, we find 2.5% more students
attending a school in a different district in 2013 as opposed to 3.3% in the first choice
option. This may imply that the reform generated a true interest to attend a farther
school which outbalanced the strategic component of the Boston mechanism, so that
the final assignment mechanisms lowered the final mobility response. Second, when
looking at heterogeneous responses in mobility, compared to the first choice option,
the school final assignment exacerbates the differences according to social and immi-
grant characteristics. The reaction to the reform by parental education in the terms
of outer-district school assignment is exclusively concentrated among parents in the
top education groups, whereas no effect is found for the rest of education groups. Re-
garding distance traveled, the effect is positive for all households, but the differential
increase observed for most educated parents is larger compared to the first choice op-
tion specification seen in Table 3.5. Regarding immigrant status, the results are similar
for native students, but with respect to immigrant students, the reaction to the 2013
effect is completely canceled. This increases the gap between native and immigrants in
the final school assignment compared to the first choice option.
46Results can be provided by the authors upon request.
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With respect to the impact on social and immigrant segregation, we follow a similar
approach as in Section 3.6: we find an increase in social heterogeneity (segregation)
of 3.9 percentage points, a slightly lower number than the ones reported in Table 3.6,
probably related to the larger mobility of highly educated parents seen in Table 3.2147.
Finally, with respect to immigrant segregation, we present the results in Figure 3.6 in
the Appendix and the results are very similar to those found in Figure 3.3, but the
segregation already starts in 2012 and remains in 201348.
3.8.4 Unobserved heterogeneity in Census Blocks
Results from Table 3.5 describe that high-educated parents react more to the reform
in terms of mobility. Conversely, estimates of social segregation in Table 3.6 proxy a
mild reduction of student segregation by parental education, and, similarly, the overall
evolution of segregation seen in Table 3.7 shows that social segregation (net of residen-
tial dynamics and school fixed effects) did not increase during the time of the reform
in Madrid. The contradiction of these two findings is puzzling, especially when the
results with respect to immigrant segregation (that we can identify at the individual
level) present higher consistency between the mobility and segregation results.
A challenge of this paper is to reconcile the findings presented. The previous litera-
ture has documented an increase in social segregation which goes hand in hand with
immigrant segregation (Bo¨hlmark et al. (2016)). If, for the case of Madrid, the mobil-
ity response is positively related to parental education of students, one would expect
an increase in social segregation too. Even more so when there is a high correlation
between immigrant status and student socioeconomic characteristics49.
A potential explanation of the puzzle could be the unobserved heterogeneity caused
by the measurement error of parental education. While we are able to measure student
immigrant status with high accuracy, the data from parental background is assumed
47Additional results on this can be provided by the authors upon request.
48Due to computation issues, the model computed for immigrant segregation only controls for the share
of immigrants at the neighborhood but does not consider school effects.
49In the city of Madrid, immigration status and social background are negatively correlated: in 2013,
the correlation of immigrant status and parental years of education was -0.21. Moreover, only 5.9% of
immigrant students were part of the top parental education quintile group, while almost 60% of immigrant
students had parents with education levels among the bottom two education quintiles.
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from census blocks covering a population of about 2,000 inhabitants. Our measure in-
curs in an error which reverses to the mean tails in each block. For example, in low
and middle-income blocks, highly educated parents are identified with much lower
education levels (and not identified through education quintiles, as their observed ed-
ucational level is confounded with those living in their same census block). A similar
phenomenon occurs for low-educated households in highly educated blocks. More-
over, it is reasonable to assume that the higher reaction to the reform of high-educated
parents can be extrapolated to parents within census blocks: hence, the most regular
bias in our measure is caused by the highest educated parents in blocks with low and
middle levels of education. This would mean that our data of parental education at
the census block incurs in a measurement error that is correlated with the effect of the
inter-district school choice reform. If that is the case, our estimates of changes in student
mobility by parental education is suffering from a negative bias, so that the additional
real gaps in mobility may be even larger after the reform50. Conversely, our measure
of social heterogeneity (through parental education) suffers a positive bias, especially
in low-educated blocks, so that the true gap between parents that react to the reform
and their preferred school is not that large. This leads to an under-estimation of the
gaps in mobility and an over-estimation (under-estimation) in the change of social di-
versity (social segregation) after the reform. This bias more the qualitative response in
the estimation of social segregation, as the empirical approach we follow builds stu-
dent heterogeneity measures with the average years of education of the census block51.
Hence, although the change in social segregation (parental education) derived from the
reform may be higher as the one estimate, this remains unknown and stays for future
research.
3.9 Conclusion
In this paper we use novel administrative data to analyze the impact of a large-scale
inter-district school choice reform in the region of Madrid on household mobility and
school segregation. We find that the reform increased the level of geographic mobility
50It is unlikely that the sign of the bias would go in the opposite direction, since on average, higher edu-
cated families living in high school quality districts do not prefer low-educated areas with low performing
schools.
51With respect to mobility, the fact that we use education groups is enough to show the qualitative
response.
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of students, with a larger response for higher educated families and families of non-
immigrant children. We show that this reform mildly increased the average level of
social diversity, but with heterogeneous results: while schools in the bottom of the
average performance distribution experienced a decrease (increase) in diversity (segre-
gation), schools in the 3rd, 4th and 5th quintile of the distribution showed a decreased in
the level of sorting. Moreover, we find solid evidence of a large increase of immigrant
segregation with the implementation of this policy. It is also noticeable that most of the
changes are driven by semi-public schools and schools with low and high scores. The
puzzling results in terms of segregation (small decrease of social segregation while a
large increase in immigrant segregation) will require further research.
It is worth mentioning that the levels of segregation prior to the reform matter. In
2015, the region of Madrid reported very high levels of social segregation in secondary
schools in comparison with other Spanish and European regions. Although our paper
addresses the mobility and segregation dynamics of new entrants in primary schools,
and hence not being completely comparable, the small changes in terms of social di-
versity (and segregation) may be explained by the fact that the original level of sorting
was potentially near to a maximum. In contrast, the opposite effects may be expected
in terms of immigrant segregation: since the region of Madrid showed relatively low
levels of immigrant segregation, the large increase on the level of segregation may be
partially explained by their potential to increase towards higher levels. Our paper pro-
vides empirical evidence of the existence of a trade-off between choice and equity in
the access to schools. Regarding the future policy agenda, the results raise worrying
concerns of an unbalanced equilibrium of the two principles behind (access to quality
education and freedom of choice). Further research will need to identify at what geo-
graphical levels of choice this trade-off becomes stronger, and, given a level of choice,
what are the more efficient education policies that contribute to mitigate the heteroge-
neous impact of choice by social and immigrant characteristics.
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3.10 Appendix
3.10.1 Description of Assignment Criteria
TABLE 3.12: Tie-break Criteria in the Region of Madrid.
Ties are broken in favor of the student who got higher points on
Before 2012/2013 2012/2013 2013/2014
1 Siblings Siblings Siblings
2 Proximity Proximity Proximity
3 Disability Disability Disability
4 Large family Former student Former student
5 Low annual income per capita Large family Large family
6 Random lottery Low-income Low-income
7 Random lottery School discretionary
8 Random lottery
Notes: IPREM is the acronym in Spanish for the Multiple Effects In-
come Public Index, which was 7,455.14 euros in the period of study.
The Minimum Insertion Subsidy (Renta Mı´nima de Insercio´n) is a
special subsidy granted to people with lower income than IPREM.
School discretionary is a point that the schools have freedom to as-
sign by “public and objective” criteria.
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TABLE 3.13: Municipalities with the Single-zone School Choice Setting.
Academic year 2011/2012 2012/2013 2013/2014
Municipalities 142 small size Alcobendas Madrid
with single-zone municipalities Algete San Sebastin de los Reyes
school choice Colmenar Viejo Alcorco´nTres Cantos Fuenlabrada
Aranjuez Getafe
Arroyomolinos Legane´s
Brunete Mo´stoles
Humanes Parla
Navalcarnero Alcala´ de Henares
Pinto Coslada
San Martı´n de Valdeiglesias Rivas-Vaciamadrid
Valdemoro Torrejo´n de Ardoz
Villaviciosa de Odn Boadilla del Monte
Arganda Collado-Villalba
Daganzo Galapagar
Mejorada del Campo
San Fernando de Henares
San Martı´n de la Vega
Villalbilla
Las Rozas de Madrid
Moralzarzal
Torrelodones
# Municipalities with 142 164 179
inter-district school choice
#Municipalities in the 179 179 179
region of Madrid
3.10.2 Section Example
Figure 3.5 shows an example of the layout of the sections in the Madrid districts of
”Centro” and ”Retiro”. The larger the sections the less is the proportion of residential
area there:
FIGURE 3.5: Census Blocks in the City of Madrid.
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3.10.3 Years of Schooling
Census education categories are the followings:
1. Cannot read, cannot write
2. No studies
3. Incomplete Primary
4. Middle school, Primary or Compulsory Secondary Education
5. Vocational Training (Elemental)
6. Vocational Training (Advanced)
7. High school
8. Other Intermediate Graduates
9. University School Graduates
10. Technical Engineer
11. College Graduated
12. No-university Graduated
13. PhD and other Post-graduates
We group all these 13 categories into 6 new categories. Categories 1 and 2 are grouped
as No studies. Category 3 remains as Incomplete Primary Education. Categories 4 and
5 form the Lower Secondary Education. Categories 6, 7 and 8 are gathered together in
Upper Secondary Education. Categories 9 and 10 form the Lower Tertiary Education.
Groups 11, 12 and 13 are joined in category Post-Graduate education. In order to as-
sign an equivalent amount of years of schooling, we make the assumption that parents
were educated under the legal framework of the Education Act LGE (Ley General de
Educacio´n), which was in place for pupils born before 1985. We do this as the average
maternity age for the first offspring was 29.5 years old in 2007 (therefore those students
aged 3 in 2010) and 30.5 for 2013 (therefore those students aged 3 in 2016). This means
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that with a large probability, mothers of students born in 2007 and 2013 were at school
as part of the LGE framework. The LGE framework consisted of 8 years of basic pri-
mary schooling, with 5 years of primary school and 3 years of lower secondary school.
We assume category No Studies as only 3 years of primary and Incomplete primary as just
5 years of schooling. After that Basic schooling, there was vocational training with de-
grees of 2 to 4 years. We assume Categories 4,5 and 6 to be in between Basic schooling (8
years and some vocational training), averaging 9 years of schooling. Categories 7 and
8 pertain to High School and Other intermediate graduates, which corresponded to 12
years of schooling. Finally, university graduates and technical engineers are assumed
to do 18 years of schooling, and post-graduate studies are given an average of 3 addi-
tional years of education. The equivalence of years of schooling for a specific census
block is given by the following formula, where each percentage of census population is
multiplied by the equivalent years of schooling.
YSs =Non− studiess ∗ 3 + Primarys ∗ 5 + LowSecondarys ∗ 9+
UpperSecondarys ∗ 12 + LowTertiarys ∗ 17 + Colleges ∗ 20
(3.12)
3.10.4 School Classification
TABLE 3.14: Districts ranked by income.
Low Income District Middle-Income District High-Income District
Puente de Vallecas San Blas - Canillejas Centro
Villaverde Moratalaz Barajas
Usera Ciudad Lineal Moncloa - Aravaca
Carabanchel Tetan Retiro
Latina Fuencarral - El Pardo Chamberı´
Vica´lvaro Hortaleza Chamartı´n
Villa de Vallecas Arganzuela Salamanca
Notes: Data from district average income is derived from Municipal
census data in the city of Madrid.
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3.10.5 Tables and Figures
TABLE 3.15: Geographic Mobility, Social Diversity and Immigrant Segregation by
school grade quintile.
Geographic Mobility Social Diversity Immigrant Segregation
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.006 -0.707*** 0.019
(0.006) (0.022) (0.015)
Year 2012 0.024*** 0.014 0.042***
(0.008) (0.031) (0.016)
Year 2013 0.029*** -0.061* 0.029*
(0.009) (0.032) (0.016)
2nd Quintile Sch. Grade (t-1) 0.047*** 0.178*** 0.007
(0.008) (0.031) (0.017)
3rd Quintile Sch. Grade (t-1) 0.075*** 0.215*** 0.005
(0.008) (0.029) (0.018)
4th Quintile Sch. Grade (t-1) 0.076*** 0.302*** 0.015
(0.008) (0.029) (0.018)
5th Quintile Sch. Grade (t-1) 0.093*** 0.282*** 0.012
(0.007) (0.028) (0.019)
Year 2012*2nd Quintile -0.012 -0.122*** -0.015
(0.011) (0.043) (0.023)
Year 2012*3rd Quintile -0.034*** 0.101** -0.033
(0.011) (0.041) (0.022)
Year 2012*4th Quintile 0.010 -0.093** -0.040*
(0.011) (0.041) (0.022)
Year 2012*5th Quintile -0.019* 0.074* -0.070***
(0.011) (0.040) (0.021)
Year 2013*2nd Quintile -0.012 0.042 -0.002
(0.012) (0.044) (0.023)
Year 2013*3rd Quintile 0.002 0.123*** -0.030
(0.011) (0.043) (0.023)
Year 2013*4th Quintile 0.029** 0.158*** -0.014
(0.011) (0.042) (0.022)
Year 2013*5th Quintile -0.004 0.175*** -0.048**
(0.011) (0.041) (0.022)
Number of Obs. 53,220 53,017 1,492
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent level, respectively.
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TABLE 3.16: Mechanisms for Immigrant Segregation.
School Grade Years of Education Prop. of Immigrants
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.027** Constant -0.114 Constant 0.051***
(0.011) (0.110) (0.014)
Year 2012 0.010 Year 2012 0.029 Year 2012 0.011
(0.007) (0.035) (0.009)
Year 2013 0.010 Year 2013 0.032 Year 2013 0.021**
(0.007) (0.036) (0.010)
Sch. Grade (t-1) 0.005 Avg.Years Education (t-1) 0.013 Avg. Frac. Inmig. (t-1) -0.167***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.042)
2012*Sch. Grade (t-1) -0.022*** 2012*Avg.Years Education (t-1) -0.002 2012*Avg. Frac. Inmig. (t-1) -0.012
(0.007) (0.003) (0.044)
2013*Sch. Grade (t-1) -0.012* 2013*Avg.Years Education (t-1) -0.002 2013*Avg. Frac. Inmig. (t-1) -0.016
(0.007) (0.003) (0.042)
Number of Obs. 1,492 Number of Obs. 1,478 Number of Obs. 1,478
Notes:*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent level, respectively. We run similar models as those of Equation 3.6, with interaction terms of school
characteristics for the mean immigrant share. Because of this reason, we cannot interact school characteristics that are constant across years (school ownership or school
district).
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TABLE 3.17: Mechanisms: Segregation Index of Dissimilarity
Dissimilarity Index Social Segregation Immigrant Segregation
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
A. School Grade
1st School Quantile Sch. Grade 0,435 0,443 0,455 0,331 0,368 0,361
(0,011) (0,010) (0,007) (0,012) (0,015) (0,018)
2nd School Quantile Sch. Grade 0,465 0,505 0,475 0,357 0,411 0,392
(0,005) (0,005) (0,004) (0,013) (0,016) (0,017)
3rd School Quantile Sch. Grade 0,454 0,462 0,468 0,349 0,392 0,447*
(0,009) (0,007) (0,005) (0,020) (0,022) (0,020)
4th School Quantile Sch. Grade 0,455 0,489 0,455 0,349 0,435 0,449*
(0,005) (0,006) (0,006) (0,015) (0,014) (0,027)
4th School Quantile Sch. Grade 0,432 0,442 0,423 0,452 0,456 0,427
(0,007) (0,003) (0,006) (0,019) (0,023) (0,019)
B. Income District
Low Income District 0,361 0,364 0,358 0,373 0,382 0,410*
(0,004) (0,006) (0,004) (0,012) (0,011) (0,013)
Medium Income District 0,409 0,421 0,403 0,427 0,454 0,446
(0,005) (0,004) (0,006) (0,022) (0,017) (0,011)
High Income District 0,278 0,297 0,292 0,474 0,493 0,471
(0,006) (0,008) (0,005) (0,016) (0,014) (0,018)
C. Public vs Semi-Public Schools
Public School 0,481 0,485 0,482 0,372 0,386 0,401*
(0,004) (0,005) (0,004) (0,010) (0,007) (0,007)
Semi-Public School 0,499 0,504 0,481 0,433 0,502 0,508*
(0,004) (0,002) (0,004) (0,009) (0,011) (0,013)
D. Bilingual vs Non-Bilingual
Bilingual School 0,473 0,484 0,460 0,413 0,451 0,466
(0,005) (0,004) (0,004) (0,015) (0,014 (0,012)
Non-Bilingual School 0,486 0,487 0,482 0,423 0,426 0,443*
(0,003) (0,003) (0,005) (0,009) (0,009) (0,009)
Notes: Standard Errors (in parentheses) are computed by bootstrapping individual data. We per-
form 20 bootstrap replications for each estimate. * indicate significance change at the at 5 percent
level between 2011 and 2013.
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TABLE 3.18: Mechanisms: Interactions with Semi-Public School.
School Grade Years of Education Prop. of Immigrants
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.046*** Constant -0.074*** Constant 0.038***
(0.004) (0.019) (0.006)
Year 2012 -0.005 Year 2012 0.013 Year 2012 -0.004
(0.005) (0.027) (0.008)
Year 2013 0.016*** Year 2013 -0.048* Year 2013 0.052***
(0.005) (0.027) (0.008)
Avg. Grade 0.017*** Avg.Years Education (t-1) 0.011*** Avg. Frac. Inmig. (t-1) -0.043*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.026)
Semi-Public 0.035*** Semi-Public -0.199*** Semi-Public 0.080***
(0.005) (0.026) (0.007)
Sch. Grade (t-1)*Semi-Public 0.022*** Avg.Years Education (t-1)*Semi-Public 0.021*** Avg. Frac. Inmig. (t-1)*Semi-Public -0.319***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.043)
2012*Sch. Grade (t-1) 0.005 2012*Avg.Years Education (t-1) -0.002 2012*Avg. Frac. Inmig. (t-1) 0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.036)
2013*Sch. Grade (t-1) 0.005 2013*Avg.Years Education (t-1) 0.006** 2013*Avg. Frac. Inmig. (t-1) -0.149***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.034)
2012*Semi-Public 0.043*** 2012*Semi-Public 0.001 2012*Semi-Public 0.027***
(0.007) (0.037) (0.010)
2013*Semi-Public 0.039*** 2013*Semi-Public 0.078** 2013*Semi-Public 0.003
(0.007) (0.037) (0.010)
2012*Semi-Public*Sch. Grade (t-1) -0.016** 2012*Semi-Public*Avg.Years Education (t-1) 0.002 2012*Semi-Public*Avg. Frac. Inmig. (t-1) -0.005
(0.008) (0.003) (0.062)
2013*Semi-Public*Sch. Grade (t-1) -0.013 2013*Semi-Public*Avg.Years Education (t-1) -0.005 2013*Semi-Public*Avg. Frac. Inmig. (t-1) 0.144***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.055)
Number of Obs. 53,22 Number of Obs. 52,468 Number of Obs. 52,468
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent level, respectively. Each panel represents regressions from Equation
3.11, interacting semi-public schools with other school characteristics. We control for the population density in the student neighborhood.
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TABLE 3.19: Geographic Mobility, Social and Immigrant Segregation. Bilingual vs.
non-bilingual schools
A. Outer District Applications B. Travel Distance
(Fraction) (Meters)
Constant 0.064*** 6.729***
(0.004) (0.013)
Year 2012 0.012*** -0.020
(0.004) (0.015)
Year 2013 0.028*** 0.080***
(0.005) (0.015)
Bilingual School 0.006 0.132***
(0.005) (0.016)
2012*Bilingual School -0.002 0.036
(0.007) (0.023)
2013*Bilingual School 0.007 0.041*
(0.007) (0.023)
Number of Obs. 53,017 53,017
C. Social Segregation D. Immigrant Segregation
Constant -0.581*** 0.018
(0.011) (0.013)
Year 2012 -0.010 0.014*
(0.017) (0.009)
Year 2013 0.016 0.014
(0.017) (0.008)
Bilingual School 0.211*** 0.022
(0.018) (0.023)
2012*Bilingual School -0.005 -0.018
(0.025) (0.014)
2013*Bilingual School 0.026 -0.016
(0.026) (0.014)
Number of Obs. 53,004 1,483
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent
level, respectively.
TABLE 3.20: Relationship between low-income and former student bonus in the effects
of the 2013 reform on mobility for the city of Madrid.
A. Outer District Application B. Travel Distance
(Fraction) (Meters)
Low-Income Bonus Former Student Bonus Low-Income Bonus Former Student Bonus
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.080*** 0.083*** 6.808*** 6.814***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013)
Year 2013 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.108*** 0.109***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012)
Bonus Points -0.033** -0.058*** -0.070 -0.139***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.044) (0.037)
2013*Bonus 0.005 0.018 -0.006 -0.030
(0.019) (0.016) (0.063) (0.054)
Number of Obs. 34,949 34,949 34,808 34,808
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent level, respectively. We
control for the population density in the student neighborhood.
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TABLE 3.21: Geographic Mobility Coefficient Effects (Final School Assignment)
Dependent variable
Outer district applications Travel Distance
(Fraction) (Log Meters)
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
(1) (2)
A. Baseline Estimates
Baseline Effect (vs 2011) - 0.0124*** 0.0247*** - 0.0078 0.0939***
- (0.035) (0.0035) - (0.012) (0.012)
B. Heterogeneous Effects: Parental Education
(3) (4)
Baseline Effect (vs 2011) - 0.0042 0.0099 - -0.0252 0.060***
- (0.0075) (0.0075) - (0.025) (0.0257)
2nd quintile EDU 0.0149** -0.0005 0.0035 0.111*** 0.0597 0.0246
(0.0076) (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.025) (0.039) (0.0363)
3rd quintile EDU 0.069*** 0.0049 0.0101 0.196*** 0.0170 -0.0101
(0.0075) (0.0106) (0.0109) (0.025) (0.0354) (0.0361)
4th quintile EDU 0.073*** 0.0042 0.0234** 0.287*** 0.0121 0.0253
(0.0075) (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.025) (0.0357) (0.0363)
5th quintile EDU 0.094*** 0.031*** 0.0324*** 0.319*** 0.065*** 0.117***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.026) (0.037) (0.0379)
C. Heterogeneous Effects: Immigrant Status
(5) (6)
Baseline Effect (vs 2011) - 0.0168*** 0.0305*** - 0.0152 0.106***
- (0.038) (0.0038) - (0.0125) (0.0127)
Immigrant student -0.041*** -0.0175* -0.0296*** -0.179*** -0.0056 -0.0452
(0.0073) (0.0097) (0.10) (0.024) (0.033) (0.033)
Number of Obs. 51,126 51,126
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5-
and 1-percent level, respectively. Each panel represents regressions from Equation
(1), (2) and (3) respectively. In Equations (2) and (3) heterogeneous effects need to be
interpreted as an addition to the baseline effect. We control for the population density
in the student neighborhood. Clustering errors at the district or neighborhood levels
does not alter the significance level of the results.
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FIGURE 3.6: Post-Reform effects on share of immigrant students for final school assign-
ment, by quantiles.
Chapter 4
Job Tasks and Wages across the
world: Evidence from PIAAC
4.1 Introduction
The technological change phenomenon is leading to an automation of a range of low
and medium-skill occupations, in particular those whose contents follow precise and
well-understood procedures or routines. Workplace computerization leads to an au-
tomation of these routines and hence to a gradual change of contents/tasks demanded
at the workplace. Such computerization is driven by a decline in the relative price of
computer capital (identified with technological progress), which increases computer
and technology adoption at firms and the workplace, hence altering the allocation of
labor across different task inputs. Specifically, computer capital and labor are relative
complements in carrying out non-routine/non-codifiable tasks, while computer capital
and labor are substitutes in performing routine (codifiable) tasks. Indeed, Autor et al.
(2003) document a change in the occupational distribution of employment employment
polarization and assesses that computerization is indeed a key driver to understand
such changes.
Understanding employer behavior with respect to their labor demands in the face
of computerization requires a theoretical framework which specifically links skill re-
quirements with technological change. The traditional Mincerian human capital model
was very successful in explaining the relationship between wages and investment in
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human capital but given its supply based nature, it not helpful in understanding skill
demand requirements. Autor et al. (2003)(ALM) and, more recently, Acemoglu and Au-
tor (2011) developed a new theoretical task framework rooted in a fundamental differ-
ence between skills and tasks. In this framework, the basic units of production are
job content/tasks, which are supplied by production factors (labor and capital) which
combined can produce units of output. Assignment of factors to tasks is determined
in equilibrium by comparative advantage and hence each task is done by the least-cost
factor.
This task framework, however, still faces important challenges and measurement
is undoubtedly one of the most important ones. The first empirical studies used de-
tailed occupation data to approximate job tasks. However, tasks may share similarities
across very different occupations and hence the occupation data approach does not al-
low such similarities to be identified in an objective way. A subsequent set of empirical
studies used two datasets from surveys which offered job descriptors (contents) to each
occupation: the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and its successor, the Occupa-
tional Information Network (O*NET). Autor and Dorn (2013), Acemoglu and Autor
(2011), Goos et al. (2014), among others, have recently used these datasets for the mea-
surement of task contents. However, this has two major drawbacks even though this
approach assigns job descriptors to occupations objectively (and hence can be validated
by the agencies which supply them).
The first one is that these job descriptors DOT and O*NET are derived from US sur-
veys. Whereas the occupational based job descriptors may be similar to the US ones for
some OECD countries, such approximation for other countries may lead to large errors
in job contents. The second limitation is that this approach overlooks job tasks het-
erogeneity within occupations. In fact, empirical research has found important hetero-
geneity in job content at the worker level within detailed occupations (see Spitz Oener
(2006) and Autor and Handel (2013)). In particular, Spitz-Oener argues for the case of
Germany that job content changes take place mostly within, rather than between occu-
pations1. Hence, measuring job tasks at the workplace remains critical for an accurate
understanding of tasks, relating them to occupations, human capital and other demo-
graphics, as well as for identifying its link with wages on the verge of a technological
1Spitz documents the case of Germany in the period between 1979 and 1999 and divides job contents in
five categories: non-routine analytic, non-routine interactive routine cognitive, routine manual, and non-
routine manual. Results from a shift-share analysis show that task changes within occupations account
for 85%, 87%, 99%, 86% and 98% respectively of the total change in tasks between 1979 and 1999.
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transformation.
The empirical studies that measure tasks at the worker level are, to date, single-
country analysis (Spitz Oener (2006) and Autor and Handel (2013)). Our paper extends
the empirical assessment of task measurement at a worker level to a broad sample of
countries. Specifically, we compute differences in the tasks content of jobs across a har-
monized and hence comparable sample of countries that includes European, Asian and
American countries. There is evidence that the process of de-routinization has not fol-
lowed identical paths across countries. Hardy et al. (2016) document an increase rather
than a decrease in routine cognitive employment in the transition economies of East-
ern and Central Europe. Gimpelson and Kapeliushnikov (2016) and Aedo et al. (2013)
found similar results for Russia and Southern European countries, respectively. Hence,
there is a need for an assessment of job tasks around the world from a comparable
sample of countries at the worker level.
We therefore use the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Compe-
tencies (PIAAC), a survey which provides harmonized information across countries.
We use very precise information on job contents at the worker level, which allows for
job task heterogeneity within occupations to be considered and hence the nuanced in-
terplay between job demand, tasks, occupational sorting and earnings to be under-
stood. At the same time, given the availability of worker level information on the in-
tensity of computer use at work, we assess the empirical relationship between comput-
erization at work and the task content of workers. This is indeed the first of the three
contributions of our paper to the literature, i.e., to depict comparable cross-country dif-
ferentials in the ALM task framework for 20 OECD and non-OECD countries.
The second contribution of this paper is to study the relationship between job con-
tents and other demographics and job characteristics, in particular, the role played by
worker sorting into occupations in determining job tasks, as well as the association
between computerization at work and the type of tasks that workers perform. Such
analysis is conducted by very detailed and unique measures of worker cognitive skills,
which help to disentangle such relationship from potential confounding worker effects.
Finally, our third contribution is to assess the predictive power of job tasks on worker
wages: we do so under the task approach, which assumes that workers self-select into
jobs according to their comparative advantage.
Our findings show that New Zealand and Great Britain display the largest values
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in non-routine cognitive and personal tasks. On the other side, routine (cognitive and
manual) ones are found to be highest in Lithuania and Turkey. Second, computer use at
work is revealed as a key factor in explaining differences in job contents, both between
and within occupations. Third, job tasks exert a high predictive power to explain wage
differences, even within occupations. Additionally, results are consistent with the as-
sumption by the task approach that workers self-select into occupations based on their
comparative advantage. Finally, our individual-based task measures are validated by
comparing them with those which would be obtained when assigning job descriptors
from O*NET dataset (which have been previously used in the literature), bringing fur-
ther nuances that can add more value in future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data sources and
a discussion on data sources and the construction of task/job contents. Section 3 and
4 present empirical estimates of task determinants and the relation between tasks and
wages. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Data Sources, Task Measures and Descriptives across Coun-
tries
4.2.1 Data
Our empirical approach uses data from the Programme for the International Assess-
ment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), conducted by the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in two waves first, in 2011-2012 and second,
in 2014-2015 -in 31 participating countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain,
Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, New
Zealand, Poland, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden,
Turkey and the United States. The data sample contains 201,033 observations, which
represent a total population of 815 million adults aged 16 to 65. The survey includes a
personal interview comprising a questionnaire followed by a skills assessment of liter-
acy, numeracy and problem-solving skills in technology environments.
The questionnaire contains information about personal background, education and
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training, current work status, work history and skills used at current job (or last job) and
everyday life. As said previously, the variables of job contents (tasks) used at work are
particularly appropriate for the analysis within occupations. In addition, the PIAAC
skills assessment provides an accurate measurement of cognitive skills, an excellent
proxy to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Beyond the assessment of specific read-
ing, mathematical or technology contents, the skill assessment framework of PIAAC
emphasizes the ability of workers to apply background knowledge, a unique feature
used by OECD in their cognitive skill assessments.
This paper aims at understanding the task content of jobs in a framework where occu-
pational sorting drives worker choices. Unfortunately, not all countries in the sample
provide detailed occupation-level information at more than one digit. Therefore, we
lose 11 countries from the sample and remain with 20 countries for the analysis: Bel-
gium, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, Greece,
Italy, Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, New Zealand, Russian Fed-
eration, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey.
4.2.2 Constructing Worker-level Task Measures
Using data from the worker responses of activities conducted at work, we construct
measurements of task intensities. We follow the original Autor et al. (2003) approach
that defines five task measurements: non-routine cognitive, non-routine personal, rou-
tine cognitive, routine manual and non-routine manual.
We construct a set of indices based on the PIAAC background questionnaire. The
background questionnaire displays answers on work habits and tasks performed at
the workplace, normally organized through different types of frequency answers. To
keep consistency in the aggregation of answers into indexes, we restrict our set of items
used to those with the frequency category on responses to the question starting by
”How often does does your job usually involve”. The responses are organized as five
qualitative time inputs: (i) Every day; (ii) At least once a week but not every day; (iii)
Less than once a week; (iv) Less than once a month; (v) Never.
113
TABLE 4.1: Task Framework with PIAAC Data
Task PIAAC Questionnaire Item Item No.
Non routine Cognitive Write Reports G Q02c
Non routine Cognitive Write Reports G Q02c
Non routine Cognitive Read Diagrams, Maps or Schematics G Q01h
Non routine Cognitive Faced Complex Problems (¿30 mins) F Q05b
Non - routine Personal Planning the activities of others F Q03b
Non-routine Personal Persuading/Influencing People F Q04a
Routine Cognitive Learning-by-doing from task performed D Q13b
Routine Cognitive Organizing your own time F Q03c
Routine Cognitive Instructing, training or teaching people F Q03c
Routine Cognitive Making speeches or giving presentations F Q02c
Routine Manual Hand and finger dexterity F Q06b
Notes: All questions provide the same time categorical answers: (i) Every Day; (ii) At least
once a wee but not every day; (iii) Less than once a week; (iv) Less than once a month; (v)
Never.
We follow Autor and Handel (2013) to construct the indexes for each of the dimen-
sions using the first component of a principal component analysis2. Due to data limita-
tions on manual tasks, we only construct four of the five job tasks: non-routine cogni-
tive, non-routine personal, routine cognitive and routine manual. For the non-routine
cognitive task index, we use three different items: (i) write reports; (ii) read diagrams,
maps or schematics; and (iii) face complex problems that take at least 30 minutes. We
construct the non-routine personal task index with the following items: (i) planning
the activities of others; (ii) persuading or influencing people. The routine cognitive
task index is constructed with four different items: (i) learning-by-doing at work; (ii)
organizing own time; (iii) instructing, training or teaching people, individually or in
groups; (iv) making speeches or giving presentations in front of five or more people.
The last two items follow the approach used by Autor and Handel (2013), which con-
struct the routine cognitive index emphasizing the importance of the lack of face-to-face
interactions.
The manual routine index is constructed from the item using skill or accuracy with
hands or fingers item, which has been widely used in the task literature (see Autor et al.
(2003) and Autor and Dorn (2013)). Table 4.1 depicts the job task items from the PIAAC
background questionnaire that are used to construct each of the task indexes. For non-
routine manual tasks, an alternative would be to use the question on Physical Work.
2Autor and Handel (2013) follow a principal component analysis to derive continuous job task variables
taking advantage of multiple responses of items. The data from Spitz Oener (2006) only contain binary
information on whether the worker either performs a certain task or not, and aggregate measures are
constructed as percentage of activities performed for each category of tasks. As a robustness check with
our approach, data comparing both methods lead to similar results, with correlation of 0.90 for non-routine
cognitive tasks, 0.78 for non-routine personal tasks, and 0.92 for routine cognitive tasks.
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Nevertheless, the non-routine manual task constructed in, for example, the Autor et al.
(2009) approach is a non-codifiable type of work3. These should include, among others,
task such as dexterity, coordination, object handing or spatial orientation tasks. Unfor-
tunately, the PIACC dataset does not include items to learn about these non-routine
manual job contents and, hence, we decide not to use any non-routine manual task
measure in our approach.
Our sample consists of 51,056 observations (from 20 countries for which occupation
at more than 1-digit is available) that are well defined for each item of the task frame-
work, as well as the worker covariates later used in the next section. We then compute
the indexes for each task. Consistent with Autor and Handel (2013), the first com-
ponent of the principal component analysis for each task explains a relatively large
variance (see Table 4.10 in Section 4.6), being 0.55 for non-routine cognitive tasks, 0.71
for non-routine personal tasks and 0.45 for routine cognitive tasks4. We also compute
the indexes into their standardized form and compare their results at the worker level.
The indexes of non-routine cognitive and personal tasks are positively correlated (0.47),
while both are negatively correlated (-0.49 and -0.60) with routine cognitive tasks. Rou-
tine manual task index does not correlate with the rest of indices in any relevant way.
4.2.3 Job Task Descriptives around the World
In Figure 4.1 we depict the average values of the standardized form of the task vari-
ables explained above. In particular, we find that New Zealand, Great Britain, Den-
mark, Japan, South Korea and Netherlands display the largest values of non-routine
cognitive tasks, while these are lowest in Turkey, Lithuania and Greece. This is con-
sistent with what is found for the case of routine cognitive tasks (where the order is
3For the manual non-routine category, both Spitz Oener (2006) and Autor and Handel (2013) use activ-
ities that are clearly identifiable as non-routine. Spitz Oener (2006) uses as response of activity: Repairing
or renovating houses/apartments/machines/vehicles, restoring art/monuments, and serving or accom-
modating, while Autor and Handel (2013) use four activities: (i) operating vehicles, mechanized devices,
or equipment; (ii) time spent using hands to handle, control, or feel objects, tools, or controls; (iii) man-
ual dexterity; (iv) spatial orientation. From the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), Autor and Dorn
(2013) use eye-hand-foot coordination variable for the manual (non-routine) task and finger dexterity to
be included as the manual part of the routine construct. Finally, Acemoglu and Autor (2011) use from the
Occupational Information Network (O*NET) pace determined by speed of equipment, controlling ma-
chines and processes and spend time making repetitive motions for routine manual tasks and operating
vehicles, mechanized devices, or equipment, spend time using hands to handle, control or feel objects,
tools or controls, manual dexterity or spatial orientation.
4Follwoing Autor and Handel (2013), Abstract and Routine scales are derived from a first component
of a principal component analysis which explain 41% and 56% of the total variation respectively.
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mostly inversed), with the exception of Netherlands. Moreover, we find large values
of non-routine personal tasks in New Zealand, Great Britain, Denmark and Nether-
lands and low values in Japan, Lithuania and Slovakia. Finally, routine manual tasks
are low in Japan, South Korea, France and Russia, whereas high in Lithuania, Slovenia
and, surprisingly, New Zealand. The cross-country comparison between the three task
indexes shows a very high and positive correlation between non-routine cognitive and
personal (0.72), whereas those two display a negative correlation with routine cognitive
tasks (-0.60 and -0.59 respectively). The routine manual task correlates positively with
non-routine personal tasks (0.32) and negatively with routine cognitive tasks (-0.24).
FIGURE 4.1: Job Task Measures by Countries.
Notes: Results display values of standardized indexes for each task, with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Observa-
tions are weighted so that countries are weighted equally. Results are also presented in Table 4.12 Section 4.6
Secondly, we look at the task content of jobs across a set of individual covariates,
which can be found in Table 4.2. The results show a larger value of non-routine cogni-
tive tasks for males, whereas no difference in the other tasks. Moreover, the task-age
curve displays a concave shape for non-routine tasks, whereas a convex shape is found
for routine tasks. Workers’ education and skills are positively related to non-routine
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(both cognitive and personal) tasks, whereas negatively related to routine tasks. Fi-
nally, workers receiving training on the job show larger shares of non-routine tasks and
a lower share of routine cognitive tasks, compared to those which do not receive any
training on the job. Regarding sectors, services display larger shares of non-routine
personal tasks, whereas lower shares of routine tasks, both cognitive and manual.
TABLE 4.2: Distribution of Task Measures by Worker Covariates.
NRC NRP RC RM
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Gender
Female -0.17 0.95 -0.02 0.99 0.03 1.00 0.00 1.01
Male 0.14 1.02 0.02 1.01 -0.02 1.00 0.00 0.99
Age
25 or less -0.27 0.94 -0.15 0.94 0.17 0.9 0.08 0.95
25 - 34 0.13 1.00 0.04 0.98 -0.08 0.98 0.03 0.98
35 - 44 0.07 1.00 0.07 1.01 -0.06 1.00 0.00 1.00
45 - 54 -0.03 1.00 -0.02 1.02 0.03 1.02 -0.01 1.01
55 - 64 -0.17 0.97 -0.09 1.01 0.12 1.02 -0.08 1.04
Education Level
Lower Secondary or Less -0.56 0.87 -0.44 0.89 0.46 0.86 0.13 0.94
Upper Secondary -0.15 0.97 -0.13 0.99 0.20 0.92 0.09 0.96
Post-secondary or Tertiary Professional 0.12 0.94 0.13 0.98 -0.20 0.98 0.01 0.98
Tertiary (Bachelor/Master) 0.53 0.88 0.41 0.93 -0.56 0.96 -0.24 1.06
Literacy Skills (Quartile)
Quartile 1 -0.38 0.95 -0.27 0.97 0.26 0.99 0.16 0.93
Quartile 2 -0.07 0.99 -0.04 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.07 0.97
Quartile 3 0.15 0.97 0.1 0.99 -0.09 0.98 -0.04 1.01
Quartile 4 0.42 0.91 0.29 0.94 -0.32 0.93 -0.25 1.06
Numeracy Skills (Quartile)
Quartile 1 -0.44 0.93 -0.32 0.95 0.29 0.98 0.16 0.92
Quartile 2 -0.13 0.97 -0.07 1.00 0.09 1.00 0.07 0.97
Quartile 3 0.11 0.97 0.08 1.00 -0.05 0.98 -0.06 1.02
Quartile 4 0.46 0.91 0.3 0.95 -0.33 0.93 -0.18 1.05
On the Job Training
No -0.22 0.96 -0.17 0.97 0.2 0.96 -0.01 1.00
Yes 0.36 0.95 0.27 0.98 -0.33 0.97 0.01 0.99
Sector
Manufacturing 0.06 1.04 -0.16 1.00 0.16 0.95 0.07 0.98
Construction 0.00 1.01 -0.12 1.02 0.15 0.94 0.18 0.90
Services -0.03 0.98 0.1 0.99 -0.10 1.02 -0.06 1.02
Notes: the sample includes all employed respondents of all countries. Results display values of standard-
ized indexes for each task, with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Observations are weighted so that
countries are weighted equally. NRC refers to non-routine cognitive, NRP refers to non-routine personal,
RC refers to routine cognitive and RM refers to routine manual tasks.
4.2.4 Validity of Job Task Measures: Worker level vs Occupational Level
(PIAAC and O*NET)
To better understand the reliability of our measures, we compute the worker-level
measurement of tasks at the occupational four-digit level and compare them with the
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worker-level values. Table 4.3 shows a positive large correlation of worker and occupational-
level task measurements.
Moreover, we can validate our individual-based task measures by comparing them
with those which would be obtained when assigning job descriptors from O*NET to
each of the 4-digit occupational level. For comparability reasons, we use O*NET dataset
to construct non-routine cognitive, non-routine personal, routine cognitive and routine
manual measures using exactly the same task measures used in Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) at the 4-digit occupation level. As Table 4.3 shows, we find a positive correlation
of around 0.54 for non-routine cognitive tasks, 0.46 for non-routine personal tasks, 0.26
for routine cognitive tasks (which is lower than expected) and 0.30 for routine manual
tasks. The fact that the PIAAC occupation-level correlation O*NET is slightly larger
compared to the PIAAC worker-level correlation (except for routine cognitive tasks) is
consistent with Autor and Handel (2013)5.
TABLE 4.3: Correlation between Worker and Occupation-Level Task Measures (PIAAC
and O*NET)
Worker-level PIAAC Occupation-level PIAAC
Occupation-level PIAAC Occupation-level O*NET Occupation-level O*NET
Non-routine cognitive 0.672 0.417 0.536
Non-routine personal 0.644 0.368 0.456
Routine cognitive 0.679 0.235 0.264
Routine manual 0.585 0.197 0.304
Notes: The sample includes employed respondents aged 20-64 and currently working for which variables in
Section 4.3 are well defined and have non missing values. Observations are weighted so that countries are
weighted equally.
In order to better understand the consistency of our estimates beyond the interna-
tional sample, we further investigate for which countries the relation between occupation-
level task measures (PIAAC and O*NET) showed in the last column of Table 4.3 is
stronger. In Table 4.4, we find a large occupation-level correlation of both task mea-
sures in Belgium, Denmark France, Netherlands, Great Britain, or Slovenia. Moreover,
we find low levels of correlation for Russia, South Korea (which is even negative for
routine manual tasks), Cyprus, or Lithuania. A potential explanation for these differ-
ences may be found in differences in the degree of similarity of these economies (insti-
tutions, degree of technological changes, etc) compared to the US. As mentioned before,
O*NET dataset provides job descriptors at occupational level for the US economy, and
5Autor and Handel (2013) find positive and high occupation-level correlation between their measures
and O*NET measures for Abstract (0.65), Routine (0.48) and Manual tasks (0.63).
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this may be applicable to some countries, such as some Western European countries
but not to others, such as Eastern or South European Countries.
TABLE 4.4: Correlation of task measures at occupation level between PIAAC and
O*NET measures, by country
Non routine Non routine Routine Routine
Cognitive Personal Cognitive Manual
Belgium 0.572 0.47 0.318 0.556
Chile 0.45 0.396 0.284 0.408
Cyprus 0.479 0.378 0.241 0.205
Czech Republic 0.59 0.49 0.356 0.277
Denmark 0.547 0.442 0.269 0.35
Spain 0.557 0.418 0.241 0.563
France 0.63 0.591 0.383 0.602
Great Britain 0.548 0.528 0.255 0.434
Greece 0.541 0.411 0.211 0.385
Italy 0.632 0.474 0.211 0.338
Japan 0.595 0.431 0.245 0.343
Korea 0.487 0.367 0.245 -0.173
Lithuania 0.493 0.47 0.285 0.107
Netherlands 0.621 0.489 0.303 0.43
Poland 0.528 0.464 0.258 0.414
New Zealand 0.522 0.531 0.318 0.276
Russia 0.408 0.467 0.219 0.228
Slovakia 0.602 0.545 0.317 0.171
Slovenia 0.622 0.617 0.385 0.219
Turkey 0.513 0.425 0.121 0.396
Overall Mean 0.536 0.456 0.264 0.304
Notes: The sample includes employed respondents aged 20-64 and currently
working for which variables in Section 4.3 are well defined and have non miss-
ing values. We use one observation per occupation and country.
4.2.5 Job Tasks and Computer Adoption at Work around the world
As stated before, the implicit assumption underlying the relation between task changes
and technological change is that the decline in the price of computer capital (the ex-
ogenous driver of digitalization) is expected to increase computer adoption at work.
Measurement of a precise definition of computer adoption at work in a cross-country
setting and its relation to job tasks is another important contribution of this paper. Pre-
vious authors have used binary indicators of computer use at work in relating tech-
nological change and the task content of jobs (Spitz Oener (2006)) or a measure of
adjusted computers-per-worker at the firm level (Autor and Dorn (2013)). To exploit
further variation at the worker level, we construct a measure for the individual degree
of computer use at work through four different items with frequency inputs, the same
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qualitative responses as of those in Table 4.16. In particular, we use the following items:
(i) use the Internet to better understand issues related to work; (ii) conduct transactions
on the Internet, for example buying or selling products or services; (iii) use spread-
sheet software; (iv) participate in real-time discussions on the Internet, for example on
line conferences or chat groups7. We then compute the first component of the principal
component analysis of these four items (which explains 57.5% of the total variance) and
present it in a standardized form8.
FIGURE 4.2: Computer Use and Job Tasks across Countries.
Notes: The sample includes employed respondents aged 20-64 and currently working for which variables in section 4.3
are well defined and have non missing values. For regression purposes and due to few observations, we exclude
workers in non-profit firms and workers in Armed Forces and Skilled Agricultural and Fishery occupations.
Figure 4.2 depicts an index for each of the countries under analysis. As can be seen,
6The five item responses are again: (i) Every Day; (ii) At least once a wee but not every day; (iii) Less
than once a week; (iv) Less than once a month; (v) Never.
7We include a subset of all related items provided in the questionnaire when constructing the index
of ICT use. This arbitrary decision is based on two reasons: we exclude items with little variation in
responses and pick only one item from those that are highly correlated.
8When comparing the final index with the dummy used by Spitz Oener (2006), we find an individual
correlation of 0.67. When comparing the average index at the country level with the proportion of workers
responding yes to computer use dummy, the cross-country correlation is 0.83.
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New Zealand, Denmark, Korea and Great Britain display the largest values in terms
of computer use, whereas the lowest values correspond to Russia, Greece, Italy and
Cyprus. Moreover, the cross-country comparison shows a strong positive correlation
of computer use and non-routine cognitive (0.72) and personal (0.67) tasks, whereas a
negative correlation with routine cognitive (-0.55) tasks. There is no observed relevant
relation between computer use at work and manual routine task at work.
4.3 Job Tasks, Occupation Sorting and Computer Use at Work
The main advantage of job task individual-level measures is that research can exploit
the variance within occupations, an issue widely discussed in the literature (Spitz Oener
(2006); Autor and Handel (2013)). This section explores the potential use of job tasks
measures at the individual level in order to better understand the relation between oc-
cupational sorting, education and skills and task measures. Additionally, we consider
the extent to which computer use at work plays a role mostly between or within occu-
pations in determining the relation of task measures with computerization.
Conceptually, we follow the Autor and Handel (2013) approach and start by assess-
ing the determinants of job tasks across countries, by particularly looking at the rela-
tionship between tasks at the worker-level with key covariates within occupations. To
explore this relationship, we consider for a given worker a pooled linear model with
country fixed effects for countries, where:
Tkij =α+∑
m
β1mX Indijm +∑
o
β2oX
Job
ijo + θ ICTij + δkj + τpj + ekij (4.1)
where Tkij represents the intensity of kth-job task for individual i in country j. In
addition, X Indijm is a vector of m individual worker characteristics (such as gender, age,
level of education or literacy and numeracy skills), X Jobijo is a vector of o job characteris-
tics (public or private firm, firm size and on-the-job training), ICTij captures the use of
computer for worker i at work. Finally, δkj and τpj represent country and occupational
dummies. Country fixed effects capture the cross-country differences in the respective
task measure index that cannot be explained by the model, whereas occupational dum-
mies provide estimates net of occupational assignment. It is to be noted, once again,
121
that this model accounts for differences in individual cognitive skills through the indi-
vidual literacy and numeracy test scores. Job contents are undoubtedly driven at least
partially by individual ability, which is in most instances unobservable to researchers.
The possibility to account for them in an estimation of the determinants of job tasks
allows time invariant unobserved heterogeneity to be controlled and hence, the rela-
tionship between job contents and other covariates to be cleaned from such correlation.
Indeed, to our knowledge, it is the first time that cognitive skills are controlled for in
an estimation of the determinants of Job Contents in a cross-country analysis.
Table 4.5 presents regression results for the task measures of non-routine cognitive,
non-routine personal, routine cognitive and routine manual tasks. The first model of
each task includes country dummies, individual characteristics, job characteristics as
well as the worker-level index value of computer use. To control for occupational sort-
ing, we include occupation fixed effects. Finally, in order to control for potential dif-
ferences in elasticity of tasks with respect to computer use across countries, we include
an interaction term of country fixed effects and computer use. First, adding occupation
fixed effects increases the explanatory power of the model substantially, as we might
expect. Second, it is particularly interesting to see how the importance of gender, age
(not for all tasks) and education levels of workers in determining job tasks decrease
significantly when controlling for occupational sorting. However, they still account
for important socio-demographic marginal effects within occupation estimates. The
importance of job characteristics and the economic sector also decreases significantly.
Third, computer use is a key determinant of job task and, more importantly, this rela-
tion does remain constant even when accounting for occupational sorting.
The interaction terms display some variation which is significant, but overall the pos-
itive relation between computer use and non-routine tasks and the negative relation of
computer use and routine cognitive tasks keeps the same sign for all countries. Nev-
ertheless, for the case of manual routine tasks, the marginal term is positive, small and
significant (Column (11)), when we include the interaction with country fixed effects.
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TABLE 4.5: Task Content, Occupation Sorting and Computer Use at Work
Non routine cognitive Non routine personal Routine cognitive Routine manual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Computer Use (Index) 0.404*** 0.377*** 0.422*** 0.299*** 0.278*** 0.357*** -0.268*** -0.262*** -0.285*** -0.0578*** 0.0517*** -0.208***
(0.00535) (0.00628) (0.0172) (0.00589) (0.00673) (0.0178) (0.00579) (0.00672) (0.0159) (0.00632) (0.00742) (0.0214)
Male 0.284*** 0.195*** 0.192*** 0.102*** 0.138*** 0.139*** -0.123*** -0.141*** -0.142*** -0.0472*** -0.0360*** -0.0431***
(0.00982) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0119) (0.0135) (0.0134)
Age 25-34 0.121*** 0.0824*** 0.0852*** 0.0404** 0.0586*** 0.0635*** -0.0242 -0.0246 -0.0262 0.0272 0.0348* 0.0283
(0.0183) (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0201) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0203) (0.0193) (0.0191)
Age 35-44 0.118*** 0.0683*** 0.0696*** 0.124*** 0.126*** 0.132*** -0.0487*** -0.0341* -0.0343** -0.025 0.00926 0.0133
(0.0179) (0.0172) (0.0172) -0.0198 (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0186) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0201) (0.0192) (0.019)
Age 45-54 0.129*** 0.0691*** 0.0698*** 0.115*** 0.107*** 0.113*** -0.0478** -0.013 -0.0142 -0.0763*** -0.0277 -0.0106
(0.0182) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0199) (0.019) (0.019) (0.0187) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0205) (0.0196) (0.0195)
Age 55-64 0.0479** -0.0237 -0.0237 0.0965*** 0.0853*** 0.0876*** 0.00865 0.0498** 0.0494** -0.146*** -0.0689*** -0.0490**
(0.0198) -0.0193 -0.0193 -0.0223 -0.0215 -0.0215 -0.0212 -0.0201 -0.0201 -0.0232 -0.0222 -0.0221
High School or Sec. VET 0.138*** 0.0846*** 0.0843*** 0.145*** 0.0805*** 0.0853*** -0.154*** -0.0914*** -0.0966*** -0.0127 -0.00196 0.0143
(0.0141 -0.0138 -0.014 -0.0154 -0.0146 -0.0147 -0.015 -0.0141 -0.0143 -0.0166 -0.0161 -0.0161
Tertiary professional 0.238*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.240*** 0.101*** 0.107*** -0.301*** -0.123*** -0.129*** -0.0235 -0.0277 -0.00661
(0.0179) (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0196) (0.0187) (0.0188) (0.0195) (0.0188) (0.019) (0.0206) (0.0204) (0.0204)
Tertiary college 0.362*** 0.208*** 0.207*** 0.331*** 0.133*** 0.136*** -0.554*** -0.209*** -0.211*** -0.222*** -0.161*** -0.157***
(0.0176) (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0194) (0.019) (0.0192) (0.0212) (0.0217) (0.0217)
Literacy Skills -0.000382 -0.000181 -0.000228 -0.000760** -0.000466* -0.000485* 0.000624** 0.000576** 0.000633** -0.00127*** -0.00102*** -0.000977***
(0.000259) (0.000245) (0.000245) (0.000299) (0.000271) (0.000272) (0.000301) (0.000271) (0.000271) (0.000306) (0.000294) (0.000293)
Numeracy Skills 0.00207*** 0.00133*** 0.00136*** 0.00186*** 0.00121*** 0.00123*** -0.00114*** -0.000559** -0.000611** -0.000347 -0.00017 0.0000135
(0.000244) (0.000232) (0.000232) (0.000277) (0.000253) (0.000253) (0.000284) (0.000259) (0.000259) (0.00028) (0.000273) (0.000271)
Private firm -0.107*** -0.00616 -0.00718 0.00211 0.0622*** 0.0600*** 0.207*** -0.0119 -0.0105 0.00744 -0.00583 0.00147
(0.0114) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0132) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0157) (0.0155)
Size: 11 to 50 0.121*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.00654 0.0117 0.0125 -0.132*** -0.0978*** -0.101*** -0.00381 0.00013 -0.00194
(0.0119) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0134) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.012) (0.012) (0.0142) (0.0137) (0.0135)
Size: 51 to 250 0.152*** 0.130*** 0.130*** -0.0324** -0.00364 -0.000547 -0.117*** -0.111*** -0.116*** -0.0350** -0.0164 -0.0198
(0.0135) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0152) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0157) (0.0153) (0.0151)
Size: 251 to 1000 0.193*** 0.156*** 0.156*** -0.0665*** -0.00832 -0.00308 -0.0465*** -0.105*** -0.113*** -0.0189 -0.00697 -0.0105
(0.0164) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0182) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0194) (0.0192) (0.019)
Size: more than 1000 0.240*** 0.181*** 0.183*** -0.0393* 0.00771 0.015 -0.110*** -0.171*** -0.178*** -0.0345 -0.0489** -0.0544**
(0.0203) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0212) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0217) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0235) (0.0227) (0.0225)
On the job Training 0.246*** 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.203*** 0.149*** 0.147*** -0.267*** -0.215*** -0.213*** 0.0737*** 0.0634*** 0.0590***
(0.0101) (0.00978) (0.00977) (0.0113) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0115) (0.0112) (0.0111)
Construction 0.139*** 0.0303 0.0312 0.150*** 0.116*** 0.118*** -0.156*** -0.107*** -0.109*** 0.0565*** -0.0179 -0.0174
(0.0195) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0221) (0.0269) (0.0268) (0.0205) (0.0247) (0.0246) (0.0212) (0.0267) (0.0265)
Services -0.101*** -0.0686*** -0.0652*** 0.194*** 0.022 0.0223 -0.123*** -0.009 -0.0105 -0.103*** -0.00961 -0.00845
(0.0117) (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0129) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.012) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0168) (0.0167)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent level, respectively. We use Belgium as country of
reference for country dummies. Observations are weighted so that countries are weighted equally.
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TABLE 4.6: Task Content and Differential Country Effects of Computer Use
Non routine cognitive Non routine personal Routine cognitive Routine manual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Computer Use (Index) 0.377*** 0.422*** 0.278*** 0.357*** -0.262*** -0.285*** 0.0517*** -0.208***
(0.00628) (0.0172) (0.00673) (0.0178) (0.00672) (0.0159) (0.00742) -0.0214
Belgium as Reference
Chile -0.0893*** -0.128*** 0.120*** 0.138***
(0.0267) (0.028) (0.0283) (0.0322)
Cyprus -0.0707** -0.116*** 0.0694*** 0.308***
(0.0277) (0.03) (0.0267) (0.0327)
Czech 0.0379 0.00724 0.0686*** 0.226***
(0.0295) (0.0303) (0.0234) (0.0359)
Denmark -0.0688*** -0.135*** 0.0201 0.179***
(0.0204) (0.0215) (0.0193) (0.0258)
Spain 0.0272 -0.0482* 0.0391* 0.0171
(0.0247) (0.0267) (0.0236) (0.031)
France 0.00784 -0.0474** -0.0121 -0.105***
(0.0214) (0.0224) (0.0209) (0.0268)
Great Britain -0.123*** -0.118*** 0.0321 0.267***
(0.026) (0.0268) (0.0253) (0.0309)
Greece -0.00669 0.0133 0.0204 0.338***
(0.0283) (0.0308) (0.0304) (0.0408)
Italy 0.0234 -0.0499* 0.0398 0.149***
(0.0277) (0.0291) (0.0256) (0.0353)
Japan -0.0137 -0.132*** 0.0192 0.298***
(0.0223) (0.0234) (0.0232) (0.0292)
Korea -0.0415** -0.0920*** 0.018 0.672***
(0.021) (0.0224) (0.0205) (0.0268)
Lithuania -0.0878*** 0.0806*** -0.00886 0.418***
(0.0248) (0.0258) (0.0234) (0.0282)
Netherlands -0.0359 -0.0764*** -0.0534** 0.185***
(0.0222) (0.0236) (0.0211) (0.0301)
New Zealand -0.135*** -0.186*** 0.117*** 0.354***
(0.0225) (0.0241) (0.0222) (0.0245)
Poland -0.0654*** -0.0700*** 0.0261 0.148***
(0.0239) (0.0245) (0.0224) (0.029)
Russia -0.0395 0.0349 -0.0417 0.239***
(0.0339) (0.0356) (0.0362) (0.0455)
Slovenia -0.0129 -0.0695*** -0.0600** 0.296***
(0.0242) (0.0266) (0.0248) (0.0293)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent level, respectively.
Results display country differential effects of regression results in Table 4.5. We use Belgium as country of reference for
country dummies. Observations are weighted so that countries weight equally.
These can be seen in more detail in Table 4.6, which shows the differential effect of
computer use at work for each country, keeping Belgium (arbitrarily) as the reference
country. The largest effects of computer use on non-routine cognitive tasks (Column
2) are found for the Czech Republic, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Russia, Slovenia and Slovakia. Such relation is clearly smaller for Chile, Great Britain,
New Zealand and Turkey. Regarding non-routine personal tasks (Column 4), the effect
is largest for the Czech Republic, Greece, Russia and Slovakia, while much lower for
Japan, New Zealand and Chile. With respect to routine cognitive tasks (Column 6),
the negative effect is stronger in the Netherlands, Slovenia and Slovakia, and much
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lower in Chile and New Zealand. Finally, the relation of computer use and routine
manual tasks is negative and large in France and Belgium, while positive in a large set
of countries, in particular South Korea, with a very large positive relation.
Overall results show that computer use at work is a key factor in explaining differ-
ences in job contents, both between and within occupations, and that this holds even
after controlling for detailed individual and job characteristics, including individual
cognitive skills, which are usually unobservable. Although we cannot attribute this
to be a causal relation, this brings suggestive evidence of the importance of technol-
ogy adoption in understanding the task content of jobs across and within countries,
whereas at the same time validates our measures of job content from a more policy
perspective.
4.4 The rewards to Job Tasks in the Labor Market around the
World
The previous sections defined and validated different job task measures for a variety
of OECD countries and addressed the association between job tasks and important de-
mographic and job characteristics, as well as with a measure of digitalization, approx-
imated by the intensity of computer use at work. In this section, we turn to estimating
the rewards to the different job tasks on the labor market, through the empirical rela-
tion between wages and job tasks around the world. To our knowledge, there is not a
single study that addresses this relationship in a cross-country framework. In partic-
ular, we are interested in computing empirically the differences in the rewards to the
different job tasks, as well as differences in these rewards across different countries. We
start by presenting basic empirical relationships between (log) wages and different job
contents, to learn about the predictive power of job tasks for wages, both across and
within occupations. As before, we validate our task measures by comparing our job
tasks definition with those obtained from O*NET dataset. However, we must assess
the endogeneity of job tasks for wages to obtain true job task rewards in order to be
consistent with the task approach, by which individuals decide upon which job tasks
to perform on the basis of their comparative advantage. We do that by following the
methodology proposed by Autor and Handel (2013) to control for the self-selection of
workers into different jobs based on their comparative advantage.
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4.4.1 Wage Data
TABLE 4.7: Hourly Wages (USD) PPP Corrected, by Countries
Obs. Mean S.D.
Denmark 3,781 25.2 11.14
Belgium 2,507 22.5 10.48
New Zealand 2,520 19.38 12.67
Netherlands 2,739 19.29 5.73
Great Britain 2,852 18.99 12.76
Korea 2,874 18.46 17.05
Cyprus 1,932 17.68 12.66
Italy 1,648 16.8 10.74
Japan 2,971 16.79 13.75
France 3,346 16.05 8.5
Spain 2,248 15.87 11.17
Greece 1,143 11.21 8.1
Chile 1,967 11.1 11.13
Poland 3,616 9.75 7.89
Slovenia 2,113 9.47 4.82
Czech Rep. 2,390 9.37 6.06
Slovakia 2,253 8.81 6.93
Lithuania 2,404 7.76 5.83
Russia 1,240 5.16 5.14
Notes: Data reflects hourly earnings, including
bonuses for wage and salary earners, in PPP cor-
rected USD1. We exclude earnings below USD1
and above USD150.
The wage data reported by PIAAC that we use corresponds to hourly earnings with
bonuses for wage and salary earners. There is no public data on earnings at the indi-
vidual level for the case of Turkey among countries for which we have constructed task
measures. For this reason, we exclude the Turkey data when preparing of variables
for wage analysis, in particular when re-constructing task measures with the new sam-
ple of nineteen countries. Moreover, we use the conversion data to USD, corrected in
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), constructed by OECD for consistent comparisons. As
can be seen in Table 4.7, Nordic European as well as Anglo-Saxon countries form the
group of countries with highest hourly wages, followed by Central European, Asian
and Southern European countries. Eastern European countries display the lowest mean
wages.
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4.4.2 The Predictive Power of Job Tasks for Wages
Our basic empirical approach consists of estimating a pooled linear model for the nine-
teen countries (j = 1...19) described above:
LogWij =α+∑
m
β1mX Indijm +∑
o
β2oX
Job
ijo +∑
k
β3kTaskijk +∑
k
β4kTask jk + δj + ekij (4.2)
with LogWij being the hourly log-wage, Xijm individual m worker characteristics: these
include gender, age or level of education, but more importantly, a unique standardized
measure of individual ability approximated by the individual test scores on reading
and mathematical competencies. Using this last measure, a greater part of the supply
component of unobserved worker ability are rewarded to the task. X Jobijo includes a vec-
tor of job characteristics (public or private firm, firm size and on-the-job training), and
Taskijk is the intensity of non-routine cognitive, non-routine personal, routine cognitive
and routine manual tasks which each worker reports to exert in her work. We also in-
clude the average mean of each task at occupation-country level Task jk in order to net
out the pure individual job task reward from the association between job tasks and oc-
cupations. As before, this mean is a leave-out mean, representing the average intensity
of k-th task for all workers from a particular country in occupation p except for the i-th
worker.
Table 4.8 displays several empirical specifications of the relationship between wages
and each of the previously defined tasks. In particular, Column 1 addresses the raw
(or unconditional) relationship between wages and individual and job characteristics
in a Mincer regression where we include country dummies. Columns 2 and 3 consider
task measures, with and without controlling for worker ability measures. The first
key result is that we observe a positive relation between non-routine tasks and hourly
earnings, while a negative and small relation of routine cognitive and manual tasks
with earnings. Returns to individual and job characteristics slightly decrease when
considering job task measures. Moreover, the returns to the index of computer use at
work also decrease when considering measures of worker cognitive skills.
When ability measures are included in Column 3, the wage returns to tasks decrease
mostly for non-routine tasks (from 3.1% of hourly wages of one standard deviation of
the cognitive task measure to 2.6% and from 2.0% to 1.8% in the personal task mea-
sure), but also for manual routine tasks. In Columns 4 and 5 we include variables at
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the occupational level: we first consider task measures of PIAAC averaged at the oc-
cupational level (Column 4) and then include occupational dummies (Column 5). The
positive returns to tasks remain, except for non-routine cognitive tasks when consid-
ering tasks measures at the occupational level, which reveals the importance of within
occupation task measures to understand wage returns in the sample of countries. The
returns to task measures at the occupational level are also substantial. This indicates
that heterogeneity of job tasks within and between occupations is important, and hence
measuring it at the occupational level only would be greatly misleading.
Finally, it is interesting to compare the empirical relationship between tasks and
wages found in this paper, where 20 OECD and non-OECD countries are used, to that
found by Autor and Handel (2013), who uses a similar framework but with only US
data. Autor and Handel (2013) find that within occupations, a one standard deviation
increase in abstract tasks is related to a 7 log point wage premium, whereas we find
that the same increase in abstract tasks (non-routine cognitive and non-routine per-
sonal) predicts a 1 to 3 log point wage premium. Hence, on average, in the countries
considered in this study, the rewards to abstract tasks are much lower than those found
by Autor and Handel (2013) for the US economy.
To check the validity of our results, we also consider separate regressions for PIAAC
and O*NET occupation-level tasks. In Table 4.9, we find positive and similar returns to
non-cognitive routine tasks and modest to insignificant returns to non-routine personal
tasks. First, the PIAAC estimate in Column 1 has (slightly) more predictive power to ex-
plain wage differences than the O*NET estimates in Column 2. With respect to routine
cognitive tasks, only PIAAC occupation-level data remains significant in explaining the
negative wage returns to routine cognitive tasks, whereas O*NET data does not display
significant results. When including tasks at the individual level (PIAAC) together with
occupation-level data (using PIAAC or O*NET) in Columns 3 and 4, the magnitude of
returns at the occupation-level tasks remains constant, except for non-routine personal
tasks, which changes to a negative (although small) effect in the case of PIAAC data at
the occupation level. The individual measure estimates are complemented by statisti-
cally significant estimates for both measures of occupation-level tasks. Finally, includ-
ing both measures at the same time (Column 5) together with individual task measures
shows complementarity for non-routine cognitive tasks using O*NET and PIAAC at
the occupation level, but a negligible effect in the rest of O*NET task measures.
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TABLE 4.8: Log-Wage Returns to Tasks, Demographics and Occupation Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male 0.186*** 0.168*** 0.156*** 0.147*** 0.121***
(0.00616) (0.00627) (0.00651) (0.00846) (0.00824)
Upper Secondary -0.0838*** -0.0650*** -0.0301*** -0.0204** -0.0231***
(0.00877) (0.00875) (0.00889) (0.00921) (0.00884)
Post-secondary or Tertiary Professional 0.0973*** 0.0839*** 0.0708*** 0.0552*** 0.0408***
(0.00955) (0.00951) (0.00946) (0.00997) (0.00919)
Tertiary (Bachelor/Master) 0.286*** 0.249*** 0.217*** 0.181*** 0.139***
(0.0083) (0.00841) (0.00861) (0.0119) (0.0107)
25-34 0.117*** 0.112*** 0.114*** 0.107*** 0.0992***
(0.012) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0134) (0.0124)
35-44 0.240*** 0.232*** 0.235*** 0.225*** 0.210***
(0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0154) (0.0145)
45-54 0.279*** 0.270*** 0.277*** 0.264*** 0.245***
(0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0183) (0.0174)
55 plus 0.298*** 0.293*** 0.310*** 0.292*** 0.274***
(0.0139) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0226) (0.0206)
On the Job Training 0.0725*** 0.0500*** 0.0463*** 0.0427*** 0.0401***
(0.00644) (0.00645) (0.00641) (0.00666) (0.00649)
Private sector -0.0244*** -0.00896 -0.0104 0.0101 0.00612
(0.00727) (0.00728) (0.0072) (0.0106) (0.00995)
Firm size -0.129*** -0.119*** -0.115*** -0.110*** -0.107***
(0.00865) (0.00862) (0.00858) (0.0104) (0.00983)
Firm size -0.0332*** -0.0339*** -0.0334*** -0.0328*** -0.0314***
(0.00797) (0.00788) (0.00784) (0.0073) (0.00747)
Firm Size 0.0598*** 0.0650*** 0.0628*** 0.0631*** 0.0584***
(0.00995) (0.00984) (0.0097) (0.00866) (0.00886)
Firm size 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.115***
(0.0134) (0.0132) (0.013) (0.0132) (0.0127)
Computer Use Index 0.115*** 0.0821*** 0.0716*** 0.0593*** 0.0461***
(0.00355) (0.00378) (0.00382) (0.00564) (0.00528)
Literacy Skills -0.000169 -0.000152 -0.000174
(0.00019) (0.000169) (0.000167)
Numeracy Skills 0.00154*** 0.00137*** 0.00124***
(0.000179) (0.000155) (0.000153)
Non-routine cognitive (PIAAC Worker) 0.0311*** 0.0258*** 0.00216 0.0126***
(0.00393) (0.00392) (0.00407) (0.00386)
Non-routine personal (PIAAC Worker) 0.0202*** 0.0177*** 0.0202*** 0.0220***
(0.00403) (0.004) (0.00421) (0.00491)
Routine cognitive (PIAAC Worker) -0.0443*** -0.0450*** -0.0174*** -0.0228***
(0.00429) (0.00424) (0.00488) (0.00467)
Routine manual (PIAAC Worker) -0.0225*** -0.0194*** -0.0152*** -0.0159***
(0.00326) (0.00324) (0.00379) (0.00373)
Non-routine cognitive (PIAAC Occ.) 0.0812***
(0.0118)
Non-routine personal (PIAAC Occ.) -0.0285*
(0.015)
Routine cognitive (PIAAC Occ.) -0.0889***
(0.0156)
Routine manual (PIAAC Occ.) -0.00305
(0.0142)
Worker Ability measures No No Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Dummies No No No No Yes
Constant 2.397*** 2.411*** 2.042*** 2.099*** 2.264***
(0.019) (0.0189) (0.0308) (0.0423) (0.0423)
Observations 46,544 46,530 46,530 46,530 46,530
R-squared 0.523 0.531 0.536 0.543 0.566
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent
level, respectively. Data reflects log hourly earnings, including bonuses for wage and salary earners, in
PPP corrected USD. We exclude earnings below USD1 and above USD150. All regressions with occupation-
level variables cluster standard errors at the occupation level.
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TABLE 4.9: Log-wage Returns to Tasks within and between Occupations comparing
O*NET and PIAAC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NRC (PIAAC Worker) 0.00216 0.0166*** 0.00302 0.00279
(0.00407) (0.00517) (0.00404) (0.004)
NRP (PIAAC Worker) 0.0202*** 0.0162*** 0.0203*** 0.0199***
(0.00421) (0.00504) (0.00422) (0.00419)
RC (PIAAC Worker) -0.0174*** -0.0366*** -0.0177*** -0.0159***
(0.00488) (0.00594) (0.00488) (0.00494)
RM (PIAAC Worker) -0.0152*** -0.0176*** -0.0158*** -0.0114***
(0.00379) (0.00413) (0.00381) (0.00392)
NRC (PIAAC Occ.) 0.0766*** 0.0812*** 0.0552*** 0.0845***
(0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0156) (0.0121)
NRP (PIAAC Occ.) -0.00867 -0.0285* -0.0235 -0.0247*
(0.0143) (0.015) (0.0162) (0.0149)
RC (PIAAC Occ.) -0.104*** -0.0889*** -0.0741*** -0.0799***
(0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0168) (0.016)
RM (PIAAC Occ.) -0.0163 -0.00305 -0.00505 0.00394
(0.0136) (0.0142) (0.0129) (0.0141)
NRC (O*NET Occ.) 0.0775*** 0.0757*** 0.0551***
(0.00896) (0.00873) (0.00982)
NRP (O*NET Occ.) 0.00347 -0.00765 -0.0098
(0.00978) (0.00985) (0.00983)
RC (O*NET Occ.) -0.0162 -0.012 -0.00928
(0.0107) (0.0101) (0.00889)
RM (O*NET Occ.) 0.0105 0.0147 0.0206**
(0.00996) (0.00947) (0.00849)
PIAAC NRC (worker)*PIAAC NRC (occ.) -0.0126*
(0.00674)
PIAAC NRP (worker)*PIAAC NRP (occ.) 0.00198
(0.00804)
PIAAC RC (worker)*PIAAC RC (occ.) 0.0132**
(0.00605)
PIAAC RM (worker)*PIAAC RM (occ.) 0.0191***
(0.00576)
Individual, Job and Ability measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.091*** 2.070*** 2.099*** 2.098*** 2.125*** 2.093***
(0.0424) (0.0446) (0.0423) (0.0429) (0.0422) (0.0431)
Observations 46,544 46,544 46,530 46,530 46,530 46,530
R-squared 0.541 0.538 0.543 0.542 0.545 0.543
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10-, 5- and 1-percent level, respec-
tively. Data reflects log hourly earnings, including bonuses for wage and salary earners, in PPP corrected USD. We
exclude earnings below USD1 and above USD150. All regressions with occupation-level variables cluster standard
errors at the occupation level. NRC refers to non-routine cognitive, NRP refers to non-routine personal, RC refers to
routine cognitive and RM refers to routine manual tasks.
Overall, it can be said that returns to tasks are partially captured by worker occupa-
tions, but there is still substantial heterogeneity of tasks within occupations. Hence, we
need to consider not only definition of job contents at occupational level, but also at
individual level to capture average returns to tasks appropriately. Additionally, com-
pared to the PIAAC occupation-level measures, the O*NET measures at the occupation
130
level are, if anything, less relevant and less precise, as the standard errors of O*NET
measures are substantially higher than their PIAAC counterpart. These results are
highly consistent with those found by Autor and Handel (2013).
4.4.3 Accounting for Sorting of Workers into Occupations
Within the task approach, workers decide their job contents based on their compar-
ative advantage. Consequently, an OLS approach of Job Tasks on Wages would not
drive consistent estimates of the job task rewards. Instead, we consider, as in a Roy
(1951) model, that workers are utility (wage) maximizers and hence select into those
jobs/occupations where they attain the highest wage given their skills. Each job re-
quires a different combination of different tasks to be performed simultaneously.
Accounting empirically for the self-selection of workers into different jobs to esti-
mate adequately job tasks rewards is not straightforward. One possibility is to find
adequate instruments to circumvent the endogeneity of tasks due to the self-selection
of workers into jobs, but unfortunately we do not have such instruments. Instead, we
hypothesize, as the task approach does, that workers self-select into those occupations
with higher returns to those tasks which they perform relatively better i.e., have com-
parative advantage. From the empirical point of view, this implies that occupational
level task returns must show a positive covariance with individual level task returns.
Hence, and following Autor and Handel (2013), we consider an augmented version of
a classical mincerian regression, where in addition to the individual and occupation
endowment of tasks, presented above, we include an interaction term between indi-
vidual and occupation task returns. Moreover, Autor and Handel (2013) shows that if
all interaction terms are positive, this means that workers that are highly efficient in
conducting specific tasks self-select into occupations which reward those tasks, result-
ing in a comparative, rather than absolute advantage. Instead, the absolute advantage
hypothesis is less restrictive and requires that only one of the interaction coefficients is
positive9.
Results are displayed in Column 6 of Table 4.9 and reveal that the interaction be-
tween routine (cognitive and manual) individual and occupation based measures are
9The test presented by Autor and Handel (2013) does not provide dispositive evidence, but represents
rather an exploratory approximation to the issue.
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significantly positive, whereas such correlation is not found (at 5% level) for the non-
routine (cognitive and personal) interaction between individual and occupation mea-
sures. As Autor and Handel (2013) discuss, these results are consistent with absolute
advantage. Additionally, when we include such interactions, individual measures of
job tasks, with the exception of non-routine cognitive, still show significant predic-
tive power to explain wage differences, even within occupations. In particular, a one
standard deviation increase in non-routine personal tasks predicts a 2 log point wage
premium, whereas the same magnitude of increase in routine cognitive or in routine
manual tasks predicts a 2 log point wage penalty.
This can be mostly extrapolated to the same argument within countries. We look at
the sign and magnitude of results by countries in Table 4.12 in Section 4.6. The results
are not exactly homogeneous within countries, with variation in terms of the sign of
the interaction terms and the significance. It is true, at the same time, that at least two
interaction terms are positive for all countries, and three out of four task interaction
terms are positive for five of them (Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, and Greece),
with joint significance for France and Great Britain.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate for the first time cross-country differences in the intensity
of job tasks presented in the Autor et al. (2003) model. We therefore use for the first
time the background questionnaire items from the the Programme for International
Assessment of Adult Competences (PIACC) database, implemented in more than 30
countries between 2011 and 2014. The dataset provides very precise information on job
contents at the worker level, which allows for job task heterogeneity within occupations
when accounting for differences on job contents, a unique feature only available in
very few national surveys in the past. Additionally, the data includes novel data of
an accurate measurement of cognitive skills in literacy, numeracy and problem solving
skills, so that unobserved worker characteristics can be accounted for.
This allows us to have a clear picture of job tasks at the individual level and com-
pare it across individual and job characteristics, including key variables of the ALM
model such as computer use at work. The Nordic, Anglo-Saxon and East Asian ad-
vanced countries (Great Britain, Denmark, New Zealand, Japan and Korea) form the
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group of countries where jobs exhibit a higher intensity of non-routine task content of
jobs (both cognitive and personal dimensions). At the other end, there is the group of
Eastern European countries, such as Lithuania, Turkey Russia and the Czech Republic,
which display low levels of non-routine cognitive tasks, whereas high levels of routine
cognitive tasks.
Our measures derived from PIAAC data for 20 countries are consistent and display
large correlation with O*NET, the other main measure used at the occupational level
in the literature. In particular, relative to O*NET, the PIAAC measures shows larger
consistency for the measures of non-routine tasks and for Western European countries,
such as Belgium, Denmark France, Netherlands, and Great Britain, compared to East-
ern European countries. This validity approach confirms that the task measurement
followed is highly valuable for this current and future research, whenever new PIAAC
waves are implemented again. It may allow for dynamic analyses of the consequences
of technology adoption on job polarization or job de-routinization and the redistribu-
tive impact this may be having on the workforce population.
At the same time, when looking at the determinants of job tasks at work, we find
that the task measures are relevant to explain differences both between but also within
occupation task measures, but do not matter if we control for individual and job char-
acteristics. The importance and statistical significance of computer use at work is large
and relevant overall, hence revealing a high predictive power of computer use at work
to explain tasks determinants. We also find that task heterogeneity within occupation
is relevant across and within countries, even after controlling for individual and job
characteristics. Moreover, we find a positive and consistent relation of computer use at
work and non-routine tasks, but a negative relation with routine tasks, consistent with
the Autor et al. (2003)) framework. Although this assessment has a static point of view,
we observe that the relation between computer use at work and task content of jobs
is relevant both across and within countries. Finally, similar to what Autor and Han-
del (2013)) describe, we observe clear signs of self-selection of workers based on their
comparative advantage to be rewarded in tasks which they more effectively perform.
Finally, results on how tasks affect earnings show clear signs of worker self-selection
into jobs according to their ability to perform tasks at job. Moreover, it yet again shows
the consistency (and even complementarity) of PIAAC task measures when comparing
additional task measures such as O*NET regarding the wage returns to task measures.
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The returns to task measures at the occupational level are also substantial, but worker-
level information is still key. This indicates that heterogeneity of job tasks within and
between occupations is important and hence measuring it at the occupational level only
would be greatly misleading. These two findings (the comparison with O*NET and the
importance of within-occupation worker level data) are highly consistent to what is
found by Autor and Handel (2013) for the United States. It is to be noted that our
paper goes beyond a single country approach, as it allows us to extend such results
to a large set of diverse countries, hence providing external validity to the Autor and
Handel (2013) approach. Finally, and as a robustness check, we show that our approach
is consistent with a Roy model of self-selection.
From a policy perspective, this study is important to level the playing field of a fun-
damental policy discussion such as the impact of technological change and automation
of the job content of workers. This will be at the core of social sciences in the coming
decades. Our paper provides a consistent and promising avenue of future research on
the consequences of technological change on the labor markets from an international
perspective, whenever second or third waves of PIAAC (or national longitudinal stud-
ies) are implemented worldwide. Moreover, it confirms the importance of collecting
worker level information of job activities and habits (already discussed in previous
studies for the US and Germany), and hence the need to move away from occupation-
level studies.
4.6 Appendix
TABLE 4.10: Results of principal component analysis and cross-tasks correlations.
Computation Correlations
Number Variation of Non routine Non routine Routine Routine
of components first component Cognitive Personal Cognitive Manual
Non-routine cognitive 3 0.546 1 - - -
Non-routine personal 2 0.712 0.466 1 - -
Routine cognitive 4 0.449 -0.487 -0.597 1 -
Routine manual 1 - -0.029 0.0005 -0.014 1
Notes: The sample includes employed respondents aged 20-64 currently working for which variables in section 4.3
are well defined and have non missing values. Observations are weighted so that countries are weighted equally.
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TABLE 4.11: Distribution of Task Measures by Countries.
Obs. NRC NRP RC RM
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Belgium 1,883 -0.006 1.002 0.094 1.005 0.032 0.926 0.022 1.012
Chile 1,055 0.166 1.013 0.24 0.995 -0.372 1.011 0.442 0.865
Cyprus 1,267 -0.201 1.046 0.141 1.035 0.01 1.026 0.445 0.886
Czech Rep. 1,639 0.097 1.052 0.216 1.045 0.386 0.852 0.255 0.952
Denmark 3,175 -0.095 0.933 0.28 0.888 -0.204 0.897 0.354 0.896
Spain 1,370 0.129 1.097 -0.074 1.062 -0.214 1.024 -0.127 1.019
France 2,390 -0.09 1.024 0.036 1.011 0.037 1.014 -0.196 0.996
Great Britain 2,193 0.2 1.013 0.478 0.978 -0.122 0.935 0.533 0.81
Greece 676 -0.252 1.049 0.02 0.945 0.036 1.024 0.444 0.888
Italy 982 -0.079 1.049 -0.048 1.028 0.061 0.92 0.133 1.033
Great Britain 2,243 0.017 0.963 -0.337 0.878 -0.012 0.98 -0.28 0.973
Ireland 1,939 0.112 1.026 0.074 0.94 0.159 1.008 0.119 0.986
Italy 1,337 -0.328 0.917 -0.152 1.014 0.197 0.927 0.664 0.712
Japan 2,306 -0.073 1.017 0.158 0.952 0.114 0.942 0.052 1.022
Korea 1,953 0.288 0.97 0.532 0.927 -0.366 0.921 0.748 0.595
Netherlands 2,043 -0.041 0.914 0.216 1.027 -0.047 0.996 0.347 0.913
Norway 670 0.021 0.91 0.208 1.023 0.095 1.029 -0.205 0.963
Poland 1,263 0.021 1.045 -0.139 1.088 -0.099 1.097 0.445 0.881
Russia 1,467 -0.044 1.02 0.082 1.051 -0.038 1.079 0.641 0.74
Slovakia 691 -0.526 0.936 -0.081 0.963 -0.039 1.136 0.319 0.897
Notes: Results display values of standardized indexes for each task, with mean 0 and stan-
dard deviation 1. Observations are weighted so that countries are weighted equally. NRC
refers to non-routine cognitive, NRP refers to non-routine personal, RC refers to routine cog-
nitive and RM refers to routine manual tasks.
TABLE 4.12: Interaction terms and joint significance test results.
NRC NRP RC RM F (joint) p-value
Belgium -0.024 -0.002 0.011 0.036 2.873 0.023
Chile 0.053 0.007 -0.065 0.003 1.568 0.183
Cyprus -0.049 -0.003 0.064 0.03 5.226 0
Czech Rep. -0.013 0.027 -0.015 0.025 0.816 0.516
Denmark 0.015 0.01 0.005 0.023 1.301 0.27
Spain -0.001 0.027 0.004 0.024 1.381 0.241
France -0.001 0.022 0.02 0.072 12.903 0
Great Britain 0.001 0.051 0.011 -0.028 2.143 0.078
Greece -0.029 0.012 0.036 0.042 0.95 0.436
Italy -0.036 0.075 0.023 -0.005 4.691 0.001
Japan -0.034 -0.005 0.065 0.008 1.51 0.199
Korea -0.023 0.006 -0.018 0.042 0.834 0.504
Lithuania -0.035 -0.054 0.045 0.005 1.775 0.134
Netherlands -0.002 0.013 -0.002 0.025 2.283 0.06
New Zealand -0.015 0.029 -0.004 0.084 2.889 0.023
Poland -0.011 0.06 -0.054 0.039 5.473 0
Russia -0.22 -0.026 0.067 0.087 4.217 0.003
Slovakia -0.01 0.037 -0.031 0.047 1.916 0.108
Solvenia -0.006 0.045 -0.008 0.012 3.075 0.017
Notes: Data reflects interaction terms of tasks at the worker and occu-
pational level for country regressions of log hourly earnings, including
bonuses for wage and salary earners, in PPP corrected USD. We ex-
clude earnings below USD1 and above USD150. All regressions with
occupation-level variables cluster standard errors at the occupation level.
We include individual and job controls. NRC refers to non-routine cog-
nitive, NRP refers to non-routine personal, RC refers to routine cognitive
and RM refers to routine manual tasks.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This chapter presents the main findings of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, and
discusses the contributions in the context of the previous research and briefly comments
on the policy implications.
5.1 Chapter 2
Motivated by the sharp decline in the Programme for International Student Assessment
(PISA) test scores in 2015 in the Basque Country region in Spain, I study the reasons be-
hind the abrupt changes across socio-demographic factors, school factors, and idiosyn-
cratic factors of the Basque education system. I use decomposition methods between
PISA 2015 results and previous rounds in 2012, 2009, 2006 and 2003, to understand the
changes in performance of students in the Basque Country.
The analysis in Chapter2 allows only part of this decline to be clarified with observ-
able factors, where the explained part share varies depending on the reference year and
the subject I compare. There are three major factors which are responsible for this ex-
plained decline. First of all, the increase in repetition rates in 2015 (both among 1-year
repeaters and 2-year repeaters) causes a decrease in performance, and it is no surprise
given that repetition is known to be related to ineffective learning progress (Hattie,
2008). Second, the testing language matters for performance: the Basque Country is
a bilingual region with Spanish being the language of use at home for the majority of
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students, but Basque is the primary language of instruction at the majority of schools.
Relative to 2012, in 2015 a larger proportion of students took the test in a language dif-
ferent to the language at home. In particular, the change in 2015 had to do with more
students speaking Spanish at home that are enrolled in the Basque immersion model
(Model D) at school and who now take the test in Basque: this leads to the students
being slightly penalized in terms of test performance. Finally, a third factor is related to
the school principal perception of student behavior at school: between 2009 and 2015
this perception has deteriorated, an issue which is related to part of the observed de-
cline. What is more important, the economic crisis has not played a key role in the
decline, as one would expect given the deterioration of economic and social conditions
in certain households.
The paper contributes with key evidence on a major policy question for the Basque
education system, following the literature on decomposition methods that using re-
sults from international assessments to compare learning differences across and within
countries. The multiplicity of factors behind the results and the fact that a large share of
the decline remains unexplained requires the findings to be taken with caution. More
importantly, PISA remains as a low-stakes test where student effort varies considerably
and is not necessarily related to factors of the education system, but rather to cultural
reasons (Zamarro et al. (2016)).
5.2 Chapter 3
Chapter 3 addresses a key question in the literature of economics of education: whether
more choice generates differential family responses and hence leads to greater student
sorting. This paper uses novel and rich administrative data to address the impact of a
large school choice reform implemented in the Madrid region and its capital Madrid:
the reform generated single school choice zones for all medium and large-size munic-
ipalities, a measure which significantly increased the number of schools available to
households for students entering primary schools. By looking at new entrants to the
system aged 3, we find that the reform increased the level of geographic mobility of stu-
dents, with a large response by higher educated families and families of non-immigrant
children, whereas families with immigrant children did not respond to the reform at all.
We then look at whether the reform had an indirect effect on the school composition of
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students, and find that the reform mildly increased the average level of social diversity,
but with heterogeneous results by school performance: while schools in the bottom
of the average performance distribution experienced a decrease (increase) in diversity
(segregation), schools in the 3rd, 4th and 5th quintile of the distribution showed a de-
creased in the level of sorting. What is more important, results present solid evidence
of a large increase of immigrant segregation with the implementation of this policy,
which was exacerbated by residential dynamics of immigrant population. We conduct
several robustness checks to strengthen our identification, including a control group of
municipalities in the region which implemented the reform with no time to anticipate
the policy changes.
In terms of the interpretation and mechanisms behind the reform effects, it is also no-
ticeable that most of the changes are driven by the interest of households in attending
semi-public schools (semi-publicly funded but privately managed) and schools with
low and high scores. The puzzling results in terms of school segregation (small de-
crease of social segregation while a large increase in immigrant segregation) will re-
quire further research, although the data on parental education may be implying an
under-estimation of the true effects of the reform on social segregation. The results are
important because they contribute to closing the gap in terms of validity of previous re-
search given the usual lack of identification of large-scale reforms described by Epple,
Romano, and Urquiola (2017) in a recent literature review.
With respect to the policy implications, one cannot ignore the context of the reform.
At the time of the reform, the region of Madrid reported very high levels of social seg-
regation in secondary schools in comparison with other Spanish and European regions.
Our paper looks at primary education students, but in any case, the small changes in
social segregation may be explained by the fact that the original level of social seg-
regation was potentially near to a maximum. In contrast, the effects with regard to
immigrant segregation are better understood when put in its policy context: the region
of Madrid shows relatively low levels of immigrant segregation (in secondary schools),
and hence the increase observed in the data becomes a more natural response. In any
case, a broader policy discussion is required to better understand the transition from
primary to secondary schooling and the impact this has on the student composition
of schools. For the future policy agenda, the results acknowledge the existence of a
trade-off between equity and choice.
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5.3 Chapter 4
Chapter 4 studies the cross-country differences in the intensity of job tasks at the worker
level following the seminal work of Autor et al. (2003). This is an important aspect
for the literature studying the recent changes in the tasks workers perform at work
and its relation with strong forces such as technology, globalization or aging. We use
the OECD’s PIAAC database in more than 30 countries, which brings in two new fea-
tures. First, the worker survey enables job tasks to be measured at the worker level (a
unique feature only available in two national surveys in the past), which allows within-
occupation differences of job tasks to be understood. Second, the survey is accompa-
nied by a cognitive skill assessment, which introduces a very precise ability measure of
workers in order to control for unobserved characteristics.
We are able to depict a very clear picture of job tasks at the individual level across
countries. Consistent with previous evidence from occupational data, countries in
Northern Europe, countries with Anglo-Saxon influence (such as Great Britain or New
Zealand) and East Asian countries (such as Japan and Korea) display the largest inten-
sity in non-routine job content. At the other end, there is a group of Eastern European
countries, such as Lithuania, Turkey Russia and the Czech Republic, which display low
levels of non-routine cognitive tasks, whereas high levels of routine cognitive tasks.
What is more important, our measures are consistent and display a high degree
of correlation with O*NET at the occupational level. This is fundamental, given that
O*NET data for occupations is the most commonly used measure in the literature of job
tasks and the discussion on the future of work. In particular, with respect to O*NET, our
PIAAC task constructs display larger consistency for the measurement of non-routine
tasks for Western European countries, such as Belgium, Denmark France, Netherlands,
and Great Britain, compared to Eastern European countries. On the other hand, we
find that the task measures are indeed relevant in explaining variation within occupa-
tions (controlling for several individual and job characteristics), which improves the
relevance of the findings as opposed to O*NET occupation data.
Another two findings are important and introduce key contributions. First, we find
computer use to be highly important and statistically significant to understand task dif-
ferences at work, hence revealing the highly predictive power of computer use at work
to explain task content of jobs: we find a positive and consistent relation of computer
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use at work and non-routine tasks, whereas a negative relation with routine tasks, con-
sistent with the Autor et al. (2003)) framework. With respect to task and earnings, our
results display that workers self-select into jobs according to their ability to perform
tasks at work. Once again, the results on the wage returns to tasks add consistency to
our PIAAC task measures.
Our approach confirms that the task measurement followed is highly valuable for
this current and future research, whenever new PIAAC waves are implemented again,
as it will allow worker-level dynamics to be tracked in terms of job polarization or
other hypothesis with a more robust approach. From a policy perspective, this study
is important to level the playing field of a fundamental policy discussion such as the
impact of technological change and automation of the job content of workers. This will
be at the core of social sciences in the coming years.
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